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1 INTRODUCTION 
“Incentives are the essence of economics” (Lazear 1987: 744) and can, to a large extent, 
explain individual behavior. Among others, (intrinsic as well as extrinsic) incentives in-
duce individuals to invest in education, competencies and social skills, as specified by neo-
classical human capital theory (see e.g. Mincer 1958, 1970, 1974; Schultz 1961; Becker 
1962, 2009). Peak performances and major achievements among artists, actors, musicians, 
athletes (and other individuals in the focus of public attention) are by and large evoked by 
incentives. Thereby, incentives do not necessarily have to be of pecuniary nature. As a 
hypothetical example, despite the expected profits, medical scientists might have social 
and/or moral incentives to withhold the development of a new anti-cancer medication 
whose anticipated side-effects are likely to outweigh the benefits. On the other hand, in-
centives can also have adverse effects. If, say, the expected payoff from criminal activity is 
substantially larger than the expected income from legal work, utility-maximizing individ-
uals have an incentive to engage in illegal activities, as argued by Becker (1968). From a 
purely rent-seeking perspective, it might – under certain conditions – be economically ra-
tional for individuals to join a terrorist organization (see e.g. Krueger and Maleckova 2003; 
Berrebi 2007), to deliberately lose fights in Japanese sumo tournaments (see e.g. Duggan 
and Levitt 2002; Dietl et al. 2010) or to use illicit performance-enhancing drugs in a sport-
ing contest (see e.g. Bird and Wagner 1997; Berentsen 2002; Dilger et al. 2007; Kräkel 
2007), to name but a few examples.  
In the context of institutions, incentives serve as a means to align the interests of both par-
ties in principal-agent relationships. In particular, firm owners face the challenge of moti-
vating workers to forgo leisure time and instead increase individual effort, or more accu-
rately, labor. Thus, the provision of incentives is a key element in order to overcome – or at 
least reduce – agency problems in firms arising from information asymmetries. Building 
on Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) seminal work, the hypotheses derived from agency theo-
ry have been (and continue to be) extensively researched by, inter alia, Hölmstrom (1979, 
1982), Fama (1980), Milgrom and Roberts (1988) and Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 
1994). For a thorough review of the earlier literature one can refer to Prendergast (1999).  
Although commonly intended to motivate agents to increase effort, monetary incentives 
can also trigger the opposite effect. Depending on the institutional setting, (inappropriately 
designed) extrinsic incentives might crowd out intrinsic motivations and thus lead to nega-
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tive externalities on behalf of the principal (see e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Gneezy 
et al. 2011). This so-called “crowding-out effect” is predominantly observed in environ-
ments which do typically not involve pecuniary incentives, such as the voluntary sector 
(e.g. Frey and Goette 1999; Osterloh and Frey 2002), nonprofit, charitable organizations 
(e.g. Andreoni and Payne 2011) or other altruistically motivated actions such as blood do-
nations (e.g. Mellström and Johannesson 2008). 
Incentive contracts in employer-employee relationships can take various forms. Standard 
economic theory posits that workers should be paid a piece rate according to their marginal 
productivity.1 Contrary to this, Lazear and Rosen (1981) were among the first to propose 
compensation schemes which pay according to an individual’s rank in an organization ra-
ther than the absolute output level.2 Presupposing that workers are relatively homogeneous 
with respect to their abilities, such rank-order tournaments can be quite efficient in that 
they provide strong incentives for all individuals in a firm. However, tournaments can have 
adverse effects, too. If the difference between the winner’s prize (e.g. the promotion to a 
higher level in the firm’s hierarchy) and the second best alternative is too large, individuals 
might engage in sabotage activities and, thus, no longer act in the principal’s interest, as 
emphasized by Dilger et al. (2007). Hence, it is the role of the principal to design incentive 
and reward structures that are optimal in (i) inducing high effort levels among all contest-
ants and, at the same time, (ii) minimizing the likelihood of illegal activities. This, in turn, 
causes direct and indirect (or “hidden”) costs of control (Falk and Kosfeld 2006) that must 
be compensated by productivity gains.   
Apart from corporate tournaments, in which employees might compete for a pay raise, a 
promotion or the “employee-of-the-year-award”, rank-order tournaments can be found in 
all kinds of institutional environments: Students could vie for a limited number of scholar-
ships; turbine manufacturers could compete with one another for a major contract with one 
of the leading aircraft manufacturers; (more or less talented) singers in a television casting 
show might battle for a recording contract, while cities or even entire nations might com-
pete against each other in a bid to organize and host major sporting events such as the 
Olympic Games or the FIFA Football World Cup. In general, tournament theory offers a 
whole set of testable hypotheses and helps explaining (individual) behavior in competitive 
                                               
1 See Gibbons (1987) for a critical discussion of piece-rate compensation schemes. 
2 See Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) as well as Rosen (1986) for notable extensions to Lazear and Rosen’s 
(1981) initial theoretical framework. For a comprehensive review of the tournament theoretical literature over 
the past 30 years one can refer to Connelly et al. (2014). 
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environments. Given these merits, it is not surprising that empirical research using data 
from real-life tournaments is abundant, but yet far from exhaustive. 
A relatively new field of research that has recently gained momentum particularly among 
personnel economists and that frequently addresses (corporate) tournaments is “insider 
econometrics”. Combining rich and often highly sensitive firm-specific data with 
knowledge from industry experts, the insider econometric approach is a powerful tool 
when analyzing the impact of HRM practices on productivity (e.g. Bloom and Van Reenen 
2011). This might include the analysis of incentive effects of different pay regimes, institu-
tional changes or organizational differences (e.g. team work versus autonomous work) on 
employees in companies. Pioneering works in this field include, inter alia, Ichniowski et al. 
(1997) on productivity effects of innovative HRM practices in steel companies3 and Lazear 
(2000) analyzing the (positive) incentive effects of a switch from hourly wages to piece 
rates on the productivity of workers in a large US-based auto glass company. In a similar 
vein (and with similar results), Shearer (2004) examines the impact of hourly pay and 
piece rates on the performance of tree planters in British Columbia, while Bandiera et al. 
(2005, 2007, 2009) look at the productivity of workers on a UK fruit picking farm under 
different pay systems. Exploring peer effects among cashiers in a US supermarket chain, 
Mas and Moretti (2009) find strong support for positive productivity spillovers. Their re-
sults suggest that the mere presence of highly productive personnel in a particular shift 
reduces free-riding and thus increases the productivity of coworkers. This, however, only 
applies to workers who can see their productive peer, but not to workers who do not see 
him. While the majority of these studies addresses HRM issues, the insider econometric 
approach can be applied to other areas such as mergers and acquisitions or social networks, 
too (see Frick and Fabel 2013 for a brief literature review). For a comprehensive overview 
of insider econometric studies published over the past one and a half decades one can refer 
to Ichniowski and Shaw (2009). 
Although the insider econometric approach certainly offers many advantages, it also entails 
a few limitations: First, the access to private and highly sensitive corporate data is of 
course strictly limited (if not completely denied to “outsiders”). Second, the results of these 
studies often reflect idiosyncratic (i.e. firm- or industry-specific) characteristics that cannot 
                                               
3 The authors find that production lines using a cluster of innovative work practices (e.g. pay for perfor-
mance, team work, flexible job assignments and on-the-job training) are significantly more productive than 
lines using rather traditional work practices such as hourly pay, narrow job definitions and close supervision. 
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be generalized to other firms or industries per se. Third, counterfactual evidence about 
what would have happened if certain measures had not been adopted in a firm is typically 
non-existent. One way of circumventing some of these limitations is to turn to the (profes-
sional) sports industry. Many sports contests are designed as rank-order tournaments and 
thus provide a fruitful ground for empirical testing. Detailed performance and compensa-
tion data of production workers (e.g. players or even referees) are basically available in the 
form of by-products of today’s comprehensive media coverage of (live) sporting events. At 
the same time, it is possible to observe individuals throughout their entire careers and often 
in employment contracts with different employers.4 
Despite the already large and still growing sports economics literature, many fields still 
remain untapped and numerous questions remain unanswered. The vast majority of empiri-
cal works has focused on the North American Major Leagues for American Football 
(NFL), Basketball (NBA), Baseball (MLB) and Hockey (NHL), as well as on European 
football (soccer). Other, less popular sports have received less attention or have not been 
considered at all. Yet, it seems particularly worthwhile to examine individual behavior in 
competitive environments that are perhaps distinctly different from “common” athletic 
contests. Given, for example, the presumably less dramatic exit barriers for professional 
athletes who are active in a niche sport (i.e., with less money involved in the sport itself, 
the outside options should become relatively more lucrative), individuals might have sig-
nificantly shorter careers than professional athletes in other (major) sports. Women’s 
sports, typically receiving less attention from the media and, thus, providing lower incen-
tives for females to pursue a (professional) sports career, is an interesting and so far ne-
glected field of research.5 Moreover, while most of the existing literature has focused on 
the determinants and consequences of individual performance of the athletes themselves, 
little research has been done regarding the determinants and consequences of the monitors’ 
(i.e., referees’) performance. Exploiting some of the as yet untapped research potential, the 
present work is set out to empirically analyze individual behavior in competitive, tourna-
ment-like environments. 
                                               
4 See Alchian (1988), Kahn (2000), Rosen and Sanderson (2001) and Frick (2004) for further arguments in 
favor of sports data. 
5 This does of course not apply to all women’s sports. Women’s tennis, for example, receives similar atten-
tion as the men’s professional circuit while prize money levels and breakdowns have been equalized for all 
so-called Grand Slam tournaments. 
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This dissertation, which consists of five separate studies to be published in peer-reviewed 
academic journals in the field of personnel and sports economics, can basically be divided 
into two parts. The first two studies examine individual performance and career outcomes. 
In this part, an analysis of the determinants of individual career duration is provided while 
a particular focus is placed on how individual performance fosters or impedes career pro-
gress. The remaining three studies analyze gender differences in competitive environments. 
As will be discussed in more detail in the respective chapters, a large part of the literature 
suggests that women are, inter alia, less competitive and more risk averse than – equally 
endowed – men and that these differences can, to some extent, explain the observed gender 
wage gap as well as the underrepresentation of females in leading positions. Hence, the 
second part of this work aims to shed light on this topic by examining the (socio-) econom-
ic causes and consequences of gender differences. Aside from that, the development of the 
gender gap in competitiveness is examined over a longer time period. This, in turn, gives 
some indication of how institutional changes or changing socio-cultural conditions might 
lead to a reduction of the gender gap over time. While the first four studies use data from 
various sporting competitions where individuals are assumed to be rational and utility-
maximizing, the last study is based on data from a high-stakes TV quiz show where candi-
dates show signs of bounded rationality in their decision making. All datasets used in the 
analyses have been carefully compiled by the authors of the studies and represent unique 
and hitherto unavailable data bases for empirical testing. The econometric methodologies 
applied have been tailored to both the peculiarities of the respective datasets and the specif-
ic research questions and will be explained in more detail in the respective analyses.6 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents joint work with 
Bernd Frick where we investigate the impact of individual performance and of competitive 
pressure on the duration of ski jumpers’ careers. Our dataset includes all athletes who 
managed to win World Cup points in at least one competition in the seasons 1979/80‐
2010/11. It appears that individual careers are of a rather short duration (four years on av-
erage). Almost 50 percent of the athletes have left the circus again after two seasons and 
only about 10 percent manage to survive for ten years and more. First and not surprisingly, 
individual performance has the expected impact on career duration (the more World Cup 
points an athlete accumulates during a season, the less likely he is to terminate his career). 
                                               
6 In order to avoid redundancies across the separate studies, recurring econometric methods are only intro-
duced once. 
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Second, the degree of competition in the respective national associations also has a statisti-
cally significant impact on individual career duration: Poorly performing athletes have a 
rather high survival probability if they cannot be replaced (i.e., if the jumpers with whom 
they compete for the limited number of spots in their national team perform even worse). 
Third, we find that “superstars” – (former) World and Olympic Champions – have signifi-
cantly longer careers and that their nominations seem to be justified more by their past 
success than by their current performance. This, in turn, points at potential labor market 
inefficiencies that need to be investigated more closely. 
In another joint paper with Bernd Frick, chapter 3 focuses on the labor market of (hitherto 
semi-professional) football referees. Using performance evaluations on all 89 referees who 
officiated in the 3,968 matches played in the first three divisions of German professional 
football (soccer) in the seasons 2008/09-2011/12, this chapter seeks to identify the impact 
of individual performance on career progress (and career impediments) of German football 
referees. We contribute to the literature on favoritism in organizations by explicitly exam-
ining the consequences (rather than the causes) of biased assessments. Given the abundant 
information available, the labor market for football referees is a particularly suitable setting 
for such an analysis. Since until the start of the 2012/13 season referees were paid on a 
match basis only, it is reasonable to assume that (i) rational individuals try to maximize the 
number and importance (i.e., profitability) of matches they are assigned to, and that (ii) 
relatively better performing referees are nominated more frequently and have better career 
prospects than poorly performing referees. Moreover, it is conceivable that particularly 
poor performances entail immediate sanctions in the form of compulsory breaks or a tem-
porary demotion to a lower division. Perhaps surprisingly, we find no evidence for any 
short-term performance effects: Neither a referee’s waiting time nor the quality of his sub-
sequent nomination is determined by the performance in the previous match. Yet in the 
long term, referee performance has a statistically significant and positive impact on the 
probability of being promoted to a higher division, thus supporting tournament theoretical 
predictions. 
Turning to the research of gender differences in competitive environments, chapter 4 be-
gins with a long-term analysis of performance differences between highly self-selected 
male and female long-distance endurance athletes. Using repeated cross-sectional data 
from three prestigious long-distance races, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that although the performance gender gap between the most talented male and 
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female athletes seems to have stabilized (i.e., among the top athletes, men are consistently 
about 10% faster than women), the vast majority of women competing in culturally diverse 
environments has become more competitive over time, causing gender differences beyond 
the top positions to decline. This might, to some extent, reflect changing socio-cultural 
conditions that reduce discrimination of females in accessing leisure time and enable ambi-
tious women to train as intensively as equally talented men. As expected, gender differ-
ences between culturally homogeneous athletes from mostly gender-equal societies (i.e., 
Scandinavian countries) show significantly smaller changes over time. Perhaps surprising-
ly, here the performance gender gap seems to have slightly widened across years. A possi-
ble explanation is that saturation and substitution effects matter in the sense that women 
today are less eager (than men) to engage in traditional (and rather male-dominated) sports 
and leisure activities, but instead prefer more “trendy” pastimes. This remains to be tested 
in future research. 
Chapter 5, co-authored with Bernd Frick and Wiebke Held, addresses a peculiarity of the 
professional team sport industry that has been emphasized by some of the founding fathers 
of sports economics research (e.g. Rottenberg 1956; Neale 1964; Sloane 1971): Unlike 
purely profit maximizing firms in a “traditional” market, firms (i.e., teams) in the sports 
industry to some extent depend on the performance of their competitors (while the survival 
of the latter is of pivotal importance for their own survival). Thus, in leagues with win 
maximizing or, more generally, utility maximizing teams, some degree of outcome uncer-
tainty is said to be needed in order to sustain fan interest in the form of stadium attendance 
and TV ratings. Drawing on repeated cross-sectional data covering a period of 21 years 
(seasons 1990/91 – 2010/11), chapter 5 analyzes the long-term development of competitive 
balance in selected European team sport leagues. While most research in this strand of the 
sports economics literature has focused on men’s professional team sports, the purpose of 
this study is to provide a comparative analysis of men’s and women’s leagues. Thereby, we 
aim to measure competitive balance levels of the following men’s and women’s leagues, 
respectively: English “Premier League” and “Football League” (i.e., first and second divi-
sion English football), German football “Bundesliga” as well as German “Handball Bun-
desliga”. We find statistically significant gender differences in all three football leagues. 
That is, men’s leagues appear to be more “balanced” than women’s leagues. This, in turn, 
is indicative of a more equal distribution of talent among men as compared to women. The 
results of the Handball Bundesliga are somewhat different. Here, the gender gap seems to 
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have diminished over time to the effect that overall (almost) no statistically significant dif-
ferences in competitive balance are found. 
As already mentioned, chapter 6 differs from the previous chapters in that the data used in 
the analysis are not gathered from athletic contests but from a TV quiz show. In this joint 
paper with Julia Nagelschneider, we analyze gender differences in high-stakes decision 
making under risk. Drawing on data from the UK TV quiz show “The Million Pound 
Drop” (as well as the German and Swiss equivalents, “Rette die Million” and “Die Mil-
lionenfalle”), we test, first, if male teams are less risk averse than female teams, and sec-
ond, if male candidates are overconfident particularly when playing with a female team 
partner. The results suggest that team composition has a significant influence on the teams’ 
risk behavior which, in turn, affects “survival” chances of teams. Men are found to be less 
risk averse, since they bet larger shares of their (remaining) budget on the answer option 
which they believe to be correct. Women, on the other hand, prefer to diversify their bets. 
Moreover, men are found to be overconfident when playing with a female partner. That is, 
in two-player mixed teams men act as sole decision-makers significantly more often than 
in men’s teams, even though this behavior is not associated with a higher expected payoff. 
These results are in line with the literature so far. Yet, whereas previous research and in 
particular laboratory experiments were often criticized for their lack of external validity, 
we are able to observe individual decision making in a real-life setting. Moreover, the ex-
ceptionally high stakes in this game show are assumed to reveal the candidates’ true pref-
erences. From an economic perspective, these findings have important implications for 
management and can, to some extent, explain the underrepresentation of women in top 
management positions. Finally, chapter 7 summarizes the main results and concludes with 
some general implications as well as a plea for future research. 
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2 FLY LIKE AN EAGLE: CAREER DURATION IN THE FIS SKI 
JUMPING WORLD CUP 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although still a “niche sport” in many parts of the world ski jumping is quite popular in 
Europe as well as Japan. Invented by Norwegian soldiers more than 200 years ago, ski 
jumping has been part of the Olympic program since the inaugural Olympic Winter Games 
in Chamonix in 1924. Apart from the competitions held during the Olympics and the offi-
cial World Championships (starting in 1924, too), the sport features a well-established and 
largely televised professional circuit, with the season’s peak event being the “4-hills-
tournament” taking place around the turn of the year. Since the 1979/80 season, all major 
events (i.e., the so-called World Cup events) offer prize money to a limited number of ath-
letes.7 Although prize money levels are considerably lower than in other (major) sports, 
professional ski jumpers usually earn far more than they could earn in their second best 
alternative. Since many of the athletes have started to train professionally at a rather early 
age, few – if any – of them have invested in education and training, implying that  the op-
portunity costs of quitting the career are quite high. Therefore, the majority of the athletes 
make an effort to stay in the sports business for as long as possible (including potential 
engagements as a manager or head coach after retiring from an athletic career). However, 
the permanent risk of injury on the one hand and intense competition from other athletes 
on the other hand make “survival” difficult. In particular the competition with athletes 
from the same country can represent a considerable threat for athletes from particularly 
strong “ski nations”: In every World Cup competition, each national federation is guaran-
teed a limited number of slots only (currently a maximum of 7 per nation). Nations with a 
“tradition” in ski jumping (e.g. Norway and Austria) usually dispose of a large pool of 
world-class athletes of whom only the top contenders can be selected.8 On the other hand, 
                                               
7 Prize money levels in FIS ski jumping are substantially lower than those of other (major) sports. The winner 
of a World Cup event receives 10,000 CHF, while 8,000 are awarded to the 2nd place, 6,000 to the 3rd, 5,000 
to the 4th, 4,500 to the 5th, 4,000 to the 6th, 3,600 to the 7th, […], 300 to the 28th, 200 to the 29th and 100 
CHF to the 30th. In the season 2010/11, Thomas Morgenstern topped the annual earnings list with 213,200 
CHF, followed by his Austrian teammate Andreas Kofler (150,300 CHF) and four-time Olympic gold-
medalist Simon Ammann from Switzerland (136,400 CHF). Endorsement contracts are usually not disclosed, 
but are said to be far more lucrative than prize money. 
8 Hence, similar to e.g. the US and Jamaican sprint trials or the domestic qualifying events for marathon 
runners in Ethiopia and Kenya, a nomination for the Austrian or Norwegian World Cup ski jumping team is 
presumably more difficult to achieve than a spot among the Top 30 in a given World Cup competition.   
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equally talented ski jumpers from rather “weak” nations (who are barely threatened by the 
performance of their compatriots) might be able to survive in the circus for quite a while. 
Given the detailed data available (which can be accessed via www.fisskijumping.com) and 
the idiosyncrasies with regard to the restrictive nomination criteria, professional ski jump-
ing is a particularly interesting setting to empirically test the (potential) determinants of the 
length of professional athletes’ careers. Notwithstanding these characteristics, the career 
length of professional ski jumpers has, to the best of our knowledge, not yet been empiri-
cally analyzed. We try to close this gap in the literature by analyzing the impact of individ-
ual performance and of competitive pressure on the duration of ski jumpers’ careers. For 
this purpose, we use data including all athletes who managed to win World Cup points in 
at least one competition in the seasons 1979/80‐2010/11 (n = 766 different competitions 
and 698 athletes with 2,646 athlete‐year‐observations). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a (selective) re-
view of the literature on the determinants of career lengths of professional athletes. In sec-
tion 2.3 we describe the data used, explain our methodology and display some descriptive 
results. The econometric evidence is presented in section 2.4 while some implications for 
further research are presented in the concluding section. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The statistical analysis of survival data was initiated by bio-medical scientists computing 
so-called “life tables” to illustrate the distribution of survival times of, e.g., cancer patients 
(see, inter alia, Berkson and Gage 1950; Cutler and Ederer 1958). In the following years, 
the initial “survival analysis” was extended to include more complex econometric methods 
while at the same time the scope of applications increased. In labor economics, for exam-
ple, duration data have been used to analyze the length of employment spells (see Flinn 
and Heckman 1982a) as well as the duration of unemployment (see Kiefer and Neumann 
1979; Lancaster 1979; Nickell 1979; Flinn and Heckman 1982b). For sports economists, 
survival analyses are a useful tool when examining the career length of professional ath-
letes. Given the high salaries of NFL, NBA or European soccer players, the individual op-
portunity costs of quitting are almost prohibitively high. Hence, from a microeconomic 
(i.e., athlete’s) perspective the analysis of the determinants of individual career length is of 
considerable economic relevance. 
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In a now seminal paper Atkinson and Tschirhart (1986) use information on 260 players 
from the National Football League (NFL) who were active between 1971 and 1980 (with 
an average career length of 4.5 years) to estimate a series of hazard models. They find that 
rookies experience an increasing hazard during their first years whereas those who survive 
the middle “shakeout” years benefit from a falling hazard rate for the remainder of their 
careers.9 As expected, both team and individual performance have a positive effect on a 
player’s career length. Quarterbacks survive longer than either wide receivers or running 
backs. Moreover, the authors find that in terms of career length racial discrimination was 
not an issue in football as black players without a college degree tend to survive longer 
than white players without a degree, while black players with a college degree have, on 
average, shorter careers than observationally similar white players.  
Spurr and Barber (1994) analyze the careers of 608 baseball pitchers who began their ca-
reers in the minor leagues during the years 1975-1977 of whom only 94 (15%) eventually 
signed a contract with a major league team between 1975 and 1988. Their results suggest 
that the more a player’s performance diverges from the mean in either direction, the less 
time is required to make a decision on a player’s transition (i.e. a promotion to a team play-
ing in a higher division or a demotion to a team in a lower league). Decisions on the fate of 
marginal players, on the other hand, take much longer. Moreover, they find that once a 
threshold amount of information about a player’s quality is available, the marginal gains 
from additional information decrease rapidly. Accordingly, a player’s probability of exiting 
his current state – be it by promotion, demotion or termination – increases with time.  
Ohkusa (2001) analyzes the effect of income and productivity on the length of player ca-
reers in Japanese professional baseball (n = 595 batters and 350 pitchers). As expected, a 
higher income is associated with a lower exit probability for both batters and pitchers. Per-
haps surprisingly, a higher productivity reduces the exit probability for batters, but signifi-
cantly increases the exit probability for pitchers. This rather unexpected result is attributed 
to a finding presented by Ohkusa in another paper (1999) documenting that the estimated 
learning curve of productivity is a decreasing function of experience for pitchers (i.e., 
pitchers perform best in their youth), whereas it is an increasing function for batters (whose 
productivity increases with experience).  
                                               
9 Professional athletic careers in general seem to be skewed towards early exit (see e.g. Witnauer et al. 2007). 
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Staw and Hoang (1995) examine the survival probabilities of NBA players picked in the 
first two rounds of the 1980-1986 drafts. Using a sample of 275 players who played at least 
one year in the NBA (of whom 184 were cut from the league within the period of observa-
tion until the season 1990/91)10 they find that scoring performance and “toughness” (meas-
ured by the number of rebounds and blocks) have a statistically significant and positive 
impact on career length, whereas draft number and the number of times a player has been 
traded have a significantly negative impact on career duration. Using the same sample of 
NBA drafts active between 1980 and 1991, Hoang and Rascher (1999) present robust evi-
dence for several forms of discrimination against black players. First, they find that black 
players earn significantly lower salaries than similarly endowed white players. Second, 
black players are found to have a 36% higher risk of being cut than white players, which 
translates into a significantly shorter expected career length of 5.5 seasons (as opposed to 
7.5 seasons for white players). Third, while the net present value of wage discrimination 
amounts to $329,000, the career earnings effect of exit discrimination is considerably larg-
er ($808,000) and is attributed by the authors to customer racial discrimination.11  
In an attempt to shed additional light on the much debated question of whether men and 
women differ in their competitive orientations Coate and Robbins (2001) study the career 
length of male and female tennis professionals. Their sample consists of 236 male and 216 
female tennis players who made it into the top 50 in the singles ranking at least once in 
their respective careers between 1979 and 1994. The results suggest that despite signifi-
cantly lower real earnings12 women pursue an active career for as many years as men and 
compete just as intensely (measured by the annual number of tournaments played).  
                                               
10 Drafted players survived, on average, six seasons. However, second round draft picks’ careers were 3.3 
years shorter than those of first round draft picks. 
11 Using two large unbalanced panels from the NBA and MLB in more recent years, Groothuis and Hill 
(2004, 2008 and 2013) fail to find evidence of salary or exit discrimination in either of the two leagues. Their 
results suggest that, in line with Becker’s (1971) theoretical work on discrimination, market competition 
(fostered by objective and easily accessible performance indicators) induced discrimination to disappear.   
12 We emphasize that a large part of the earnings gap can be explained by differences in prize money levels 
for male and female tennis players at that time. Meanwhile, a number of events – particularly the four “Grand 
Slams” – have implemented identical prize money levels and distributions for men and women. Nevertheless, 
the gender pay gap in professional tennis seems to persist. As of November 2012, the annual top 100 female 
earners had accumulated $83 million in total and hence 20% less than their male counterparts who totaled 
$104 million (www.tennisdigital.com, www.wtatennis.com and own calculations). We admit, however, that 
by looking at the top 100 male and female earners we ignore a potential bias: If female tennis professionals 
were more heterogeneous than men in terms of their ability, the lion’s share of the tour’s prize money would 
be taken by few women, whereas on the potentially more homogeneous men’s tour the “cake” would be 
divided among a larger number of players. Hence it appears worthwhile to look at the earnings gap between 
the top 20, top 100 and top 500 male and female tennis players in order to better understand their respective 
level of competitiveness.       
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Using a dataset that includes every single player who appeared in at least one match in the 
top-tier of German professional soccer (“Bundesliga”) in the seasons 1963/64 to 2002/03 
(n = 4,116), Frick et al. (2007, 2009) find that defenders, midfielders and forwards have 
significantly shorter careers than goalkeepers. Moreover, the number of games played and 
goals scored per season reduce the hazard significantly, whereas disciplinary sanctions 
(i.e., yellow and red cards per season) seem to have no impact on career length. As ex-
pected, a team’s demotion to the second division increases the hazard dramatically as only 
few players of relegated teams manage to sign with another first division club. Foreign 
players (especially those from Eastern and Western Europe as well as from South Ameri-
ca) have a significantly higher exit probability. This finding may, to some extent, be at-
tributed to discrimination in the sense that managers, “co-workers” or spectators prefer 
players of German origin. On the other hand, higher hazard rates do not necessarily imply 
discrimination. A large part of the effect is presumably driven by more lucrative outside 
options especially for South American and Western European players who leave the Bun-
desliga voluntarily to sign contracts with teams in England, France, Spain and Italy.13  
In a similar vein, Boyden and Carey (2010) examine the length of player careers in Major 
League Soccer (n = 1,100 players; 1,166 spells; 3,435 player-year-observations between 
the years 1996 and 2007) finding that MLS careers are rather short (2.4 years on average). 
Again, the data do not allow distinguishing between players who are forced to exit the 
league (i.e. did not receive a new contract) and those who are lured away by foreign clubs. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the latter effect dominates. Since especially the Top 5 
European soccer leagues pay far higher salaries than MLS (average annual salary in the 
German Bundesliga currently is 1.5 million €; see Frick 2011), it is no surprise that MLS 
has even greater difficulties than the German Bundesliga to retain foreign talent in the 
league.  
In this paper we apply parametric as well as semi-parametric duration analysis to a unique 
dataset covering a hitherto unexplored individual sport – ski-jumping – where the forces of 
competition are completely different from other sports labor markets. 
                                               
13 Players from Eastern Europe are less popular among supporters, as shown in Kalter (1999) who finds that 
replica shirts with the names of South American players are bestsellers, while those with the names of obser-
vationally similar (in terms of experience, goals, games played, etc.) Eastern European players do not sell 
well.   
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2.3 DATA, METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
In the following sections, we present the data, explain the methodology used in the anal-
yses and display some preliminary – and rather descriptive – results. Moreover, we discuss 
the peculiarities of the labor market for professional ski jumpers. 
2.3.1 DATA COLLECTION 
Our empirical analyses are based on an unbalanced panel from the FIS Ski Jumping World 
Cup covering all athletes who managed to win World Cup points in at least one competi-
tion during the seasons 1979/80-2010/11.14 The final dataset includes 698 individual ath-
letes competing in 766 different competitions, yielding 2,646 athlete-year-observations. 
Since the introduction of the World Cup in 1979/80, an average of 80 different athletes 
have managed to win World Cup points in approximately 24 World Cup events per season. 
It should be noted, however, that both the number of athletes finishing “in the points” as 
well as the number of World Cup events per season increased considerably following a 
modification of the points regime before the start of the 1993/94 season (the number of “in 
the points ranks” was increased from 15 to 30). Figure 2-1 below illustrates the substantial 
increase in the number of World Cup events starting in the 1993/94 season (the volatility in 
the number of events is due to weather conditions; sometimes scheduled events have to be 
cancelled on rather short notice). In the seasons 1979/80-1992/93, the FIS hosted on aver-
age between 22 and 23 ski jumping World Cup events per season. Due to the increasing 
popularity of the sport in recent years, the average number of World Cup events per season 
was increased to about 25 (min. 19, max. 30). This increase, along with the already men-
tioned modification of the points regime, constitute two important institutional changes 
that positively affected the number of athletes receiving World Cup points (and, not to for-
get, the number of athletes receiving financial rewards). 
                                               
14 The data were obtained from www.fisskijumping.com and http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skisprung-
Weltcup. 
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Figure 2-1: Number of World Cup events per season 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Number of athletes winning World Cup points 
 
 
It appears from Figure 2-2 above that the modification of the points regime before the start 
of the 1993/94 season had, as expected, an immediate and positive effect on the number of 
athletes receiving World Cup points. Moreover, the continuously increasing number of 
World Cup competitions in the following seasons led to a further increase in the pool of 
athletes achieving a top 30 performance in at least one event in a particular season. In the 
last decade, however, it seems that the number of athletes receiving World Cup points has 
leveled at about 80 – irrespective of the annual number of World Cup events – suggesting 
that a relatively large number of athletes remain unsuccessful. In other words: Despite the 
large number of approximately 25 World Cup competitions per season, many professional 
ski jumpers fail to finish “in the points” / “in the money” at least once in a given year. This 
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development, in turn, may be attributed to the changing nature of the qualification system 
that we will now describe in more detail. 
2.3.2 THE PECULIAR NATURE OF COMPETITION IN PROFESSIONAL SKI JUMP-
ING 
The average career length of all athletes in our sample is 4.0 seasons, with a minimum ca-
reer duration of 1 season (n = 228 athletes) and a maximum career duration of 20 seasons 
(n = 1  athlete; now 41 year-old Noriaki Kasai from Japan). Perhaps surprisingly, about 30 
percent of all careers lasting for two or more seasons consist of more than one spell, i.e. 
athletes disappear from the circus and return after one or more seasons. Clearly, few of 
these athletes in fact interrupt their careers – be it for personal reasons or due to serious 
injury (Norwegian Anders Jacobsen is a prominent recent example for an athlete who took 
a year off and returned to become even more successful than he used to be before his 
“temporary retirement”). Apart from these rare voluntary exits we interpret exits (and the 
subsequent re-entries) as products of the peculiar nature of competition in FIS ski jumping, 
where athletes constantly face a number of “competitive threats”: First, the tournament 
structure of a World Cup event exerts considerable competitive pressure particularly on the 
less talented athletes: Every competition is designed as a (knockout) tournament consisting 
of three rounds where apart from the top 10 in the World Cup ranking (they are guaranteed 
entry to the first (main) round) the remaining athletes have to qualify for entry into the 
competition to which 50 athletes are admitted (since 10 athletes are seeded, the rest com-
pete for 40 vacant sports). 
To identify the top 30 athletes who advance to the final round, two alternative formats are 
currently being used: a knockout-tournament where athletes compete pairwise with the 25 
winners plus the five best performing “lucky losers” advancing to the second round, and a 
rank-order tournament where the 30 best ski jumpers reach the second round.15 Hence only 
about 30 percent of the athletes competing in each World Cup event eventually vie for 
World Cup points and financial rewards (see footnote 7 above for the exact prize money 
level and distribution in a World Cup event). Second, apart from the competitive pressure 
to succeed in the tournament and to secure a spot among the top 30, weaker athletes face a 
high risk of being relegated to the less attractive second division, the “Continental Cup”, 
                                               
15 These qualification criteria were introduced in the season 1990/91. Prior to that season, all athletes compet-
ing in the first round (often more than 100) were admitted to the second round. The main reason for the new 
format was to make the sport more attractive for TV stations by reducing the duration of the competition. 
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which was introduced before the start of the 1993/94 season. Third, since each national 
federation is guaranteed a limited number of slots only (currently a maximum of 7 per na-
tion), athletes from strong federations (e.g. Austria and Norway) face a substantially higher 
risk of exit (or relegation) than athletes from weak federations (e.g. France and Italy). 
Thus, an athlete’s career length is not only affected by his individual performance, but also 
by the performance of his compatriots. Strong athletes from nations with a particular tradi-
tion in ski jumping are, therefore, threatened by relegation while even rather weak athletes 
from weak nations may be able to survive in the circus for quite a while.16 
2.3.3 PARAMETRIC AND SEMI-PARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF CAREER AND 
SPELL DURATION 
In an attempt to examine the impact of individual performance and of competitive pressure 
on the duration of professional ski jumpers’ careers we estimate two semi-parametric pro-
portional hazard models (see Cox 1972) as well as two log-normal regression models using 
career duration and spell duration respectively as the dependent variable. Descriptive sta-
tistics are displayed in Table 2-1. 
  
                                               
16 A prominent example is Michael Edwards, better known as „Eddie the Eagle“: As the first and, at that 
time, only active British ski jumper he qualified for the 1988 Winter Olympics in Calgary despite being 
handicapped by his weight (he was 9 kg heavier than the next heaviest competitor) and his extreme farsight-
edness which forced him to wear his (often fogged) glasses at all times. In both Olympic competitions that he 
participated in (the event from the normal and the large hill) he finished last. Irrespective of his permanent 
lack of sporting success he managed to capitalize on his increasing popularity and appeared in a number of 
well-paid advertising campaigns. In 1990, the International Olympic Committee reacted to the “Edwards 
phenomenon” by introducing stricter qualification norms for the Olympic ski jumping competitions. 
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Table 2-1: Descriptive statistics of the determinants of professional ski jumpers' careers 
Variable Operationalization # of Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
     
Career end Dummy: Equals 1 if athlete terminates his career, 0 otherwise 
2,646 0.23 - 0 1 
Spell end Dummy: Equals 1 if athlete terminates or interrupts his career, 0 otherwise  
2,646 0.33 - 0 1 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Performance (-related) Indicators 
     
World Cup points Number of individual World Cup points in seasonj 2,646 136.6 257.6 1 2,083 
N_Points Standardized number of individual World Cup points in seasonj 
2,646 0.00 1.47 -1.00 8.94 
N_Points2 Square value of n_points 2,646 2.15 6.31 0 79.98 
N_Points3 Cubic value of n_points 2,646 7.62 42.15 -0.99 715.25 
Olympic Champion Dummy: Equals 1 if athlete has won an Olympic gold medal in an individual event to date, 0 otherwise 2,646 0.04 - 0 1 
World Champion Dummy: Equals 1 if athlete has won a World Champi-onship title in an individual event to date, 0 otherwise 2,646 0.09 - 0 1 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
     
Athlete ID (career duration) Individual identification number by athlete 2,646 - - 1 698 
Athlete ID (spell duration) Individual identification number by (uninterrupted) spell 2,646 - - 1 965 
Time trend Linear time trend (1 corresponds to season 1979/80 etc.) 2,646 17.04 9.27 1 32 
Nation’s share of points Relative share of cumulated individual World Cup points of nationk in seasonj 
2,646 10,83 8.10 0 34.18 
Points regime Dummy indicating the period before (0) and after (1) the modification of the points regime 2,646 0.62 - 0 1 
No. of World Cup events Number of World Cup events in seasonj 2,646 24.00 2.92 17 29 
 
Before discussing our set of explanatory variables, we present descriptive evidence based 
on a nonparametric estimation of the survivor function which is commonly referred to as 
the product-limit or Kaplan-Meier (1958) method. The Kaplan-Meier estimates yield the 
percentage of all athletes who are still in the sample after analysis time t. In our case, about 
30 percent of all careers end after one season and only about half of the athletes manage to 
survive on the tour for more than two seasons. 65 athletes (about 10 percent) survive for 
ten or more seasons. When looking at the length of uninterrupted careers (i.e., spell dura-
tion) it appears that almost 50 percent of all spells last for only one season while only one 
third of all spells are longer than two seasons. Of the 65 athletes who manage to win World 
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Cup points in ten or more different seasons, 43 jumpers have uninterrupted spells of at 
least 10 seasons. 
Figure 2-3: Kaplan Meier survival estimates 
Career duration Spell duration 
  
 
Overall, average career length is 4.0 years (std dev = 3.3; n = 698 athletes) while average 
spell length is 3.3 years (std dev = 3.0; n = 965 spells). These figures are in line with the 
evidence presented in Frick et al. (2007, 2009) who report almost identical career and spell 
durations for soccer players in the German “Bundesliga” (4.0 years (std dev = 3.3); 3.4 
years (std dev = 2.9)). Interestingly, a large part of the career duration literature finds that 
the career lengths of professional athletes in individual as well as team sports range be-
tween three and seven years (see e.g. Atkinson and Tschirhart 1986; Staw and Hoang 
1995; Hoang and Rascher 1999; Ohkusa 2001; Groothuis and Hill 2004, 2008, 2013; Wit-
nauer et al. 2007; Boyden and Carey 2010; Gibbs et al. 2012). Thus, irrespective of the 
particular design of competition, of injury risks and of the (potential) financial rewards, 
individual careers appear to be relatively short across different sports. 
2.3.4 COVARIATES 
The goal of our empirical analysis is to identify the covariates that have a statistically sig-
nificant effect on the career length of professional ski jumpers. As a first measure of indi-
vidual performance we use the number of World Cup points accumulated by athletei in 
seasonj. To control for the observable variation in the number of World Cup competitions 
per season (see Figure 2-1 above) as well as for the already discussed changes in the points 
regime (see Figure 2-2 above) we calculate for each athlete the relative number of World 
Cup points as the deviation of athlete i’s points in season j from the average number of 
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points accumulated by all athletes in season j. As we expect a non-linear relationship be-
tween individual performance and career length we also include in our estimations the 
squared and the cubic term of relative number of points.  
Second, we include two dummy variables indicating whether an athlete has ever won an 
Olympic gold medal or a title as World Champion in an individual ski jumping competi-
tion (we deliberately exclude team competitions). The interaction of these dummies with 
an athlete’s individual performance enables us to test for potential superstar effects. More 
specifically, we analyze whether (former) superstars’ nominations into the (usually rather 
small) national squads are justified by their current performance or rather driven by their 
past success (perhaps accompanied by the team manager’s hope for a positive outlier in 
performance).  
Third, we are interested in the impact of competitive pressure on the duration of ski 
jumpers’ careers. In order to test our hypothesis that athletes from rather weak nations tend 
to “survive” longer than equally talented athletes from strong nations (because the latter 
are permanently challenged by their compatriots), we calculated two different measures 
reflecting the different nations’ level of competitiveness: (i) a concentration ratio measur-
ing the dispersion of individual World Cup points within nationk in seasonj, and (ii) the 
relative share of cumulated individual World Cup points of nationk in seasonj. Although 
plausible, option (i) does not adequately reflect the level of a specific nation’s competitive-
ness, because concentration measures such as the Gini coefficient are likely to yield biased 
results.17  
Assume, for example, a strong nation with a large pool of talented athletes. Here the head 
coach is likely to rotate some of the athletes, while in a weak nation with a small pool of 
talented athletes every athlete has a chance to be nominated for every single event. Conse-
quently, a weak nation sending the same athletes to all World Cup events in a particular 
season appears to have a more homogeneous distribution of talent than a strong nation in 
which e.g. three athletes are guaranteed their nomination while the remaining three or four 
spots are permanently reallocated among equally talented athletes from a large pool (see 
Appendix A for an illustrative example).  
                                               
17 The Gini coefficient has been (and continues to be) widely used to measure, inter alia, the degree of com-
petition in individual industries (e.g. Simon and Bonini 1958), price dispersion in certain markets (see e.g. 
Borenstein and Rose 1994 for evidence from the airline industry or, with completely different results, Gerardi 
and Shapiro 2009) and income inequality using micro- (e.g. Andrews and Leigh 2009) as well as macro-data 
(e.g. Solt 2009 and Malul et al. 2013). 
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Supposing that “strong” (i.e. successful) nations have, ceteris paribus, a larger pool of 
(equally able) athletes than weaker nations, we use each nation’s relative share of World 
Cup points per season as a proxy for competitive pressure within a country’s team. Moreo-
ver, we include a time trend that controls for the (presumably increasing) opportunity 
costs of retiring early (the availability of prize money as well as endorsement contracts 
make professional careers even more attractive than they used to be in the past).18 
2.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Cox model is a now well-established econometric tool to analyze right-censored and 
time-dependent data with two distinctive advantages compared to other proportional haz-
ard models (Kiefer 1988). First, it allows including the information of right-censored data 
– a feature that is of particular importance in our context as many of the athletes in our 
dataset are still active at the end of the observation period, i.e. the end of the season 
2010/11. For these athletes the event to be explained by the covariates – exit from the 
World Cup tour – has not yet occurred and the observation is, therefore, right-censored. 
Second, since it is the most general of the available regression models, the Cox model does 
not make any assumptions about the nature or the shape of the underlying survival distribu-
tion19 and can integrate time-dependent variables. Moreover, semi-parametric models like 
the Cox model can also handle left truncation, also known as delayed entries. Left trunca-
tion occurs when individuals included in the sample arrived in the “risk pool” already prior 
to the start of the observation period. These subjects (e.g. ski jumpers who had already 
been active before the introduction of the World Cup) can be included in the study. How-
ever, their failure time must go into the econometric model without truncation (see Cox 
and Oakes 1984 and Cleves et al. 2008 for detailed analyses on the effects of including 
left-censored data).20  
                                               
18 We admit that, in principle, we should also control for a number of additional rule changes that have been 
enacted by FIS in the recent past, such as the implementation of a minimum body weight, the regulation of 
the size of the ski jumping suits and the length of the skis, because all these changes may have affected career 
length in one way or the other. The problem here is that some athletes may have benefited from these rule 
changes at the expense of others. Unfortunately, information on e.g. the body weight of the athletes is not 
available, implying that we cannot control for the impact of these rule changes on the length of the individu-
als’ careers. 
19 Since the shape of the survival distribution is left unspecified, only a functional form for the influence of 
the covariates can be specified (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002: 228). 
20 In our sample, the first year of the observation period coincides with the inaugural season of the FIS Ski 
Jumping World Cup. Although a certain percentage of the athletes in our sample had been active before this 
season (in e.g. Olympic Games and/or World Championships), none of them had ever competed in a World 
Cup competition. Hence our data are less susceptible to left-truncation bias. 
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The advantages of the Cox semi-parametric proportional hazard models notwithstanding, 
we continue estimating two additional parametric models. As suggested by the Akaike In-
formation Criterion (Akaike 1974) we estimate a log-normal model (i.e., we assume that 
the logarithm of the durations follows a normal distribution) which in our case yields more 
robust and reliable results than, for example, a log-logistic or Weibull (1951) model. Both 
models are of the following functional form: 
Exit =  β0 + β1N_Points + β2N_Points2 + β3N_Points3 + β4Olympic Cham-
pion + β5World Champion + β6OC * N_Points + β7WC * N_Points 
+ β8time trend + β9nation’s share of points + β10nation’s SoP * 
N_Points + Ɛi, 
where exit either stands for an individual’s career end or the end of an uninterrupted spell, 
depending on the model specification. In addition to the explanatory variables that were 
specified in Table 2-1 above, we include a set of interaction terms to disentangle and quan-
tify potential superstar effects and to measure the impact of competitive pressure on indi-
vidual career outcomes. 
In Table 2-2 we present the results of our estimations. We report both hazard ratios and 
regression coefficients that have to be interpreted differently. The hazard ratios from the 
Cox models indicate an individual’s probability of being eliminated from the World Cup 
tour during a specific time interval, conditional on having been in the tournament until the 
beginning of that interval. In this case, the event to be explained is the exit from the tour. A 
value between 0 and 1 implies a reduction of the exit probability. The closer the hazard 
ratio is to zero, the less likely is the exit. In the first model, for example, the hazard ratio of 
0.466 of the World Champion dummy implies a ceteris paribus 53.4 percent higher chance 
of survival in t1 for all athletes who have previously won a World Championship title com-
pared to the reference category, i.e. athletes who have not managed to win that title until t0. 
Given the magnitude of the impact, this difference is not only statistically significant but 
also economically relevant. Hazard ratios can be interpreted in a similar way if the explan-
atory variables are continuous. Looking at our first model, it appears that a one unit in-
crease in the standardized individual World Cup points in t0 increases the survival proba-
bility in t1 by more than 70 percent. Hazard rates larger than 1, on the other hand, reduce 
the probability of survival. Thus, according to our first model, a one percent increase of a 
nation’s share of points decreases the probability of survival for a particular individual by 
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two percent. That is, the more successful a national team is, the larger the competitive 
pressure in that particular squad and, hence, the less likely an individual athlete from that 
particular nation is to survive in the World Cup circus.  
Table 2-2: Career and spell duration determinants of professional ski jumpers 
Cox Proportional-
Hazard Model (1.1) 
Lognormal 
Model (1.2) 
Cox Proportional-
Hazard Model (2.1) 
Lognormal 
Model (2.2) 
Career Duration Spell Duration 
  Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient 
Variables 
          
N_Points 0.279*** 0.912*** 0.318*** 0.845*** 
(0.0518) (0.102) (0.0378) (0.0704) 
N_Points2 1.423*** -0.281*** 1.290*** -0.202*** 
(0.157) (0.0705) (0.0948) (0.0443) 
N_Points3 0.916** 0.069*** 0.958** 0.033*** 
(0.0340) (0.0221) (0.0165) (0.00980) 
Olympic Champion 0.682 0.456** 0.672* 0.518** 
(0.181) (0.203) (0.142) (0.206) 
World Champion 0.466*** 0.779*** 0.461*** 0.990*** 
(0.0905) (0.126) (0.0769) (0.120) 
OC * N_Points 1.414 -0.315** 1.093 -0.089 
(0.336) (0.144) (0.251) (0.124) 
WC * N_Points 1.393* -0.201** 1.266 -0.234*** 
(0.248) (0.0914) (0.186) (0.0641) 
Time trend 0.966*** 0.028*** 0.975*** 0.020*** 
(0.00392) (0.00313) (0.00274) (0.00233) 
Nation's share of points 1.020** -0.013** 1.014** -0.008** 
(0.00835) (0.00532) (0.00612) (0.00406) 
Nation's SoP * N_Points 1.018* -0.016** 1.015** -0.011** 
(0.0100) (0.00610) (0.00720) (0.00435) 
Constant  1.366***  1.035*** 
 (0.0984)  (0.0738) 
No. of Subjects 698 698 965 965 
No. of Failures 613 613 881 881 
Time at Risk / No. Of Obs. 2,646 2,646 2,646 2,646 
Wald Chi² 282.87*** 476.21*** 381.23*** 724.16*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results of the lognormal models (Models 1.2 and 2.2) can, in turn, be interpreted like 
the coefficients estimated in a simple OLS model. Using the same variables as above to 
illustrate the interpretation we see that a World Champion title increases the probability of 
survival in the career duration model (Model 1.2) by almost 80 percent while a one percent 
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increase in the nation’s share of points reduces an athlete’s survival probability by 1.3 per-
cent.  
Irrespective of the concrete model specification, the effects of most of the independent 
variables go in the same direction and are highly robust in a statistical sense. For ease of 
interpretation, we therefore mainly refer to the Cox estimates (Models 1.1 and 2.1). As 
expected, performance (i.e., the number of standardized World Cup points accumulated by 
an individual athlete) has a statistically significant and non-linear impact on the probability 
of survival. That is, the better the performance in a given season the higher the probability 
of a World Cup appearance in the subsequent season. The hazard ratios of the squared (cu-
bic) terms of World Cup points are larger (smaller) than one, suggesting that the marginal 
returns to effort are increasing, but at a decreasing rate for the less talented athletes and at 
an increasing rate for the top contenders. Athletes who have won an Olympic gold medal 
until t0 are on average about 30% less likely to terminate or interrupt their career in t1 than 
observationally similar athletes without a gold medal. Note, however, that these effects are 
not (or barely) significant in the Cox estimations but appear to be robust in the lognormal 
models.21  
The alleged “superstar effect” is far stronger in the case of World Champions who – as 
already discussed above – have a substantially higher survival probability than the rest of 
the athletes. The interaction of standardized individual World Cup points and the World 
Champion dummy yields mixed results with respect to the level of statistical significance 
but the hazard ratios and coefficients are consistent and suggest that the status of a World 
Champion is more important in terms of career length than an individual’s current perfor-
mance in the World Cup. In other words, athletes who have previously won the World 
Championship have a significantly higher survival probability even if their current perfor-
mance deteriorates. Since athlete survival is to a large extent determined by the national 
federations’ nominations into their (limited) squads this suggests that (former) superstars 
are preferred to currently better performing compatriots who lack the glory of past Cham-
pionship titles. Whether this head coach behavior is due to favoritism, the acknowledge-
ment of previous achievements and/or the anticipation of positive outliers in performance 
remains to be tested.  
                                               
21 We are tempted to attribute these inconsistencies to the relatively small number of observations. Since the 
Olympic Games take place only every four years and some of the titles have been repeatedly won by the 
same athletes, only 10 different athletes in our sample have won an Olympic gold medal while 23 different 
individuals have won the title of a World Champion. 
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Moreover, the inclusion of a linear time trend in the estimations reveals that survival prob-
abilities – and thus career and spell lengths – have considerably increased over time. Both 
the hazard ratios and the respective coefficients are statistically significant (at the one per-
cent level) and suggest that from one season to the next individual survival probabilities 
increase by 2-3 percent. Although we cannot separately control for the many rule changes 
and modifications in the tournament design that have occurred over time, this suggests that 
in the aggregate the institutional changes – along with changes in nutrition, medical sup-
port and training methods as well as the increasing opportunity costs of exiting – have all 
worked in the athletes’ direction.  
Finally, competitive pressure has a statistically significant and negative impact on athlete 
survival in all model specifications. More specifically, a one percent increase of a nation’s 
share of overall World Cup points per season reduces the survival probability of an indi-
vidual athlete of that particular squad by 1-2 percent. Thus, the stronger a national team, 
the greater is the domestic competitive pressure and the less likely its individual athletes 
are to survive. Along the same lines, the interaction of an individual’s standardized World 
Cup points with his national squad’s share of points reveals that equally talented athletes 
from different nations have significantly different survival probabilities, depending on the 
level of competitive pressure in the respective national team. That is, athletes from strong 
nations – such as e.g. Norway or Austria – face a ceteris paribus higher risk of being cut 
than athletes from e.g. Italy or France who – due to the lack of domestic competitors – are 
less likely to be replaced by other athletes. 
Figure 2-4: Survival curves at mean of covariates 
Career duration Spell duration 
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Figure 2-4 displays the survival curves based on the mean of the covariates in the lognor-
mal regression separately for career length as well as for spell length (taking into account 
interrupted careers). Corroborating the results of the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates (see 
Figure 2-3 above), it appears that individual careers are of rather short duration. Although 
the smoothed estimates seem to underestimate the number of early exits, the intuition is 
that the majority of athletes leave the circuit prematurely while only few individuals are 
able to survive for ten seasons or longer. 
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Using a hitherto unavailable dataset including almost 700 professional ski jumpers who 
were active in the FIS Ski Jumping World Cup between 1979/80 and 2010/11, we use par-
ametric as well as semi-parametric duration analyses to identify the (main) determinants of 
athlete “survival” (and thus individual career length and earning opportunities).  
First, and not surprisingly, individual performance has a statistically positive impact on 
career duration. That is, the more World Cup points an athlete accumulates during a partic-
ular season, the more likely he is to return in the subsequent season and hence the longer is 
his expected career duration. This effect is getting stronger over time as careers last longer 
today than they used to in the past. Whether this is due to institutional changes affecting 
the design of the competition or by improvements in nutrition, health and training or due to 
the increasing opportunity costs of exiting cannot yet be tested due to data limitations.  
Second, superstars – (former) World Champions – experience significantly lower hazard 
rates and thus have on average longer careers (and spells) than athletes failing to win a 
gold medal in a World Championship tournament. While this result is obviously driven by 
selection effects (superstars are on average more talented than the rest of the athlete popu-
lation), we include in our estimations an interaction term yielding a striking result: Athletes 
who have won a World Champion title face less competitive pressure from their compatri-
ots, as their nomination seems to be driven by their past success rather than by their current 
performance. Even if their performance deteriorates, (former) superstars are systematically 
preferred to their (recently better performing) compatriots.  
Third, athletes from strong nations with a tradition in ski jumping have significantly short-
er careers (and spells) than equally talented athletes from weak nations (who are barely 
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challenged by the performance of their compatriots). Hence, the nationality of an athlete 
has a considerable impact on individual survival probabilities. 
This competitive pressure, in turn, may simply be the result of the superior conditions that 
athletes from strong nations can enjoy: They have access to better training facilities, better 
medical services, receive larger funding and support and can – given the presumably high-
er domestic demand for ski jumping events on TV – generate significantly higher earnings 
through endorsement contracts compared to athletes from countries where ski jumping is 
still a peripheral sport. This can be tested in future research using for instance TV viewing 
figures (which are available for some countries for a small fee), information on country-
specific club memberships (indicating the domestic popularity of the sport) and, if availa-
ble, information on the earnings of the top athletes.  
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2.6 APPENDIX A 
The following example illustrates that a concentration ratio – in this case the Gini coeffi-
cient – is an inappropriate measure to determine a national team’s level of competitiveness 
in professional ski jumping. For this purpose we look at individual World Cup points ac-
cumulated by all athletes from Norway and the Czech Republic in the season 2010/11. 
Norway, the birthplace of ski jumping and traditionally one of the most successful nations 
in professional ski jumping, came second in the annual nations ranking. In total, 11 differ-
ent athletes managed to win World Cup points in that particular season. The Czech Repub-
lic disposes of a considerably smaller pool of talented athletes and usually finishes well 
below the podium places in the nations ranking. In the season 2010/11, 6 athletes were able 
to win World Cup points, securing their country a top 10 spot in the nations ranking. 
Table 2-3: Gini coefficients of concentration of points in the FIS ski jumping World Cup 
Norway Czech Republic 
i xi hi (2i - n - 1) / n hi* ((2i - n -1) / n) i xi hi (2i - n - 1) / n hi* ((2i - n -1) / n) 
1 2 0.0007 -0.9091 -0.0006 1 1 0.0013 -0.8333 -0.0011 
2 7 0.0023 -0.7273 -0.0017 2 53 0.0670 -0.5000 -0.0335 
3 32 0.0106 -0.5455 -0.0058 3 56 0.0708 -0.1667 -0.0118 
4 56 0.0185 -0.3636 -0.0067 4 119 0.1504 0.1667 0.0251 
5 106 0.0349 -0.1818 -0.0064 5 180 0.2276 0.5000 0.1138 
6 155 0.0511 0.0000 0.0000 6 382 0.4829 0.8333 0.4024 
7 344 0.1134 0.1818 0.0206 ∑ 791 1.0000 0.0000 0.4949 
8 364 0.1200 0.3636 0.0436 
9 419 0.1381 0.5455 0.0754 
10 645 0.2127 0.7273 0.1547 
11 903 0.2977 0.9091 0.2707 
∑ 3033 1.0000 0.0000 0.5438 
 
Table 2-3 lists the individual World Cup points (xi) accumulated by all athletes (i) from 
Norway (n = 11) and (ii) the Czech Republic (n = 6) in the season 2010/11 in ascending 
order. Each athlete’s relative share of points (hi) is then obtained by the following formula: 
hi = xi / ∑ x௡௜ୀଵ i.     (1) 
The remaining computations are displayed in the upper line of Table 2-3 and yield the re-
spective Gini coefficients (which can be found in the highlighted lower right corners). The 
Gini coefficient can take values between 0 (all World Cup points are evenly distributed 
among all athletes) and 1 (maximum heterogeneity, i.e. one athlete wins all the points for 
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his national team while all other athletes fail to win a single point). It appears from Table 
2-3 that the Czech ski jumpers were more homogeneous and thus had to face greater com-
petitive pressure from their compatriots than the Norwegian athletes. However, these re-
sults suffer from two obvious “distortions”. First, the number of athletes accumulating 
World Cup points varies considerably between the two nations (and the remaining nations 
in the sample). Second, given the limited number of World Cup slots per nation, most of 
the Norwegian athletes experienced some form of rotation throughout the season and hence 
participated in a smaller number of events. The Czech athletes, on the other hand, have 
been active in all (or most) of the World Cup events in that season. Due to this bias it is not 
possible to simply calculate the Gini coefficient with a reduced (and comparable) number 
of Norwegian athletes. Table 2-4 below shows an adjusted Gini coefficient for Norway, 
where we add up all World Cup points of the least performing (or less often nominated) 
individuals and allocate the sum of points to a hypothetical single sixth athlete who is as-
sumed to have participated in all events. 
Table 2-4: Adjusted Gini coefficient of a reduced number of athletes 
I xi hi (2i - n - 1) / n hi* ((2i - n -1) / n) 
1 344 0.1134 -0.8333 -0.0945 
2 358 0.1180 -0.5000 -0.0590 
3 364 0.1200 -0.1667 -0.0200 
4 419 0.1381 0.1667 0.0230 
5 645 0.2127 0.5000 0.1063 
6 903 0.2977 0.8333 0.2481 
∑ 3033 1.0000 0.0000 0.2039 
 
The actual distributions of individual World Cup points as well as the estimates of the dis-
tributions of talent in the two nations in our example are presented in Figure 2-5 below. 
The hypothetical talent pool is represented by the dotted line and can be seen as a proxy for 
individual World Cup points each athlete could have achieved had he been active in all 
World Cup competitions in that season. We assume here that the Norwegian ski jumping 
federation has access to a number of equally talented athletes from the right tail of the tal-
ent distribution whereas none of the less talented Czech athletes has the potential to win 
World Cup points. 
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Figure 2-5: Distribution of talent in selected countries in the World Cup season 2010/11 
Norway Czech Republic 
  
Note: Number of athletes on the x-axis, cumulative individual World Cup points on the y-axis. 
 
Although the distribution of talent in both countries is based on rough estimates – which 
are far from statistical accuracy – Figure 2-5 illustrates that a largely homogeneous pool of 
athletes might induce regular changes in the compositions of the team which, in turn, can 
result in misleading concentration ratios. Therefore, it seems sensible to use each national 
team’s relative performance (as expressed by the share of World Cup points per season) as 
a proxy for competitive pressure in a particular squad. 
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3 THE PERFORMANCE OF GERMAN FOOTBALL REFEREES: ARE 
THERE SANCTIONS FOR POOR OFFICIATING? 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In their seminal paper on the economic theory of tournaments, Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
posit that (promotion) tournaments serve as a means of identifying (and rewarding) the 
most productive workers in a firm. In the sports context, too, rank-order tournaments – in 
combination with appropriately designed reward structures – are widely used to align the 
interests of principals (tournament organizers) and agents (athletes). However, a large body 
of literature has documented the existence of inefficiencies in particular labor markets that 
are evoked by subjective and biased performance assessments, including favoritism. Pren-
dergast (1999) provides a thorough theoretical analysis of this phenomenon. To empirical-
ly test the theory of favoritism in principal-agent relationships, the labor market for profes-
sional football players is a particularly suitable setting. First, as pointed out by Kahn (2000: 
75), “[t]here is no research setting other than sports where we know the name, face, and 
life history of every production worker and supervisor in the industry. Total compensation 
packages and performance statistics for each individual are widely available, and we have 
a complete data set of worker-employer matches over the career of each production work-
er and supervisor in the industry.” Second, (major) professional team sports in general and 
European football in particular experienced tremendous economic growth in the recent 
past, representing a labor market of a considerable size22 that merits closer inspection. 
Third, professional football entails the advantage of being a widely televised sport, where 
independent experts can easily evaluate player- and – in this context more importantly – 
referee performance ex post. These performance data are open to the public and can be 
accessed online.23 Thus, from a researcher’s perspective, it is possible to monitor the moni-
tor (i.e., the umpire) at almost no cost.  
Given these merits, it is not surprising that an already large and still growing strand of lit-
erature exploits football data to unveil and explain in-group favoritism. Following Aker-
lof’s (1980) theoretical framework of the interaction between social customs and agents’ 
choices, the commonly observed home bias, for instance, is predominantly attributed to 
                                               
22 According to the latest financial report provided by Deutsche Fußball-Liga (2014), the 18 first division 
teams in the German Bundesliga generated aggregate revenues of almost 2.2 billion € in the season 2012/13.  
23 The data used in this study come from various special editions as well as the website of “Kicker” 
(www.kicker.de), a renowned football magazine.  
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referees’ unintended adherence to social norms (see e.g. Buraimo et al. 2012b). Such be-
havior may certainly distort competition and lead to dramatic sporting consequences as 
well as economic losses for the disadvantaged teams. Yet, little research has been done so 
far concerning the consequences of poor – be it biased or simply inadequate – officiating 
on the side of the referees.24 Put differently, the question of whether poor officiating leads 
to sanctions in the form of fewer nominations for the referees, longer waiting times and/or 
long-term impediments to their career has, to the best of our knowledge, not been empiri-
cally answered to date.25 This paper aims at closing this gap in the literature.  
In the next section, we present a selective review of the literature on favoritism in organi-
zations, with a particular focus on empirical studies using football data. We then proceed in 
section 3.3 with a detailed description of the institutional framework, including the nomi-
nation procedure and ranking system of referees in German football, which serves as a 
basis for the subsequent formulation of hypotheses. In section 3.4, we briefly explain how 
referees are incentivized. The data, methodology and some descriptive statistics are pre-
sented in section 3.5 while the empirical findings are discussed in section 3.6. We then 
conclude with a plea for further research in this field. 
3.2 FAVORITISM IN ORGANIZATIONS – THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 
A growing empirical literature has unmasked what passionate football fans always knew: 
Referees in professional sports are (unfortunately) not impartial. While some referees are 
even found to be corrupt (see Hill 2009; Distaso et al. 2012 for the “Calciopoli” scandal in 
Italian football; or Buraimo et al. 2012a for an analysis of consumer demand following this 
scandal), the majority of the studies finds that referees somehow favor the home team. Irre-
spective of the alleged referee bias, home advantage is a common phenomenon in sports.26 
                                               
24 Using a dataset of more than 3,000 Bundesliga matches from the seasons 1995/96-2004/05 Frick et al. 
(2009a, b) find that referees with an average performance in a particular match have to wait one week longer 
until their next nomination than referees with a particularly good performance. Since the dataset is restricted 
to first division matches, temporary demotions (i.e., nominations to lower division matches) had to be omit-
ted. In a similar vein, Frick (2012) focuses explicitly on the career duration of football referees active in the 
German Bundesliga. The results suggest that individual survival is mainly determined by the number of nom-
inations, which may serve as a proxy for individual performance. 
25 A notable exception is presented by Boeri and Severgnini (2011) who look at the assignments of referees 
to important matches in the Italian football league dependent on their performance in the previous match. The 
scope of the study, however, is consciously restricted to a short time period in which some Italian referees 
were heavily engaged in match rigging. 
26 Courneya and Carron (1992: 14) define home advantage as “the consistent finding that home teams in 
sport competitions win over 50 % of games played under a balanced home and away schedule”. 
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The reasons for this home advantage are manifold. Nevill and Holder (1999) provide a 
literature review of earlier studies that have identified four factors thought to mainly con-
tribute to home bias, namely learning and rule factors as well as travel and crowd factors. 
The accumulated evidence suggests that learning (becoming increasingly familiar with the 
conditions when playing at home) and rule factors (e.g. batting last in baseball) play only a 
minor role in causing home advantage. Travel factors were found to significantly contrib-
ute to home advantage when teams or individual athletes had to cross a number of time 
zones. However, in European football travel distances are relatively small in most national 
leagues and even in (the majority of matches played in) pan-European cup competitions. 
Thus, travel factors are considered a minor cause of home advantage. The most prominent 
causes of home advantage appear to stem from crowd effects. Nevill and Holder (1999) 
propose two possible mechanisms to explain the observed effects: The crowd is able to 
either (i) raise the performance of the home team (i.e., social support), or (ii) influence the 
umpires to subconsciously favor the home team (i.e., social pressure). Although disentan-
gling these effects often proves to be a cumbersome task for the econometrician, the vast 
majority of the literature suggests that the latter is the driving force behind the home effect. 
This is in line with the assumptions predicted by the theory of conformity27 (Bernheim 
1994; Becker and Murphy 2000).  
The following literature review summarizes and classifies the more recent empirical evi-
dence on referee home bias in professional sports. Notwithstanding the fact that there are 
other manifestations of bias (see, inter alia, Plessner and Betsch 2001 for sequential effects 
in awarding penalties in football; Jones et al. 2002 for reputation bias among association 
football referees; Price and Wolfers 2010 for racial bias by referees in the NBA; or, with 
similar findings in the MLB, Parsons et al. 2011), the following studies explicitly focus on 
differential treatment caused by some form of home bias. The first (and main) part of the 
literature review captures studies using data from professional football. In the second part 
the scope is broadened to empirical findings from selected individual sports. 
                                               
27 The theory of conformity posits that individuals who care about status are willing to conform to a certain 
standard of behavior, anticipating that even small deviations from the social norm could seriously impair 
their reputation. 
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3.2.1 HOME TEAM FAVORITISM IN ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL 
In association football, referees represent the major monitoring authority responsible for 
the enforcement of rules under the Laws of the Game.28 Typical tasks of a referee include 
the determination of extra time, issuing sanctions in the form of yellow and red cards as 
well as allowing goals and penalties. Unlike in major US sports, where umpire decisions 
can be overruled by instant video proof, referee decisions in football are usually incontest-
able and can thus adversely and irrevocably affect the course of the game. As pointed out 
by Buraimo et al. (2010), “[c]ritical refereeing decisions can be pivotal for a team’s pro-
spects of winning championships, qualifying for lucrative European competition or avoid-
ing relegation.” The empirical literature examining home bias in football refereeing can be 
divided according to the above-mentioned typical tasks of a referee. 
3.2.1.1 DETERMINATION OF EXTRA TIME 
Referees are in charge of tracking the amount of time that is ‘lost’ due to injuries, substitu-
tions, time wasting or other interruptions of the game. Although they receive official rec-
ommendations from the assistant referee, the so-called fourth official, the “men in black” 
take sole responsibility for the amount of time that is added at the end of each half of a 
game. A number of studies examining the amount of extra time find that referees add sig-
nificantly more “injury time” when home teams are trailing as compared to when home 
teams are leading in score. Seminal evidence in this strand in the favoritism literature 
stems from Garicano et al. (2005) who use data from Spanish football. Their results sug-
gest that home team favoritism in the form of extra time exists even after controlling for 
the number and the length of interruptions in the game. These results are confirmed by 
Lucey and Power (2004) for the Italian Serie A and US Major League soccer. Scoppa 
(2008) reports similar results for Italian football. Sutter and Kocher (2004) and Dohmen 
(2008) find that in the German Bundesliga, too, referees favor trailing home teams in terms 
of added time.  
The following studies are unable to identify persistent bias but rather demonstrate how 
institutional changes can foster referee performance and impartiality. Rickman and Witt 
(2008) first confirm the above results for English football but then show that home team 
favoritism in the English Premier League disappears after the introduction of professional 
employment contracts. Referees who were paid on a match basis at the beginning of the 
                                               
28 The Laws of the Game gather the codified football rules that are defined by the Fédération Internationale 
de Football Association (FIFA) and approved by the International Football Association Board.  
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sample period were found to significantly favor the home team by adding more extra time 
when the home team was one goal behind. This effect disappeared after the modification of 
the payout regime from match fees to annual salaries. Looking at exactly this transition 
phase between the two payout regimes in English football, Bryson et al. (2011) find that 
referees who move onto salary contracts increase their performance relative to those who 
are still paid a match fee. These results are robust to referee fixed effects, thus ruling out 
potential ex ante ability and/ or sorting effects. Nevill et al. (2013) report a systematic de-
cline in refereeing bias in top-tier English and Scottish football leagues which they attrib-
ute to improved training of referees post World War II that has facilitated greater resilience 
to crowd influence and, thus, more objective decision-making. Another example for the 
reduction in referee bias is presented by Rocha et al. (2013). Applying ordinary least 
squares and probability regressions to a dataset from the first division of the Brazilian 
Football Championship, the authors lend further support to the notion of favoritism among 
referees. However, when controlling for the importance of a match (as measured by the 
quality of both teams and whether a match was broadcasted or not) and the quality of the 
referee, the results are somewhat different: With increasing importance of a match the 
amount of extra time tends to be closer to an objectively justified amount. In other words, 
monitoring reduces referee bias. In a more general sense, these results suggest that career 
concerns play a major role in agents’ choices in the presence of comprehensive monitoring. 
3.2.1.2 SANCTIONS 
In order to avoid illegal behavior by players, referees can issue cautions in the form of yel-
low and red cards, the latter implying the expulsion of a player from the field. The use of 
disciplinary sanctions (and in particular a red card) can weaken a team considerably29 and 
thus represents another potential source of referee bias. In fact, a number of empirical re-
searchers have added weight to the hypothesis that umpires favor home teams in terms of 
issuing sanctions in the form of cards. Analyzing referee patterns in the award of discipli-
nary sanctions in the English Premier League over a period of 7 years, Dawson et al. 
(2007) show that away teams receive more cards than home teams. Since this effect per-
sists even after controlling for the quality of both teams, the evidence suggests that referees 
(presumably unintentionally) favor the home team. In line with these results, Buraimo et al. 
(2010), Dawson and Dobson (2010) and Reilly and Witt (2013) find that referees in Eng-
                                               
29 See Ridder et al. (1994) for a quantification of the effect of a player’s expulsion on the outcome of a foot-
ball match; i.e., the final score. 
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lish and German football as well as in pan-European cup competitions issue fewer cards to 
the home team and that this effect cannot solely be attributed to away teams playing more 
aggressively but rather points at home team favoritism on behalf of the referees. Whether 
the observed home bias in awarding cards is constant across all referees or subject to some 
referees being more favorably inclined towards the home team than their colleagues (see  
Boyko et al. (2007) and Johnston (2008) for contradictory evidence), remains a contested 
issue and leaves room for future research. 
3.2.1.3 GOALS AND PENALTIES 
A few studies offer support for referee home bias in terms of penalty decisions. Nevill et 
al. (1996) find that home teams in the highest divisions of the English and Scottish football 
leagues are given significantly more penalties than away teams. Yet, Sutter and Kocher 
(2004) argue that concentrating on awarded penalties only produces spurious evidence for 
favorable treatment. Assuming that home teams typically play more offensively and are 
thus more likely to enter the penalty area, the “surplus” in penalties might simply reflect 
different styles of play. In order to circumvent any confounding factors of this nature, the 
authors look at the ratio of legitimate and rewarded penalties to legitimate but refused pen-
alties in the German Bundesliga in the season 2000/2001. Their analyses reveal that in 81 
percent of the cases the home team is awarded a legitimate penalty whereas visiting teams 
receive a legitimate penalty in only 51 percent of the cases, pointing at a considerable and 
statistically significant (χ2=9.7; p<0.01) home bias in terms of awarding penalties. Investi-
gating the impartiality of referees in 3,519 matches played in 12 consecutive seasons in the 
German Bundesliga, Dohmen (2008) corroborates these findings and additionally identifies 
refereeing home bias with regard to awarding disputable goals. 
3.2.1.4 CROWD EFFECTS 
As postulated at the beginning of this section, the majority of studies ascribe the observed 
referee home bias to social forces. That is, referees – who intend to act as neutral rule-
enforcers – unintentionally conform to the crowd’s preferences in order to avoid crowd 
displeasure. In an attempt to quantify this crowd effect, a number of studies have included 
information on the size and composition of the crowd as well as the proximity of football 
fans to the pitch and the related crowd noise (see, inter alia, Garicano et al. 2005; Boyko et 
al. 2007; Dohmen 2008; Buraimo et al. 2012; Goumas 2012). Although empirical evidence 
on the magnitude of specific crowd effects is mixed, the general tenor suggests that all of 
the above-mentioned crowd characteristics somehow have an impact on referee behavior. 
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The larger the crowd and the greater the share of home team supporters in the stadium the 
more inclined the referee is towards the home team. Interestingly, home bias seems to be 
lower in stadia where a running track separates the fans from the pitch. Skeptics would 
surely argue that this reflects team-specific effects. However, Buraimo et al. (2010) make 
use of a quasi-experiment in which they show that teams in the German Bundesliga that 
changed their ground structure with removal of a track – Schalke and Bayern Munich 
moved to new stadia in 2001 and 2005, respectively, while Hannover modernized its old 
stadium in 2003 – benefitted from a significant increase in home team favoritism on the 
part of the referees.  
Additional experimental evidence in this field is presented by Nevill et al. (2002) who 
asked 40 qualified English referees to assess videotaped tackles that were recorded during 
an English Premier League match from the 1998/1999 season. 22 of the referees evaluated 
the video scenes with the crowd noise, while the remaining 18 referees watched the videos 
in silence. Applying binary logistic regression analyses to their dataset, Nevill et al. (2002) 
find that those referees assessing tackles in the noise condition awarded significantly fewer 
fouls (15.5 percent) against the home team than the referees watching the scenes in silence. 
Moreover, the statistically significant difference of 15.5 percent almost exactly reflects the 
reported percentage difference/advantage for home wins in football. In a similar vein, Pet-
tersson-Lidbom and Priks (2010) investigate referee decisions in the absence of crowd 
noise by looking at games in the Italian Serie A that had to be played in empty stadia fol-
lowing a series of uproar and riots during games. Their results suggest that referees are 
more likely to penalize home team players in the absence of spectators whereas home team 
favoritism prevails in “normal” matches with a crowd involved. However, Buraimo et al. 
(2010) express criticism towards the reliability of the results for a number of reasons in-
cluding, among others, the relatively small subsample (only 24 matches were played in 
empty stadia), a lack of control for within-game influences as well as a potential endogene-
ity problem regarding teams with a reputation of crowd trouble. Summarizing, these find-
ings suggest that crowd noise is a salient feature in explaining the causes for refereeing 
home bias. Yet, when analyzing the impact of social pressure on referee behavior in foot-
ball, player- and team-specific effects need to be addressed econometrically. 
3.2.2 HOME BIAS IN SELECTED INDIVIDUAL SPORTS 
Apart from the extensive literature addressing the issue of home team favoritism in profes-
sional team sports, a considerable strand in the literature identifies a similar phenomenon 
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in individual sports: Athletes competing on home soil fare significantly better than their 
opponents. The empirical evidence presented in the following suggests that “social sup-
port”, i.e., the crowd’s positive influence on the “local hero” (see section 3.2), cannot ex-
plain the home advantage alone, but rather points at some form of home bias on behalf of 
judges/referees. 
Whereas home bias seems to be less of a problem in sports that involve relatively objective 
performance assessments – Bray and Carron (1993), Koning (2005) and Nevill et al. 
(1997), for instance, find little evidence of home advantage in alpine skiing, speed skating, 
professional tennis and golf – empirical evidence of home bias in more subjectively judged 
individual sports is abundant. Analyzing data from the Winter Olympics between 1908 and 
1998, Balmer et al. (2001) find that home advantage was significantly larger in events that 
were subjectively assessed by judges (e.g. figure skating and freestyle skiing) than in more 
objectively evaluated competitions (e.g. Nordic skiing), which is indicative of judges scor-
ing “home” contestants disproportionately higher than “away” contestants. In the same 
spirit, Balmer et al. (2003) observe home bias in the Summer Olympics held between 1896 
and 1996 for subjectively assessed sports, i.e., boxing and gymnastics, while no home ad-
vantage is found for two rather objectively judged groups of sports, namely athletics and 
weightlifting. Balmer et al. (2005) confirm the prevalence of officiating bias for European 
championship boxing by showing that the expected probability of a “home win” is signifi-
cantly larger when bouts are decided by points as opposed to fights ending in a (technical) 
knockout. Similar to the above-mentioned experimental study by Nevill et al. (2002), who 
asked football referees to assess videotaped tackles in two different conditions (i.e., with 
and without crowd noise), Myers et al. (2012) apply the same methodology to Muay Thai 
(Thai boxing) judges. Their results are in line with Nevill et al. (2002), suggesting that 
Muay Thai judges, too, apparently succumb to crowd noise and (inadvertently) favor the 
“home” boxer.  
Although experimental evidence of this nature is characterized by a high level of internal 
validity (since only the crowd noise condition is allowed to vary), Myers and Balmer 
(2012) argue that experiments lack external validity, as particularly referee decisions in the 
laboratory bear little resemblance to “real-life” decisions in live sports settings. In an at-
tempt to achieve external validity for the above results, Myers and Balmer (2012) conduct 
a controlled experiment to determine the impact of crowd noise on officials in a live sport-
ing event including “home” and “away” contestants. In an international Thai boxing tour-
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nament, judges were randomly assigned to a ”(crowd) noise” or “no crowd noise” group, 
with the latter receiving noise cancellation headphones. The results corroborate the prevail-
ing evidence on officiating bias and contribute to the existing literature by providing first 
experimental evidence on the impact of crowd noise on officials in a live tournament set-
ting.  
It should be noted, however, that crowd noise cannot always explain partiality on the part 
of judges or referees. Some scholars provide evidence for systematic referee bias irrespec-
tive of any crowd effects. Zitzewitz (2006), for example, examines the (voting) behavior of 
ski jumping and figure skating judges who were active in events before, during and after 
the 2002 Winter Olympics. One of the key results of the study suggests that figure skating 
judges and – to a lesser extent – ski jumping judges exhibit nationalistic bias. That is, judg-
es deliberately award higher scores to athletes from their own country than other judges do. 
This finding stands in stark contrast to the evidence presented so far in as much as the ob-
served favoritism by agents is due to (deliberate) strategic decision-making rather than the 
result of (subconscious) crowd influence.30 
3.2.3 SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Summarizing, the results of the above studies lend strong support to the notion that referee 
home bias is a widespread phenomenon (and presumably the main influencing factor of 
home advantage) in sports. Moreover, officiating bias appears to be most pronounced in 
sports which involve subjective decision-making. However, what has as yet not been ad-
dressed in the literature is whether poor officiating (which, given the presumably more 
objective nature of independent performance evaluations of referees, is a necessary conse-
quence of favoritism) entails any career-impeding sanctions on the side of the officials. 
The aim of this study is to close this gap in the literature. Before the data, methodology and 
empirical findings are presented, the following section describes how referees in the Ger-
man Bundesliga are selected, evaluated and incentivized. 
                                               
30 Corroborating the general susceptibility to partiality of figure skating judges, Findlay and Ste-Marie (2004) 
show that judges award higher scores to figure skaters they know compared to those skaters they do not 
know. All else being equal, this finding points towards a significant reputation bias of judges.   
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3.3 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, NOMINATION PROCEDURE AND HY-
POTHESES 
In order to ensure a high level of quality and consistency among referees, the German 
Football Association (Deutscher Fußball-Bund, henceforth DFB) has implemented a rank-
ing system that is specifically designed to select and incentivize the most talented referees. 
Analogous to the classification of football teams into divisions, referees, too, are divided 
into divisions, with the three top divisions currently consisting of 19-22 referees, each.31 
With a few exceptions, only the highest ranked referees are allowed to officiate in first 
division games. This does not categorically rule out that first division referees are also ap-
pointed to second and third division matches. The ranking system does however exclude 
the possibility of a third division referee officiating in a first division game. In other words, 
referees are almost exclusively authorized to umpire games in divisions that are equal to or 
lower than their own qualification level (i.e., the division that has been officially appointed 
to them by the DFB). Moreover, top referees can achieve the ultimate status of becoming 
an official FIFA referee which legitimizes them to officiate in European Cup competitions 
as well as in international caps. Thus, there is a huge intrinsic (and, as will be elucidated in 
the next section, extrinsic) incentive for referees to climb up the career ladder to eventually 
qualify for the pool of first division referees. The referee classification into divisions and 
the small elite pool of FIFA referees (approximately 10 at a time) are updated annually, 
prior to the start of the season. The DFB has initially imposed a mandatory retirement for 
referees at an age of 50. Perhaps in response to the increasing dynamics of professional 
football and/ or a growing pool of promising referee aspirants the age threshold for retire-
ment has been gradually reduced to the current level of 47, allowing more referees (typi-
cally between one and five per season) to get promoted to a higher division. At the same 
time, only few referees are demoted, suggesting that the DFB prefers an “up-or-out” prin-
ciple (see e.g. Waldman 1990) to career progression.  
Nevertheless, the question remains whether those referees who get promoted are in fact the 
top referees in their respective division or if other factors such as seniority, network effects 
                                               
31 In the early years of the German Bundesliga, which celebrated its inaugural season in the year 1963, at 
times more than 50 different referees per season were given the opportunity to umpire at least one first divi-
sion match. The pool of referees was then constantly reduced to 37 in the season 1980/81, roughly 25 in the 
mid-1990s and approximately 20 officials per division in the post-millennial seasons (data can be accessed 
via http://www.weltfussball.de/schiedsrichter/bundesliga). 
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or pure luck determine success and failure.32 Given the widely acknowledged positive in-
centive effects of rank-order tournaments, and assuming the DFB’s tournament-like classi-
fication of referees to be effective (in identifying the most productive agents), we derive 
the following hypothesis: 
Hpromotion: The better a referee’s average performance and the more consistent 
this performance throughout the season, the higher the likelihood of a 
permanent promotion to a higher division. 
Consequently, a referee’s qualification level should serve as an indicator of individual abil-
ity and, thus, referee performance is assumed to improve with increasing level of qualifica-
tion. That is, FIFA referees should, on average, perform better than “ordinary” first divi-
sion referees, who, on the other hand, are supposed to deliver better performances than 
second or third division officials. Accordingly, the second hypothesis states: 
Hability: The higher a referee’s qualification level (i.e., the higher the division 
he is appointed to prior to the season), the better the average perfor-
mance. 
We deliberately exclude a consistency measure in our second hypothesis as we look at ag-
gregate performance data where outliers in performance variation are likely to be smoothed 
out. While the first two hypotheses largely reflect a referee’s long-term performance and 
its expected impact on career progression, it remains to be tested whether a referee’s short-
term performance has any (immediate) impact on individual career prospects. More specif-
ically, we want to test if a referee’s performance in one particular game somehow affects 
his subsequent nomination. It is possible that, for example, poorly performing referees 
have to wait significantly longer until their next nomination than their (better performing) 
colleagues. Another potential sanction on behalf of the DFB would be to appoint well qual-
ified but poorly performing referees to matches played in a lower division. In this context, 
it should be mentioned that referees are nominated for a match on rather short notice. Typ-
ically, officials are informed about their nomination less than a week prior to the match 
day. The information on the exact fixture that a referee is assigned to is internally disclosed 
about 48 hours before the match, while the public is informed only 24 hours prior to kick-
                                               
32 The performance of a referee is typically assessed by a delegate of the DFB who monitors the umpire di-
rectly in the stadium. The corresponding evaluation sheet, however, is handed over to the authorities only a 
few days after the game. In the meantime, evaluators can thus rely on other “experts” analyzing critical 
scenes that are televised in the aftermath of a game. 
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off. The DFB implemented these precautionary measures in order to reduce the likelihood 
of match rigging (see DFB 2013). Therefore, it is possible that particularly poor perfor-
mances have an immediate effect on the subsequent nomination and, thus, the following 
two hypotheses can be formulated: 
Hwaiting time: Referees who perform poorly in one particular match have to wait sig-
nificantly longer than their (better performing) colleagues until they 
are nominated for the next match. 
Hdemotion: Referees who perform poorly in one particular match have a signifi-
cantly higher likelihood of being temporarily demoted to a lower divi-
sion with their subsequent assignment. 
In order to gain a better understanding of the financial implications associated with the 
different nomination outcomes, the following section intends to illustrate how top-class 
German football referees are incentivized. 
3.4 REMUNERATION OF REFEREES IN GERMAN ASSOCIATION FOOTBALL 
Notwithstanding the assumption that the labor market for football referees is likely to at-
tract a far more passionate and intrinsically motivated workforce than, for example, the 
steel industry, the DFB relies on financial incentives to ensure high levels of effort among 
its top referees. Although until recently German referees were still considered amateurs 
who, unlike their colleagues in, e.g., England and Spain did not receive a fixed annual sala-
ry (see Frick et al. 2009a for a detailed breakdown of fix and variable pay of referees in the 
“Top 5” football leagues in Europe), they invest a lot of time and effort that calls for some 
form of financial compensation.33 After all, the referees who are active in the three top 
divisions in Germany represent the very right tail of the talent distribution of a pool that 
currently consists of roughly 75,000 referees in Germany. On the other hand, more than 99 
percent of German referees officiate in minor league matches on a mostly voluntary basis 
(usually, the regional federations pay travel costs and/ or a small allowance). Initially, even 
the top referees received only a small allowance of approximately 100 € on top of their 
travel expenses. Following a dramatic increase in league revenues in the early 1990s (see 
                                               
33 In addition to their primary task of officiating matches which is often associated with substantial time and 
travel expenses, referees in the highest divisions are required to take part in training courses and performance 
evaluations on a regular basis. Since many of the referees already pursue a “regular” profession, the time-
consuming refereeing activity most likely impedes career progress and thus leads to foregone income.   
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Frick and Prinz 2006), the DFB introduced a match fee of 750 € that was paid to first divi-
sion referees with the beginning of the season 1992/93. This fee was then gradually in-
creased to the current level of 3,800 € (see Figure 3-1). 
Figure 3-1: Match fees of football referees in the German Bundesliga, 1992/93-2012/13 
 
Note:  Match fees (see y-axis) prior to the introduction of the euro in Germany, on 1 January 2002, are 
converted and approximated to euro amounts. Match fees are not adjusted for inflation. Own illus-
tration based on data provided by the DFB. 
 
The two assistant referees (also named linesmen) receive half of what the referee is paid, 
while the recently introduced “fourth official”, who monitors the activities off the pitch, 
receives a quarter of what the referee is paid. Referees and their assistants in the second 
and third division receive approximately 50 and 20 percent, respectively, of what the refer-
ee teams in the first division are paid (see Table 3-1). 
Table 3-1: Current match fees of referees and assistants in the top 3 German football divisions (in €) 
Source:  Own illustration based on data from the DFB. 
 
In addition to the match fees, the DFB covers all travel expenses, such as transportation, 
food and accommodation costs, amounting to approximately 200 € for a single referee. 
Moreover, referees who are assigned to a first division match receive an additional premi-
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um of 500 € from the league sponsor. Since referees were exclusively paid on a match ba-
sis until the season 2011/12, we assume that rational individuals sought to maximize the 
number of nominations (and thus their income). Figure 3-2 below illustrates how much the 
21 Bundesliga referees who were active in the season 2011/12 (and who are displayed on 
the x-axis) earned from match fees (y-axis).      
Figure 3-2: Cumulative individual income of Bundesliga referees in the season 2011/12 
 
Source:  Own illustration and own calculations based on data from the DFB. 
 
It appears that most of the first division referees accumulated between 70,000 and 90,000 € 
from match fees alone.34 As already discussed above, top referees can generate additional 
income by officiating in European Cup competitions as well as in international caps, where 
match fees sometimes amount to 6,000 € and more. Hence, FIFA referees usually earn 
more than 100,000 € per year. Assuming that many of the top referees had to reduce (or 
completely refrain from) investments in vocational education and training, the opportunity 
costs of quitting the career are quite high. Thus, referees have a huge incentive to (i) climb 
up the career ladder and eventually become a Bundesliga or even FIFA referee, and (ii) 
                                               
34 Usually, referees can expect a sufficiently large number of nominations per season that guarantees them a 
satisfying minimum wage (currently about 50,000 € for first division referees) even in the absence of a fixed 
salary. The negative outlier above can be explained by a sad and unique case where an experienced first divi-
sion referee, Babak Rafati, attempted suicide only hours before his expected opening whistle in the Bun-
desliga match between Cologne and Mainz on 19 November 2011. Symbolically enough, Rafati’s debut as a 
Bundesliga referee in the year 2005 saw exactly the same two teams facing each other. Rafati, who was 
found in his hotel room by his assistant referees who provided first aid, later explained that he suffered from 
serious depression and that he could no longer cope with the enormous pressure to perform. Not having re-
turned to the pitch ever since, he soon after officially quit his career and meanwhile gives seminars on per-
formance pressure, mobbing and burn-out.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
A
nn
ua
l i
nc
om
e 
in
 1
,0
00
 €
The Performance of German Football Referees: Are there Sanctions for Poor Officiating? 45
maximize the number and quality of nominations. Despite the relatively high income even 
top referees were, until recently, still considered amateurs in an otherwise highly profes-
sionalized environment. With the beginning of the season 2012/13, however, the DFB in-
troduced a fixed salary that has since been paid to all first and second division referees. 
This base salary is paid irrespective of the number of nominations but depends on the indi-
vidual qualification level and experience: FIFA referees with a Bundesliga experience of 
five years or more received an annual base salary of 40,000 € whereas equally experienced 
Bundesliga referees received a fixed sum of 30,000 € in the season 2012/13. Bundesliga 
referees with less than five years of experience and second division referees were paid 
20,000 and 15,000 €, respectively, while linesmen received between 2,500 and 15,000 €, 
depending on their status and experience (see Table 3-2). 
Table 3-2: Annual base salary of Bundesliga referees in the season 2012/13 (in €) 
Status/Division/Experience Referee Linesman 
FIFA, experience of 5 years or more 40,000 15,000 
Bundesliga, experience of 5 years or more 30,000 15,000 
Bundesliga, experience of 5 years or less 20,000 10,000 
2nd Division 15,000 2,500 
Source:  Own illustration based on data from the DFB. 
 
Only one year after the introduction, base salaries for first and second division referees 
were raised substantially while match fees remained unchanged. In the season 2013/14, 
FIFA referees received a fixed sum of 60,000 € while experienced (inexperienced) Bun-
desliga and second division referees earned 50,000 (40,000) and 25,000 €, respectively. In 
response to the increasing requirements for referees, Wolfgang Niersbach, current DFB 
president, recently announced a further pay raise that is intended to create optimal condi-
tions for top referees in the long term. From the season 2016/17, base salaries will increase 
to 75,000 € for FIFA referees. Bundesliga referees can expect an annual fixed fee of 
55,000 - 65,000 €, depending on their experience, while second division referees will then 
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receive a guaranteed annual base pay of 35,000 €. With respect to the earnings structure it 
is striking that the absolute pay gap between FIFA and Bundesliga referees has remained 
unchanged over the years while it has increased between the two latter and second division 
referees. The relative pay gap, on the other hand, has decreased dramatically over time. 
Whether the ongoing adjustment of (fixed) salaries leads to reduced effort levels of refer-
ees – as predicted by tournament theory – remains to be tested and opens avenues for fu-
ture research. In this paper, however, we explicitly focus on the time period before the in-
troduction of fixed salaries for top division referees. In the following section, we present 
our data, explain the econometric models used in the analyses and display some descriptive 
results. 
3.5 DATA, METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our empirical analyses are based on two distinct datasets. The first covers all matches 
played in the first three divisions in German association football in the four seasons be-
tween 2008/09 and 2011/12 (n = 3,968 matches) and includes a number of match-specific 
variables – such as attendance and a measure of team heterogeneity reflecting match uncer-
tainty – as well as a whole set of referee-specific variables (n = 89 referees). The second 
dataset includes season-level variables of all 89 referees who were active in at least one of 
the four seasons and comprises information on each referee’s qualification level (i.e., the 
division he is appointed to prior to the season), average referee performance and perfor-
mance consistency throughout the season as well as career-related outcomes such as pro-
motion, demotion or career end (n = 251 referee-season observations). The data were ob-
tained from various special editions (and the online source) of “Kicker”, a renowned foot-
ball magazine, while averaged betting odds from the website www.betexplorer.com serve 
as a proxy to compute the teams’ implicit winning probabilities which are then translated 
into a heterogeneity index (see Appendix B).  
We deliberately restrict our datasets to the period of four (consecutive) seasons for two 
reasons: First, season 2008/09 marks the inaugural season of the fundamentally modified 
third division that hitherto consisted of several regional divisions (a three/four-track league 
until 1999/2000 and a two-track league until 2007/08) which were then merged into a na-
tionwide single division.35 Top referees, who are usually appointed to first division match-
                                               
35 The restructuring of the third division was enacted by the DFB in order to foster the already increasing 
professionalization of higher division football in Germany. Since the modification of the league structure, 
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es, also officiate in second and third division fixtures on a regular basis. The same applies 
for designated second division referees who are often assigned to third division matches, 
too. Hence, it is possible to observe and compare the performances of referees with differ-
ent qualification levels. Moreover, we are able to determine a referee’s waiting time be-
tween two assignments in any of the top 3 divisions. Finally, the data allow us to observe 
temporary promotions and demotions (i.e., movements between divisions) of referees. We 
thus contribute to the literature and extend the already mentioned studies by Frick et al. 
(2009a, b) who look at first division matches only.36 Second, season 2011/12 represents the 
last season where referees were paid on a match basis only. With the introduction of annual 
fixed salaries in the subsequent season, the incentives for referees are likely to have 
changed dramatically. In order to obtain a relatively balanced panel with a consistent 
league structure and almost identical incentive schemes across the years – as already 
shown in Figure 3-1, match fees in season 2008/09 were slightly lower than in the follow-
ing three seasons – the two datasets almost necessarily need to be restricted to the current 
observation period. 
We proceed as follows: In section 3.5.1, we present the match-level data of our first dataset 
and define and explain the variables used in the empirical analyses. Subsequently, we pro-
vide some descriptive evidence and elaborate on the econometric models applied. The sea-
son-level data and the corresponding estimation techniques which are used to test for long-
term performance-effects on career progress are described in section 3.5.2. 
3.5.1 MATCH-LEVEL DATA 
Recall that our first dataset includes all 3,968 matches that were played in the first three 
German football divisions in the period 2008/09 to 2011/12. Apart from abundant match-
specific information, we have detailed information on the referee of each fixture. These 
include age, experience (i.e., the number of previous assignments in any of the top divi-
sions), the current qualification level (i.e., first, second or third division referee) as well as 
                                                                                                                                              
third division games have been largely televised, thus guaranteeing third division teams considerable earn-
ings from TV broadcast rights which are an important source of revenues besides gate revenues and sponsor-
ship payments. According to a recent DFB report (see DFB annual financial report 2012/13), the third Ger-
man football league generates more revenues and attracts more fans to the stadia than any other team sport’s 
first division in Germany. 
36 One of the shortcomings of earlier studies is that the status of a referee sometimes tended to be inaccurate-
ly reported: referees who appear to pause for a number of games might in fact be assigned to lower division 
matches. The nomination for a lower division match, in turn, could either imply a sanction on behalf of the 
league officials or manifest the necessity to assign an experienced and qualified umpire to an important lower 
league match. 
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a potential FIFA status. We also include in our dataset a dummy variable indicating wheth-
er a referee is temporarily promoted in the sense that he is assigned to a match in a division 
that is higher than his current qualification level. However, out of 89 different referees in 
our sample only seven were temporarily promoted (n = 37 matches). Among the covariates 
of interest, grade appears to be the most important one as it reflects the performance of a 
referee in a given match in form of a (German) school grade. The best possible grade is 1, 
which corresponds to an immaculate performance, whereas the lowest possible grade, 6, is 
awarded for a woefully insufficient referee performance. It appears from Figure 3-3 that 
the grades are non-normally distributed with the distributions varying across divisions.  
Figure 3-3: Distribution of grades of all referees active in Germany’s top 3 football divisions  
  
  
 
The performance evaluations used in our analyses are conducted by independent monitors 
who observe the referee live at the stadium, while the corresponding grades are published 
by “Kicker” a few days after the match. These independent monitors are different from the 
official delegates of the DFB whose evaluations are usually not disclosed. Yet anecdotal 
evidence suggests that there is a rather high correlation between the official referee evalua-
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tions that are carried out by the DFB and those conducted by independent “Kicker ex-
perts”. Against the backdrop of the already mentioned delay between the actual perfor-
mance assessment and the eventual publication of the score which gives evaluators enough 
time to consult TV images of (and other opinions on) critical scenes, it seems reasonable to 
assume that different evaluators come up with a similar grading.  
In addition to that, we include a number of match-specific variables in order to control for 
the division and season in which a match takes place, the actual match day as well as the 
attendance. Note that divisions 1 and 2 consist of 18 teams each, while division 3 is slight-
ly larger with 20 teams, implying that proportionately more matches are played in the third 
division (380 per season as compared to 306 in the first or second division). Match day 
intends to capture the increasing importance of matches towards the end of the season. 
These matches are often decisive in terms of championship, qualification for the UEFA37 
Champions League and Europa League as well as promotion and relegation.38 Attendance 
is another control variable that is thought to reflect the importance of a match. We use ab-
solute attendance figures instead of capacity utilization to take account of the assumption 
that a near-capacity crowd of 60,000 or more fans requires a more qualified and experi-
enced referee than a sold-out small stadium. Besides, utilization rates – at least in the first 
division – amount to approximately 90 percent and offer little variation. However, since 
attendance is non-normally distributed39 across the three divisions but appears to be right-
skewed (see Figure 3-4), we use LogAttendance. 
                                               
37 Union of European Football Associations. 
38 In order to differentiate between “decisive” and rather unimportant matches taking place on the (pen-) 
ultimate match day we include a dummy variable that is 1 if at least one team is still in contention for any of 
the above mentioned outcomes, and is 0 otherwise. Even though the share of “decisive” matches is almost 60 
percent (133 out of 224), this variable has no statistically significant effect on the nomination outcome and is 
therefore omitted in the estimations. The results are, however, available upon request. 
39 According to the skewness and kurtosis test for normality by D’Agostino et al. (1990) and empirical ad-
justments to this test by Royston (1991c) we can reject the hypothesis that attendance is normally distributed. 
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Figure 3-4: Frequency distribution of attendance figures in Germany’s top 3 football divisions 
     
 
Moreover, we aim to quantify match uncertainty by introducing a heterogeneity measure 
that is based on betting odds. In line with Fama (1970), who argues that in efficient mar-
kets prices fully reflect all information available, it can be assumed that the betting market 
serves as a reliable source of match-relevant information. More specifically, odds issued by 
bookmakers appear to be the most appropriate tool in determining the ex ante relative 
strength of two opposing teams as all publicly available information is assumed to be re-
flected in betting odds. This has been empirically tested by Forrest et al. (2005) who em-
ploy a large sample of almost 10,000 English football matches and convincingly demon-
strate that odds-setters are better forecasters than even the most sophisticated statistical 
models. We use averaged betting odds from the website www.betexplorer.com in order to 
compute the implicit winning probabilities for each team which are then translated into a 
heterogeneity index, PosHET, which takes values between 0 (complete balance) and 1 
(maximum heterogeneity). A sample calculation following Deutscher et al. (2013) can be 
found in Appendix B. Both LogAttendance and PosHet can be interpreted as signals for 
match importance (and thus the necessity to assign a more or less qualified referee to this 
particular fixture) and are included in our estimations so as to reduce the risk of omitted 
variable bias. Detailed summary statistics can be found in Table 3-3. 
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Table 3-3: Summary statistics of the match-level analysis on referee performance and nomination outcomes 
Variable Operationalization # of Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
     
Waiting time in games Waiting time of a referee after an assignment, measured in games 3,879 2.41 1.60 1 24 
Waiting time in days Waiting time of a referee after an assignment, measured in days 3,879 20.10 23.54 1 484 
Nomination in t+1 
Dummy: Equals 1 if referee is nominated for a match of 
the subsequent match day, 0 otherwise 3,940 0.32 - 0 1 
Division in t+x 
Categorical variable indicating the division of a referee’s 
next assignment in t+x 
3,879 2.06 - 1 3 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Referee-Specific Information 
     
Grade 
Referee’s performance evaluation, 1 indicating an immac-
ulate performance, while 6 represents the worst grade that 
is awarded for a very poor performance 
3,968 3.11 1.08 1 6 
Age Referee’s age 3,968 33.41 6.04 20 46 
Experience Referee’s experience, expressed as the number of previous assignments in any of the top divisions 3,968 103.42 100.88 0 357 
Appointed division Referee’s qualification level (i.e., the division appointed prior to the season) 3,968 1.75 - 1 3 
FIFA referee Dummy: Equals 1 if referee is an official FIFA referee, 0 otherwise  3,968 0.24 - 0 1 
Temporary promotion 
Dummy: Equals 1 if referee is assigned to a match of a 
division that is higher than his qualification level, 0 other-
wise 
3,968 0.01 - 0 1 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Match-Specific Information      
Division Categorical variable indicating the division in which the match takes place 3,968 2.08 - 1 3 
Season Categorical variable indicating the season in which the match takes place (1 corresponds to season 2008/09 etc.) 3,968 2.50 - 1 4 
Match day Match day in a given season 3,968 18.27 10.32 1 38 
Attendance Stadium attendance40 3,968 20,174 19,329 1 80,720 
LogAttendance Log transformation of stadium attendance 3,968 9.33 1.24 0 11.30 
Averaged Betting Odds and Heterogeneity (Match Uncertainty) Measures 
   
Odd home win Bookmakers’ average odd for a home win 3,967 2.25 0.87 1.1 17.5 
Odd away win Bookmakers’ average odd for an away win 3,967 3.83 1.90 1.17 22.88 
Odd draw Bookmakers’ average odd for a draw 3,967 3.49 0.48 3.03 8.97 
WinProb home Implicit probability of a home win 3,967 0.45 0.12 0.05 0.85 
                                               
40 In response to different violations of the rules three matches had to take place in the absence of spectators. 
In order to “keep” these observations after the log transformation the respective utilization rates were indicat-
ed as 1. 
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WinProb away Implicit probability of an away win 3,967 0.28 0.11 0.04 0.81 
Prob draw Implicit probability of a draw 3,967 0.27 0.03 0.11 0.30 
Payout ratio Bookmakers’ average payout ratio 3,967 0.92 0.01 0.90 0.95 
HET Heterogeneity (match uncertainty) measure 3,967 0.17 0.23 -0.76 0.81 
PosHET HET, taking only positive values (see Appendix B) 3,967 0.23 0.16 0 0.81 
Note:  The reduced number of observations for all dependent variables is due to the fact that i) for those 
referees who terminated their career during the observation period it is of course impossible to ob-
serve the waiting time until (or the quality/division of) the next assignment, while ii) for the remain-
ing referees in our sample we could only observe the respective last assignment within the observa-
tion period but not a potential next assignment beyond the observation period. The same holds true 
for the 28 referees who were active during the last match day of season 2011/12 in any of the three 
divisions and for whom information on their subsequent match is certainly missing. Betting odds 
and, thus, match uncertainty measures are available for all but one game (i.e., the third division fix-
ture between Erfurt and Dresden in the season 2008/09). 
 
3.5.1.1 ESTIMATING POTENTIAL SHORT-TERM SANCTIONS USING OLS REGRESSION 
As our empirical analyses are based on various regression functions, which will be ex-
plained in more detail below, we model several dependent variables. Testing the hypothe-
sis Hwaiting time requires a response variable that measures a referee’s waiting time between 
his current and his next assignment. In this context, two alternative measures arise, namely 
(i) waiting time in days, and (ii) waiting time in games. Although it appears to be more 
precise at first glance, measuring the waiting time in (calendar) days is prone to bias since 
match days in German top football leagues do not always follow a weekly rhythm. Quite 
the contrary, due to regular mid-week league games as well as national cup and interna-
tional cap breaks, the timespan between two match days usually varies between three days 
and two weeks. Moreover, every season includes a winter break (usually lasting between 
three and six weeks), while an extended summer break of two to four months occurs in-
between two seasons. Given the variation in time between two match days, it is almost 
impossible to adequately determine a referee’s adjusted waiting time (in calendar days) 
between two assignments. On that account, it seems appropriate to measure the waiting 
time in match days. By doing so, we are able to circumvent the obvious bias, as illustrated 
in the following example: A referee who is active on the penultimate match day of seasonj 
and who is again nominated for the second match day of seasonj+1 might have to pause for 
more than 100 days, making it difficult to determine the net waiting time in days. On the 
other hand, the waiting time measured in games (in this case amounting to three games, 
implying that a referee’s next assignment occurs in the third succeeding match) requires no 
further adjustment.  
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In order to test whether a referee’s performance in one particular match has an immediate 
effect on the waiting time (wt) until his next assignment, we estimate an OLS model of the 
following functional form: 
wt = β0 + β1grade + β2appointed division + β3FIFA referee + 
β4LogAttendance + β5age + β6experience + β7PosHET + β8controls 
+ Ɛi, 
where β0 denotes the intercept with the ordinate, ‘controls’ stands for season as well as 
division dummies that are included as control variables in the first model and Ɛi is the un-
explained random error term. Here and in the following, all models are estimated with 
clustered and robust standard errors, using referee ID as cluster variable. Match day and 
temporary promotion turned out to have no statistically significant effect on the waiting 
time (nor on the alternative response variables that are explained in the following sections), 
while leaving the coefficients of the other covariates as well as the explained variance vir-
tually unaffected. Therefore, these variables are omitted in the entire match-level analysis. 
First, we estimate a pooled model that covers all observations of our dataset. In a second 
step, we estimate separate regressions for each division to examine division-specific ef-
fects. 
3.5.1.2 EXAMINATION OF IMMEDIATE SANCTIONS APPLYING PROBIT REGRESSION 
Albeit the average waiting time is 2.4 games (standard deviation = 1.6) some referees have 
to wait significantly longer until their next assignment, thus representing potential outliers 
that could impact the results. In order to capture only immediate nomination effects we 
shall look at the nomination outcome in t+1. The corresponding dependent variable, nomi-
nation in t+1 (nom), is a dichotomous (or binary) outcome variable that equals 1 if a referee 
is nominated for the subsequent match, and is zero otherwise. To explain the correlation 
between a set of independent variables and a binary outcome variable, the most frequently 
applied estimation techniques are logit and probit models. Both are considered superior to 
the linear probability model (LPM) which in fact violates several critical assumptions (see 
Gujarati and Porter 2009: 543-546; Wooldridge 2013: 559-561). Although the coefficients 
of both models have to be interpreted differently, logit and probit estimations yield very 
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similar results.41 For the sake of brevity, we restrict our analysis to probit regressions. The 
underlying model is of the following general form:   
nom = β0 + β1grade + β2appointed division + β3FIFA referee + 
β4LogAttendance + β5experience + β6PosHET + β7season controls + 
Ɛi. 
In anticipation of the results in section 3.6 it should be stated that depending on the divi-
sion, we observe countervailing and to some extent counterintuitive effects for FIFA refer-
ees. To be more precise, FIFA referees who are active in a first division match in t0 have 
the expected higher likelihood of being nominated in t+1 than “ordinary” first division ref-
erees. On the admittedly rare occasion that a FIFA referee is active in the third division (n 
= 71 matches, see Figure 3-6 below) the probability of being nominated for the subsequent 
match is 11 percentage points lower compared to non-FIFA referees who are active in the 
third division.  
This rather surprising result may provide grounds for believing that even top referees are 
penalized for poor performances in the sense that they are degraded to a lower division 
match and/ or are forced into a small break. However, the actual cause appears to be 
somewhat different: The season in the third division usually starts two to four weeks earlier 
than in the first and second division. During that time, a disproportionately large number of 
third division matches is officiated by FIFA referees. The same holds true for “ordinary” 
first and second division referees. Thus, the pool of referees eligible for nomination for the 
first match days in the third division is relatively large as it includes first, second and third 
division referees. In contrast, due to the temporarily increased competitive pressure among 
referees (i.e., a pool of about 60 (instead of the usual 20) referees competes for an assign-
ment in only 10 third division matches per match day), individual chances of being succes-
sively nominated are substantially lower. Therefore, the finding that qualified (FIFA) ref-
erees appear to be sanctioned following an assignment in the third division is most likely 
the result of a temporary oversupply of labor at the beginning of the season. In fact, if the 
                                               
41 The characteristic difference between both methods is the underlying distribution: logit models are based 
on a standard logistic distribution while probit models follow a standard normal distribution. Both distribu-
tions have a mean value of zero but their variances are different (i.e., 1 for the standard normal and π²/3 for 
the standard logistic distribution). Consequently, the normal distribution has slightly thinner tails than the 
logistic distribution, leading to marginally different outcomes towards the tails (see Gujarati and Porter 2009: 
572 for an illustrative example).     
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observations from the first two match days of each season are excluded from the estima-
tions, the alleged “sanctioning effect” disappears, while other findings remain unaffected.42 
3.5.1.3 TESTING SHORT-TERM PROMOTIONS AND DEMOTIONS WITH ORDINAL PROBIT 
AND POISSON REGRESSION 
Notwithstanding the preceding limitations, it seems worthwhile to explicitly test Hdemotion, 
i.e., whether referees who perform poorly in one particular match have a significantly 
higher likelihood of being temporarily demoted to a lower division in their subsequent as-
signment.43 In contrast to the above-mentioned probit regression model, the response vari-
able, division in t+x, can have more than two outcomes and requires a different estimation 
technique. In that regard, the poisson regression model is a particularly well suited econo-
metric tool as it appropriately models count data.  
The characteristic feature of count data is that the dependent variable is discrete and takes 
only a finite number of non-negative integer values. Sometimes, count data are used to 
model rare or infrequent events such as the number of patents applied for by a company in 
a fiscal year. In the underlying study, the response variable can take the values 1, 2 and 3, 
depending on the assigned division. It should be noted that poisson regression, which is 
based on maximum likelihood estimators, usually requires a large sample size (Long and 
Freese 2006; Cameron and Trivedi 2009). This condition is satisfied by our data. Moreo-
ver, a statistically insignificant goodness-of-fit chi-squared test suggests that the poisson 
model fits our data reasonably well.  
On the other hand – for the same reasons discussed for binary response variables – a linear 
model might not adequately reflect all values of the explanatory variables (see Gujarati and 
Porter 2009: 576-579; Wooldridge 2013: 580-585) and is therefore not considered in the 
analysis. However, since the dependent variable, division in t+x, is ordinal, it makes sense 
to additionally estimate an ordinal logit or probit model (commonly referred to as ordered 
logit/probit). Here again, ordered logit and probit models are interchangeable and lead to 
almost identical results. In the following, we refer to the latter. The estimation technique of 
ordered probit is very similar to the bivariate probit model. The distinctive advantage of 
ordered probit is that it is the best estimator for response variables that have more than two 
outcomes and which are ordinal in nature, although the arithmetic gets rather complicated 
                                               
42 The results of these estimations are available from the authors upon request. 
43 Of course, the reverse case is also conceivable in the sense that particularly good performances are reward-
ed with an assignment in a higher division. 
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due to the non-trivial underlying distribution (see Gujarati and Porter 2009: 580). For both 
poisson and ordered probit we estimate a model of the following functional form: 
div = β0 + β1grade + β2appointed division + β3FIFA referee + 
β4LogAttendance + β5experience + β6PosHET + β7season controls + 
Ɛi, 
where div is the response variable, division in t+x, indicating the division of a referee’s sub-
sequent assignment. All estimation results are reported in section 3.6. In the following sec-
tion, we describe our second dataset that includes aggregate referee information at the sea-
son-level. 
3.5.2 SEASON-LEVEL DATA 
In order to investigate empirically whether (i) a referee’s average performance as well as 
the performance consistency throughout the season have a statistically significant effect on 
the likelihood of (permanent) promotion to a higher division (i.e., Hpromotion), and whether 
(ii) top division referees are in fact better than lower division referees in terms of average 
performance (i.e., Hability), we compiled a second dataset with aggregate season-level in-
formation. To explicitly test the first hypothesis, we use a binary response variable, promo-
tion, which indicates whether or not a referee is promoted to a higher division in the subse-
quent season.  
In addition to that, we look at the reverse outcome(s), namely that a referee is (iii) perma-
nently demoted to a lower division – or to a lower status in the case of FIFA referees – 
(i.e., demotion), exits the sample (iv) prematurely (i.e., exit) or (v) due to reaching the age 
threshold of 47 (i.e., retirement). Whereas retirement and demotion only occur rarely, we 
observe quite a number of premature exits every season (which might include demotions to 
the fourth division). Merging the observations of the two latter variables yields our second 
response variable of interest, demotion or exit, which is also a binary outcome variable. For 
the purpose of assessing individual career outcomes following the season 2011/12, we in-
clude information on a referee’s status at the beginning of the season 2012/13. For detailed 
summary statistics see Table 3-4.  
  
The Performance of German Football Referees: Are there Sanctions for Poor Officiating? 57
Table 3-4: Summary statistics of the season-level analysis on referee performance and career progress 
Variable Operationalization # of Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
     
Promotion 
Dummy: Equals 1 if referee is promoted to 
higher division or status in the subsequent 
season, 0 otherwise 
251 0.10 - 0 1 
Demotion or exit 
Dummy: Equals 1 if referee is demoted to 
lower division or status in the subsequent 
season or retires early, 0 otherwise 
251 0.12 - 0 1 
Demotion 
Dummy: Equals 1 if referee is demoted to 
lower division or status in the subsequent 
season, 0 otherwise 
251 0.01 - 0 1 
Exit Dummy: Equals 1 if referee retires early, 0 otherwise 251 0.11 - 0 1 
Retirement Dummy: Equals 1 if referee retires due to the official age limit, 0 otherwise 251 0.01 - 0 1 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES      
AvgGrade Average grade of all assignments of refer-eei in seasonj 
251 3.19 0.36 2.31 4.39 
CV 
Coefficient of variation of avgGrade 
(standard dev. divided by arithmetic 
mean), indicating performance consistency  
251 0.33 0.07 0.12 0.53 
Age Referee’s age 251 31.60 5.80 20 46 
Appointed division 
Categorical variable indicating a referee’s 
qualification level (i.e., the division ap-
pointed prior to the season) 
251 2.02 - 1 3 
FIFA referee Dummy: Equals 1 if referee is an official FIFA referee, 0 otherwise 251 0.15 - 0 1 
Season assignments Number of assignments of refereei in sea-sonj 
251 11.20 3.73 3 21 
Temporary promotion 
Dummy: Equals 1 if referee officiated in a 
higher division than was suggested by his 
appointed division in at least one match of 
the season, 0 otherwise 
251 0.02 - 0 1 
Season Categorical variable indicating the season (1 corresponds to season 2008/09 etc.) 251 2.50 - 1 4 
 
Among all independent variables, the individual average grade of all season assignments 
(avgGrade) is our main variable of interest. Using all 251 referee-season observations, we 
obtain an arithmetic mean of avgGrade of 3.19. Since outliers in performance in single 
matches are likely to be smoothed out throughout the season, avgGrade displays a rather 
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low standard deviation. On the other hand, the difference between the best seasonal aver-
age performance (2.31) and the worst outcome (4.39) is quite substantial, raising the ques-
tion of whether individual performance or performance evaluations vary contingent upon 
the division in which the match takes place. Therefore, we separately computed the aver-
age grade for all matches played in the first, second and third division, respectively (see 
Figure 3-5). 
Figure 3-5: Average individual referee performance separated by division  
  
Note:  Average individual referee performance expressed by average referee grade (y-axis), separated by 
division (x-axis). Source: Own calculations based on data from www.kicker.de. 
 
It appears from Figure 3-5 that referees who are assigned to a first division match receive 
on average poorer grades than referees who are active in a second division match which, in 
turn, tend to perform significantly worse than referees who monitor matches in the third 
division. But does this rather surprising descriptive result necessarily imply that designated 
first division referees perform worse than referees with a lower qualification level (or that 
their performances are simply evaluated more strictly)? Figure 3-6 aims to shed light on 
this somewhat ambiguous issue. 
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Figure 3-6: Average individual referee performance separated by division and qualification level  
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from “Kicker Online”. 
 
The above diagram shows the average performance (i.e., the average grade) of referees (y-
axis) conditional on the division of their individual assignment (x-axis) and their qualifica-
tion level (colored bars). The number of observations for each allocation is indicated on 
top of each bar. With respect to first division matches it appears that FIFA referees receive 
on average significantly better grades than “ordinary” first division referees. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, designated second division referees who are temporarily promoted to a first divi-
sion match on average receive the best grades. However, only about two percent of all first 
division matches are monitored by second division referees. These referees are presumably 
the top performers among their peers and thus represent a positively selected sub-group. At 
least the underlying data reveal that four out of five designated second division referees 
who are temporarily promoted to one or more matches of the next higher division in a par-
ticular season are permanently promoted to the first division after the season. 
A similar picture can be observed with regard to referee performance in second division 
matches. As expected, the higher the qualification level, the better the average perfor-
mance. Again, in the rare case of a temporary promotion (n = 10 matches, monitored by 2 
different referees who are both promoted to the second division after the season), designat-
ed third division referees seem to outperform their higher qualified colleagues – with the 
exception of FIFA referees. The sub-sample comprising all third division matches is prob-
ably most suitable to compare the performances of referees with varying levels of qualifi-
cation as the number of observations for each qualification level is sufficiently high. Here, 
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FIFA referees receive on average by far the best grades, while “ordinary” first and second 
division referees seem to perform significantly better than third division referees.  
These preliminary results are in line with the initial hypothesis, Hability, stating that better 
qualified referees should, on average, perform better and thus receive better average grades 
than their less qualified colleagues. To take up the question that emerged from Figure 3-5 
above, it appears from Figure 3-6 that referee performance in fact deteriorates towards 
higher leagues, irrespective of the individual qualification level. That is, referees who are 
active in a first division match tend to receive poorer grades than equally qualified col-
leagues who are appointed to a second or third division match. This holds true for FIFA 
and first division referees active in all divisions as well as second division referees active 
in the two lower divisions, while third division referees are almost exclusively assigned to 
matches in their appointed division.  
What remains to be tested is whether the observed effect indeed reflects a drop in perfor-
mance or whether poorer grades are simply the result of stricter performance assessments. 
Both are complementary rather than substitutable explanations. On the one hand, in line 
with most of the literature related to crowd effects (see section 3.2.1.4), the increasing 
number of spectators in higher divisions is likely to adversely affect referee performance. 
On the other hand, one of the side effects of the increasing media coverage of higher divi-
sion football is that all individuals are subject to increased monitoring. As a consequence, 
the probability of detecting false referee decisions – be it a wrong offside call or a mistak-
enly awarded red card – is undoubtedly higher in a first division match where critical 
scenes are repeatedly shown from multiple camera angles than in a sparsely broadcasted 
lower division match. 
Summarizing, the aim of the season-level analysis is to identify the determinants of long-
term career success and failure. For that purpose, we estimate two different semi-
parametric proportional hazard models (see Cox 1972) as well as two probit models which 
have the following general form: 
succ./fail. =  β0 + β1avgGrade + β2CV + β3appointed division + β4FIFA referee + 
β5season assignments + β6temporary promotion + β7age + β8season 
controls + Ɛi, 
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where succ./fail. stands for the respective response variable, promotion (demotion or exit), 
which equals 1 in case of a referee’s promotion to a higher division/status (demotion to a 
lower division/status or early retirement) in the subsequent season, and 0 otherwise. Using 
the arithmetic mean and sample standard deviation of individual referee performance, we 
also compute the coefficient of variation (CV) which serves as a performance consistency 
measure. Season assignments is thought to be a good indicator of individual career success 
as the number of assignments per season should reflect both a referee’s current reputation 
and the likelihood of success or failure in t+1. Temporary promotion indicates whether a 
referee is assigned to one or more matches in a division higher than his actual qualification 
level at some point in the season.  
It should also be mentioned that in the season-level analysis we use age instead of experi-
ence as an explanatory variable. The reason is that with respect to long-term career out-
comes age supposedly has more explanatory power than is the case in short-term nomina-
tion decisions. For example, a referee aged 45 might have similar chances of being nomi-
nated for an important match compared to an equally endowed colleague who is a few 
years younger. When it comes to permanent promotion decisions, however, individuals 
approaching retirement age might potentially fare worse than, say, a 35-year-old referee 
with similar characteristics. This, of course, presupposes that the DFB aims at promoting 
its top referees at a rather young age, thus reducing turnover at the top level of refereeing 
and, at the same time, giving the best referees the opportunity to officiate in international 
matches for an extended period of time. 
These assumptions – along with the hypotheses developed in section 3.3 – need to be test-
ed econometrically. We also aim to shed additional light on the descriptive results emerg-
ing from the illustration and discussion of the datasets. The results of our empirical anal-
yses are presented in the next section.   
3.6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In the following, we report the estimation results of both our match-level analyses, examin-
ing the influencing factors of referees’ nomination outcomes in the short run (section 
3.6.1), and our season-level analyses, investigating which factors determine career progress 
of referees in the long run (section 3.6.2). A short summary of the results is provided in 
section 3.6.3.   
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3.6.1 THE IMPACT OF REFEREE PERFORMANCE ON SHORT-TERM NOMINATION 
OUTCOMES 
We begin with the estimation results of the pooled and separate OLS regressions (Table 
3-5). Recall that here and in the following two result tables, all models are estimated using 
robust standard errors (adjusting for clustering of observations by Referee ID).  
Table 3-5: OLS estimation results regarding potential short-term sanctions of referees 
 Pooled OLS Separate OLS 
Response Variable Waiting Time in Games   
 All divisions Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 
Covariates       
Grade 0.019 
(0.023) 
0.024 
(0.024) 
0.021 
(0.024) 
0.019 
(0.019) 
0.059 
(0.036) 
-0.038 
(0.065) 
Appointed  
division 
      
1 Reference category Reference category 
       
2 1.174*** 1.242*** 1.145*** 0.050 1.575*** 0.588*** 
 (0.105) (0.102) (0.116) (0.260) (0.118) (0.107) 
3 1.708*** 1.759*** 1.629*** - 0.124 1.382*** 
 (0.099) (0.107) (0.104)  (0.193) (0.086) 
FIFA referee 0.004 
(0.052) 
-0.151*** 
(0.047) 
-0.054 
(0.041) 
-0.105* 
(0.059) 
-0.079 
(0.088) 
0.329** 
(0.135) 
LogAttendance -0.083** 
(0.037) 
-0.086** 
(0.037) 
-0.081** 
(0.037) 
-0.062 
(0.050) 
-0.058* 
(0.032) 
-0.076 
(0.057) 
Age 0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.006 
(0.007) 
- - - - 
Experience -0.002*** - -0.001*** -0.001** -0.000 -0.002** 
 (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
PosHET 0.020 
(0.130) 
0.018 
(0.128) 
0.018 
(0.130) 
0.040 
(0.146) 
-0.442* 
(0.224) 
0.382 
(0.352) 
Constant 1.985** 
(0.421) 
2.450*** 
(0.383) 
2.716*** 
(0.368) 
2.536*** 
(0.519) 
2.406*** 
(0.351) 
2.431*** 
(0.506) 
       
Season and  
division dummies 
included 
Yes Yes Yes Only 
season 
dummies 
Only sea-
son dum-
mies 
Only sea-
son dum-
mies 
       
Observations 3,878 3,878 3,878 1,210 1,203 1,465 
F 173.80*** 168.95*** 171.97*** 3.17** 74.54*** 92.94*** 
R² 0.219 0.216 0.217 0.022 0.321 0.094 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Coefficients denoting statistical and economic significance are in bold. 
 
In the first three columns, we report the pooled OLS regressions results which include all 
observations of our match-level dataset. All three model specifications are very similar and 
yield almost identical results. The only difference is the alternating inclusion of age and 
experience. Since both variables are highly correlated (at 0.86), the interpretation of the 
coefficients in the first model specification is likely to be biased due to multicollinearity. 
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A weakness of the second specification is that age alone appears to be a poor predictor of 
individual quality. Experience, on the other hand, seems to be a better predictor, as can be 
inferred from (i) its statistically significant (albeit economically irrelevant) coefficient, (ii) 
the “absorbance” of the FIFA referee effect observed in the second specification, as well as 
(iii) a marginally larger coefficient of determination (i.e., “R²”) in the third model specifi-
cation as compared to the second one. The purpose of displaying the results of all three 
specifications (instead of presenting only the third column) is to demonstrate that experi-
ence is a better predictor of individual refereeing quality (and nomination outcomes). Col-
umns 4-6 display the results of the models that we estimated separately for each division.  
Perhaps the most striking result is that referee performance (i.e., grade) seems to have no 
statistically significant impact on the nomination outcome in the short-term. In other 
words, a referee’s performance in one particular match seems to have no effect on the 
length of time until his subsequent employment. In what appears to be the main determi-
nant of short-term nomination outcomes, a referee’s qualification level (i.e., appointed 
division and, to a lesser extent, FIFA referee) exhibits both a statistically and economically 
significant correlation with individual waiting time: The higher a referee’s qualification44, 
the shorter the expected time period until the next assignment.45 For example, a designated 
second division referee who is active in a second division match has to wait on average 1.6 
games longer until his next assignment than a designated first division referee active in the 
same division, irrespective of the refereeing quality in that particular match.46 In terms of 
earnings, longer waiting times between two assignments imply fewer nominations per sea-
son and thus considerable income losses. In the present example, second division referees 
have approximately five assignments less per season, resulting in foregone income of 
about 10,000 €. Regarding the other covariates of interest, reflecting stadium attendance, 
refereeing experience and match uncertainty, we are unable to find persistent and both sta-
tistically and economically significant effects. 
To sum up, it appears that the waiting time between two assignments (and thus the total 
number of employments per season) is independent of individual referee performance in 
                                               
44 Recall that qualification increases with decreasing values for appointed division. 
45 The relatively low R² (of about 2 percent) in the separate estimation for the first division can be explained 
by the fact that out of 1,224 first division matches in our dataset only 28 were monitored by designated sec-
ond division referees (see Figure 3-6), hence causing the major explanatory variable, appointed division, to 
offer almost no variation. Recall that the negative coefficient of FIFA referee in the separate estimation for 
the third division is due to the peculiarities at the start of the season that were discussed in section 3.5.1.2.    
46 Under normal circumstances (i.e., match days are scheduled according to a weekly rhythm), an additional 
waiting time of 1.6 games is equivalent to about 10 calendar days.  
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the previous match but rather seems to be predetermined by a referee’s qualification level. 
Nevertheless, it is worth testing for potential immediate sanctioning effects. Table 3-6 lists 
the results of several probit estimations that seek to identify the determinants of a referee’s 
nomination outcome in t+1. For ease of interpretation, we report marginal effects at the 
means of the covariates.47 
Table 3-6: Marginal effects after probit regression testing for potential immediate sanctions of referees 
Marginal effects after probit regression 
Response Variable Nomination in t+1 
 Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 
Covariates    
Grade -0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.023* 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
Appointed division    
1 Reference category 
    
2 -0.035 -0.403*** -0.143*** 
 (0.118) (0.040) (0.051) 
3 - 0.212* -0.250*** 
  (0.129) (0.046) 
FIFA referee 0.071** 
(0.029) 
0.054 
(0.036) 
-0.108*** 
(0.032) 
LogAttendance 0.084*** 
(0.029) 
0.006 
(0.021) 
0.025** 
(0.013) 
Experience 0.000 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
PosHET -0.082 
(0.069) 
0.149* 
(0.083) 
-0.156* 
(0.085) 
    
Season dummies included Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 1,215 1,215 1,508 
Wald Chi² 33.01*** 206.79*** 134.95*** 
Pseudo R² 0.011 0.198 0.062 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Marginal effects are computed at the means of all covariates, reporting a discrete change from the base 
level for categorical variables and an infinitesimal change for continuous variables. 
Coefficients denoting statistical and economic significance are in bold. 
 
The empirical evidence from the above table reveals a similar picture as in the previous 
estimations. Due to the low variation of appointed division in the first model specification, 
it is not surprising that the ‘Pseudo R²’ is quite low, too. Again, grade appears to have no 
effect on the probability of a nomination in t+1. On the other hand, FIFA referee and 
                                               
47 Instead of the traditional ‘mfx compute’ Stata command we use the more recent ‘margins’ command, 
available in Stata 11 and  newer versions, that enables us to accurately predict the values of independent 
categorical variables. That is, categorical variables (or factor variables), as for instance appointed division, 
are treated as such, while simultaneously computing the probabilities for all continuous variables as in the 
traditional ‘mfx compute’ command. 
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LogAttendance have the expected positive impact on the immediate nomination outcome: 
FIFA referees who are active in a first division match have a 7 percentage points higher 
chance of being nominated (for a match in any division) on the following match day than 
referees without FIFA status. Umpires who are assigned to matches/stadia attracting a huge 
crowd have a significantly higher likelihood of nomination in t+1 than referees who are 
nominated for less attended matches, all else being equal. When interpreting the coeffi-
cients, however, one has to be cautious with the direction of causality. It seems more likely 
that those referees who are selected for important matches are per se the ones who are fa-
vored by the DFB in terms of the number and quality of nominations. 
The empirical evidence derived from matches played in the second and third division is 
perhaps more convincing because of the far more heterogeneous pool of referees. As a 
consequence, appointed division once more appears to be the main influencing factor of 
the nomination outcome: The better the qualification, the higher the likelihood of a succes-
sive nomination. For example, a designated first division referee active in a second divi-
sion match has a 40 percentage points higher chance of being nominated in t+1 than a sec-
ond division referee, all other conditions remaining the same. Interestingly, third division 
referees who are temporarily promoted to the second division fare significantly better than 
first and second division referees. Whether this result reflects favorable treatment of pro-
motion candidates or simply represents a “statistical artefact” due to the small number of 
observations (n = 10) cannot be conclusively answered with the data used here. The coun-
terintuitive result for FIFA referees active in the third division has been discussed before. 
Grade is statistically significant at the 10 percent level in the second model specification. 
The economic relevance, however, is rather low. A one unit change of grade – which is 
already substantial, given a mean of 3.11 and a standard deviation of 1.08 – leads to a two 
percentage points change in the probability of nomination. Match uncertainty (i.e., PosH-
ET) has a statistically barely significant impact with the expected direction in the third di-
vision. That is, referees who are assigned to matches with two equally strong teams are 
more likely to be nominated in the subsequent match than similarly endowed referees mon-
itoring two rather uneven opponents. Of course, this result is indicative of selection effects 
in the sense that “more able” referees are assigned to more balanced matches. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, the reverse effect seems to be true for referees who are active in the second divi-
sion. Therefore, the overall effect of match uncertainty should be interpreted cautiously.  
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The empirical analyses presented so far include an outcome variable that basically reflects 
a referee’s waiting time between two assignments and the probability of a consecutive 
nomination, respectively. In both cases, we can draw conclusions as to what determines the 
mere number or frequency of assignments. In order to learn more about the determinants of 
the (income-relevant) quality (i.e., the division) of individual assignments and to empirical-
ly answer the question of whether poor referee performance is sanctioned in the form of a 
temporary demotion to a lower division, we have estimated separate poisson and ordered 
probit regressions for each division.  
Table 3-7: Poisson and ordered probit estimation results on qualitative sanctions for referees 
 Poisson Regression Ordered Probit Regression 
Response Variable Division in t+x   
 Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 Division 1 Division 2 Division 3 
Covariates       
Grade 0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
0.038 
(0.026) 
-0.003 
(0.028) 
-0.102 
(0.063) 
Appointed  
division: 
      
1 Reference category Reference category 
       
2 -0.010 
(0.039) 
0.426*** 
(0.050) 
0.346*** 
(0.040) 
-0.023 
(0.105) 
1.384*** 
(0.192) 
1.471*** 
(0.192) 
3 - 0.556*** 
(0.075) 
0.677*** 
(0.044) 
- 2.221*** 
(0.546) 
4.570*** 
(0.302) 
FIFA referee -0.113*** 
(0.036) 
-0.033 
(0.059) 
-0.260*** 
(0.068) 
-0.308*** 
(0.098) 
-0.079 
(0.213) 
-1.000*** 
(0.278) 
Experience -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
LogAttendance -0.019 
(0.035) 
0.025** 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.048 
(0.095) 
0.098** 
(0.041) 
-0.089 
(0.055) 
PosHET -0.021 
(0.059) 
-0.050 
(0.062) 
0.029 
(0.026) 
-0.051 
(0.162) 
-0.174 
(0.248) 
0.370 
(0.376) 
Constant 0.765*** 
(0.371) 
0.278*** 
(0.107) 
0.462*** 
(0.050) 
- - - 
       
Season  
dummies included 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 1,210 1,203 1,465 1,210 1,203 1,465 
Wald Chi² 93.38*** 704.64*** 2063.56*** 88.02*** 242.42*** 409.55*** 
Pseudo R² 0.005 0.056 0.048 0.025 0.269 0.636 
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The computation and interpretation of marginal effects is not very useful in regression 
analyses where the dependent variable is a multiple outcome variable.48 In particular with 
                                               
48 By estimating marginal effects we would undo the very advantage of poisson and ordered probit regres-
sion: The point of applying these kinds of regression techniques is that one can use the ordered nature of the 
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respect to ordered probit one has to be very cautious when interpreting the coefficients in 
this model (Greene 2000: 878). Therefore, we report ‘plain’ regression results which allow 
determining the direction and level of statistical significance, but not the exact magnitude 
of each effect. Despite this limitation, we obtain unambiguous results that are robust to 
different specifications. First, and in line with the above results, we are unable to find evi-
dence for any performance-related short-term sanctions. In other words, no matter how 
poor (or excellent) a referee’s performance in one particular match, it will not affect the 
appointed division (and, thus, the level of remuneration) in the subsequent assignment. 
Second, individual qualification/status appears to be the main determinant of the outcome 
variable: FIFA referees are less likely to be assigned to a lower division in t+x than “ordi-
nary” first division referees.49 Moreover, the evidence from second and third division 
matches reveals that appointed division has the expected impact on the nomination out-
come: The higher a referee’s qualification level, the more likely is ceteris paribus a subse-
quent assignment to a higher division.50 However, the latter effect has to be interpreted 
carefully due to a potential endogeneity problem: Since only few designated second (third) 
division referees are assigned to first (second) division matches, while third division refer-
ees are categorically excluded from first division matches (see Figure 3-6), a large part of 
the effect is likely to be caused by unobservable nomination restrictions on the part of the 
DFB. 
All in all, the empirical evidence presented in this section suggests that short-term nomina-
tion decisions are, by and large, based on ex ante selection effects rather than the result of 
immediate performance evaluations.  
  
                                                                                                                                              
response variable to estimate the overall effect for each explanatory variable. Marginal effects, on the other 
hand, show the effects for each category of the response variable, similar to a multinomial probit or logit 
regression (Liao 1994: 41-47; Borooah 2002: 12-15), which is clearly not the most suitable way to interpret 
our results. 
49 Note that this effect is statistically insignificant in the specifications which are estimated separately for 
second division matches. 
50 Recall that larger numbers are associated with a lower qualification level with respect to the x-variable and 
a lower division of assignment regarding the y-variable. With the first division being the reference category, 
positive coefficients indicate an expected lower division of assignment in the subsequent match. 
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3.6.2 THE IMPACT OF REFEREE PERFORMANCE ON LONG-TERM CAREER PRO-
GRESS 
In this section, we present and discuss the empirical evidence on the determinants of long-
term career progress. 
Table 3-8: Hazard ratios and marginal effects for career progress 
Cox Proportional-
Hazard Model 
(1.1) 
Probit Model 
(1.2) 
Cox Proportional-
Hazard Model 
(2.1) 
Probit Model 
(2.2) 
Response Variable Promotion Demotion or Exit 
  Hazard Ratio dy/dx Hazard Ratio dy/dx 
Covariates 
AvgGrade 0.070*** -0.159*** 0.473 -0.043 
(0.056) (0.045) (0.299) (0.054) 
CV 0.080 -0.149 0.290 0.006 
(0.216) (0.186) (0.826) (0.230) 
Appointed division     
1 Reference category 
     
2 0.236 -0.033 0.767 -0.033 
 (0.279) (0.044) (0.570) (0.041) 
3 0.446 -0.038 6.763** 0.197** 
(0.429) (0.047) (5.411) (0.092) 
FIFA referee - - 0.708 0.050 
   (0.673) (0.077) 
Season assignments 0.911 -0.004 0.747*** -0.030*** 
(0.104) (0.006) (0.062) (0.008) 
Temporary promotion 12.17*** - - - 
(6.571)  
Age 0.891* -0.009** 1.162*** 0.010*** 
(0.061) (0.004) (0.060) (0.004) 
     
Season dummies included - Yes - Yes 
Observations 251 251 251 251 
No. of Failures 24 - 29 - 
Time at Risk 627 - 627 - 
LR Chi² / Wald Chi² 35.06*** 38.43*** 28.93*** 55.51** 
Pseudo R2 - 0.151 - 0.213 
In parentheses, we report robust standard errors for models 1.1 and 2.1, while we report clustered robust 
standard errors for models 1.2 and 2.2. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Marginal effects are computed at the means of all covariates, reporting a discrete change from the base 
level for categorical variables and an infinitesimal change for continuous variables. In some estimations, 
temporary promotion predicts success and failure perfectly and is therefore omitted. FIFA referee is 
omitted in the first two model specifications due to the impossibility of further promotion. Season dum-
mies are of course not included in the Cox estimations, while the inclusion of a time trend left the results 
unchanged. Probit regressions are estimated with clustered and robust standard errors, using referee ID as 
cluster variable. Results are robust to models estimated separately for each division, which are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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In Table 3-8 we report the results of our estimations. We present both hazard ratios51 and 
marginal effects that have to be interpreted differently. The hazard ratios in the first model 
specification indicate an individual’s probability of being promoted to a higher divi-
sion/status in t+1, conditional on having been active until the previous season. Hazard ratios 
smaller than 1 imply a reduction of the promotion probability. The closer the hazard ratio 
is to zero, the less likely is the event to be explained. In the underlying example, age dis-
plays a hazard ratio of 0.89, implying that a one year older referee has a ceteris paribus 11 
percent lower likelihood of promotion than his younger counterpart. That is, every addi-
tional year of age appears to impede career progress quite substantially. Although this re-
sult is barely statistically significant at the 0.1 level, it remains robust in the probit specifi-
cation (see results in the second column), albeit the magnitude of the effect is smaller 
there. Moreover, in accordance with our assumption in section 3.5.2, referees who are tem-
porarily promoted to one or more matches of the next higher division in a particular season 
are almost certainly permanently promoted to the higher division after the season. Since 
temporary promotion almost perfectly predicts promotion (as well as demotion or exit), it 
is not included in the remaining estimations.  
A particularly striking result is that although referee performance appears to have no im-
pact on short-term nomination outcomes (as shown in section 3.6.1), avgGrade has a statis-
tically significant and economically relevant effect on long-term career advancement (i.e., 
the probability of promotion): The better the average performance throughout the season, 
the higher the likelihood of promotion. This result is robust to a wide range of different 
specifications (of which only the above Cox and probit estimations are presented).  
Perhaps surprisingly, neither performance consistency, CV, nor the number of nominations 
per season, season assignments, nor a referee’s qualification level, appointed division, 
have an effect on long-term career progress. In the face of these results, it appears that the 
DFB’s tournament-like ranking system is effective – at least in the long term – in identify-
ing and rewarding the on average most productive agents. 
                                               
51 A methodological note with regard to the Cox proportional hazard models is warranted: Unlike in “tradi-
tional” survival analysis, where subjects exit the sample after the event of interest (e.g. death or career end), 
the individuals in our sample are usually still active after a promotion (or demotion) and hence need to be 
continuously observed. Otherwise, one would waste possibly relevant information. Moreover, some referees 
are promoted to a higher division/status more than once during the observation period. One way of analyzing 
multiple failure time data without losing relevant information is to estimate the models without specifying a 
multiple record ID variable (here: referee ID) in Stata. 
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The empirical evidence on the determinants of career setbacks is somewhat different. First, 
neither avgGrade nor CV seem to have a systematic impact on the probability of a refer-
ee’s demotion to a lower division or a premature end of the refereeing career. Instead, ca-
reer failure appears to be strongly affected by a referee’s age as well as his current qualifi-
cation level (i.e., appointed division). More specifically, designated third division referees 
are at a far greater risk of being demoted or of terminating their career52 than referees with 
similar characteristics, but who are “higher up the hierarchy”. Second, and in line with the 
above finding that every additional year of age significantly impedes career advancement, 
age also has the expected impact on career setbacks: The older a referee, the more likely is 
ceteris paribus some form of career-related failure. Third, it appears that the number of 
individual assignments per season affects the outcome in the expected direction. That is, 
the larger the number of assignments per season, the lower is the likelihood of individual 
failure, and vice versa. This result, however, should be interpreted with caution, as the di-
rection of causality is unclear. Do referees react to personal underemployment (and thus 
foregone income) by terminating their career and instead falling back on potentially more 
lucrative outside options? Or is a smaller number of assignments the result of a long-
planned career decision on behalf of the DFB? Besides that, one should be aware of a po-
tential endogeneity issue: Referees who terminate their career in mid-season almost neces-
sarily have fewer assignments than their colleagues. The data do not allow determining 
whether a referee in fact terminates his career in the middle of the season, or whether he is 
simply not considered for nomination in the second part of the season. This information is 
contained in the error term which in turn might be correlated with the independent variable 
(i.e., season assignments). 
3.6.3 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
Irrespective of the already mentioned limitations, the intuition arising from the accumulat-
ed evidence on the determinants of referees’ (short- and long-term) career outcomes is 
straightforward. 
With regard to the match-level analyses it appears that short-term nomination decisions are 
unaffected by individual performance (in the previous match). That is, even very poor ref-
ereeing does not entail any short-term sanctions whatsoever; nor are particularly good per-
                                               
52 Due to data limitations – refereeing activity is only observed in the three highest divisions – we cannot 
distinguish between demotion and exit in the case of third division referees. Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that only few referees are in fact demoted to a lower division while the majority terminates their career prem-
aturely.  
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formances rewarded with the prospect of a follow-up assignment and/or a nomination to a 
higher division (which would be associated with considerably higher earnings). In what 
seems to be the main determinant of short-term nomination decisions, the individual quali-
fication level (i.e., appointed division) significantly influences when, where and how often 
individual assignments occur. These findings lead one to suspect that the DFB – contrary 
to official statements – determines referee assignments well in advance (thus ruling out 
potential short-term performance effects). 
The season-level analyses, in turn, suggest that in the long term, individual performance 
indeed matters and has a statistically significant impact on career progress: The better a 
referee’s average performance throughout a particular season (as measured by individual 
“Kicker” grades), the more likely he is to get promoted to a higher division or status in the 
subsequent season. Those failing to “move up the ladder” are increasingly threatened by 
demotion or even premature termination of their career with increasing age.  
3.7 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RE-
SEARCH 
Applying a wide range of different regression models to two distinct and hitherto unavaila-
ble datasets that include referee- and match-specific information spanning four seasons of 
the top 3 German football divisions, we analyze the determinants of referees’ career out-
comes. Although (short-term) nomination decisions at the match-level appear to be inde-
pendent of a referee’s performance in the previous assignment (but are rather subject to ex 
ante selection effects), long-term career progress seems to heavily depend on individual 
performance. Thus, in line with the recommendations emerging from tournament theory, 
the DFB apparently succeeds in identifying and rewarding the most productive agents in 
the long term. This, in turn, suggests that, in the long run, labor market inefficiencies due 
to favoritism, random selection, and the like are presumably rather small (if existent at all). 
The evidence resulting from the match-level analyses, however, gives rise to question the 
effectiveness of the football association’s recurring hiring decisions. If neither poor nor 
particularly good performances in single matches have an effect upon the subsequent nom-
ination outcome, individuals are perhaps less inclined to constantly exert maximum effort. 
Short-term nomination decisions with a stronger focus on the most recent individual per-
formance could help to align the interests of the football association and the referees. 
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Moreover, it appears that the DFB prefers an ‘up-or-out’ principle to career progression. 
That is, referees are either promoted to the next higher division on a regular basis or some-
how forced to terminate their career. Whether the (few) observed cases of premature career 
terminations are indeed actively enforced by the DFB or not, cannot explicitly be tested 
with the available data. It is also conceivable that referees who are “stuck” in a lower divi-
sion and who are attracted by potentially more lucrative outside options more or less vol-
untarily end their career. Qualitative data (e.g. interviews with referees who quit their ca-
reer prematurely) could shed further light on this matter. 
A limitation of this study is that all information concerning referee performance is based 
on performance evaluations conducted by independent “Kicker experts”, whereas official 
evaluations carried out by the DFB were not available for this period. Yet anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that there is a rather high correlation between both grading systems. After 
all, “Kicker” as well as official DFB grades are disclosed (internally, for the latter) a few 
days after each match. Given the extensive broadcasting of critical referee decisions in the 
meantime, systematic differences in the performance assessments of referees appear very 
unlikely.  
Finally, the recent professionalization of referees in German association football represents 
an institutional change worth investigating. Future research in this field could examine 
whether the (still ongoing) modification of the pay regime has an effect on e.g. individual 
career length. One would expect that the introduction of an additional annual fixed salary 
reduces the expected value of the outside option and thus induces referees to “stay in the 
business” for as long as possible. 
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3.8 APPENDIX B 
The following example intends to illustrate how betting odds can be used to quantify the 
degree of heterogeneity (i.e., match uncertainty) of opposing teams. On match day 13 of 
the 2011/12 season, Bayern Munich played Borussia Dortmund at home, and was clearly 
favored by the bookmakers. The odds for a home win, draw and away win were 1.60, 3.89 
and 5.50, respectively, implying that bettors received an amount of 5.50 € for every euro 
they had placed on the away team (as Borussia Dortmund won this match). By summing 
up the inverse of these quotes, we obtain the so-called payout ratio: 
payout ratio= 11
Payoff home win+
1
Payoff draw+
1
Payoff away win
. 
Using the above odds yields the following equation:               
payout ratio= 11
1.60+
1
3.89+
1
5.50
, 
which results in a payout ratio of 0.94, indicating that 94 percent of the money staked by 
bettors is paid out to them again, while the remaining share of 6 percent represents the 
bookmakers’ average margin for this particular game (which indeed varies considerably 
between different bookmakers). In the next step, the implicit winning probabilities can be 
calculated by dividing the payout ratio by the payoffs associated with the different match 
outcomes. This yields an implicit probability of a home win of 0.59, while the implicit 
probabilities of a draw and an away win are 0.24 and 0.17, respectively. In order to quanti-
fy the degree of heterogeneity between the teams, HET is introduced which is defined as 
the difference between the implicit probabilities of a home win (PH) and an away win (PA):   
HET = PH – PA. 
HET can take values between -1 and +1, where negative values are indicative of the away 
team being favored by the bookmakers while positive values point at a home team favorite. 
Values close to zero suggest that the opposing teams are homogeneous in their abilities 
(and prospects of winning) and hence imply a high degree of match uncertainty. Values 
close to -1 and +1, on the other hand, indicate a presumably less balanced match with ra-
ther heterogeneous opponents. In the above example HET amounts to 0.42, identifying 
Bayern Munich as clear home favorite (the average home advantage – as expressed by a 
HET value of 0.17 in Table 3-3 – is considerably smaller). 
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For ease of interpretation we refrain from a differentiation between home and away favor-
ites and introduce PosHET, which takes only positive values varying between zero and 
one. The advantage of PosHET is that larger regression coefficients indicate a higher de-
gree of heterogeneity whereas with HET one would have to disentangle the effects of home 
and away favorites (which is not necessary for the purpose of this study).  
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4 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN COMPETITIVENESS: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE FROM LONG-DISTANCE RACES 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The prevalence of a substantial gender gap in competitiveness53 has been documented and 
discussed by a large and diverse body of literature. Yet, the reasons for its emergence (and 
persistence) remain highly contested. One school of thought states that genetic and/ or psy-
chological predispositions cause the observed sex differences. More recent studies show 
that particularly in the sports environment the gender gap – although still existent – has 
narrowed over the years (see Frick 2011a, 2011b). This supports the ‘culture-and-
incentives-hypothesis’ which posits that (i) changing socio-cultural conditions, which fos-
ter a similar socialization of boys and girls in a growing number of countries over the 
world, enable more women to engage in competitive sports, and (ii) adjusted incentive 
systems (such as identical prize money levels and distributions) encourage women to train 
as hard as equally talented men.  
Since long-distance races signal enduring competitiveness and both men and women usual-
ly compete at the same time and under equal conditions, they are an ideal setting to analyze 
gender differences in competitiveness. Using repeated cross-sectional data from the annual 
long-distance triathlon World Championship (also known as “Ironman Hawaii”), the 
“Swiss Alpine Marathon”, a mountain ultra-marathon, as well as the “Vasaloppet”, a long-
distance cross-country ski race in Sweden, it appears that women have indeed become 
more competitive over time (at least in the first two events, while the results are somewhat 
different for the “Vasaloppet”). This, however, seems to be caused by an influx of (intrin-
sically) motivated female athletes who cannot reasonably target the top positions (and thus 
the “money ranks”), suggesting that societal changes rather than monetary incentives ex-
plain the observed reduction of gender differences. Hence, this paper adds to the existing 
(sports economics) literature by providing evidence for a decrease of gender differences in 
competitiveness among less talented and rather intrinsically motivated contestants.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides a selective review 
of the recent literature – both experimental and non-experimental. Section 4.3 describes the 
                                               
53 Competitiveness is defined here as the ability and willingness to deliberately perform a task in a competi-
tive environment. 
Gender Differences in Competitiveness: Empirical Evidence from Long-Distance Races 76
data and methodology and offers some descriptive evidence. Section 4.4 presents the econ-
ometric evidence while the main findings are discussed in section 4.5.    
4.2 PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH  
Despite recent gender policy developments in industrial countries, women are still un-
derrepresented in leading positions in management and academia. For instance, the boards 
of directors and top executive positions of the FTSE 100 are predominantly reserved for 
men: In 2012, only 14.8 percent of the seats were held by women. If only top executive 
positions are considered, the share of women is considerably smaller, equaling roughly 6 
percent (Sealy and Vinnicombe 2013). Although gender inequalities seem to be most pro-
nounced in the labor market – and in particular on the far right tail of the income distribu-
tion – there is ample evidence for significant gender differences in various other competi-
tive settings.54 
Regardless of the already large and still growing literature on gender differences in com-
petitive environments, a consensus concerning the reasons for the emergence (and persis-
tence) of the observed gender gap in competitiveness has yet to be reached. A contested 
issue, for instance, is whether gender differences are due to genetic differences or behav-
ioral characteristics. While a number of empirical studies suggest that a gender gap in 
competitiveness is most likely evoked by particular circumstances – such as a promotion 
tournament, where the pressure to succeed is high – an equally large number of laboratory 
studies using data from “real life experiments” are unable to find statistically significant 
gender differences. Finally, a wide-ranging and still increasing number of publications use 
professional sports data to analyze and explain gender differences of highly (self-)selected 
                                               
54 The observable inequalities on the playing field are often – at least to some extent – explained by deeply 
embedded gender differences caused by inherent traits and societal norms which are only gradually changing 
(see, inter alia, Gneezy et al. 2009 and Booth and Nolen 2012). A large part, however, has to be attributed to 
discriminatory practices. Schneider and Bauhoff (2013), for example, find a surprisingly large share of job 
adverts discriminating with respect to gender despite the General Act on Equal Treatment that has been en-
acted in Germany in 2006. Using the so-called correspondence method to study discrimination in the German 
labor market of apprentices, Kolle (2014) emphasizes that gender discrimination in hiring seems to be most 
pronounced in male-dominated jobs. In an attempt to tackle discriminatory practices in the recruitment pro-
cess – one of the “opposable” causes for gender inequalities – anonymous application procedures (AAP), 
which are already common practice in the US, were introduced in pilot projects in several European econo-
mies. As a result, women had an increased probability of being offered a job under AAP (Åslund and 
Nordström Skans 2012). Looking at “blind” auditions of professional musicians (each candidate’s identity 
was concealed by a screen) Goldin and Rouse (2000) find similar evidence in the sense that the proportion of 
women in symphony orchestras increased under the “anonymous” (or “blind”) audition. 
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athletes with similar aspirations and “competitive motivations”.55 Notwithstanding the 
above-mentioned merits, all three strands of literature also suffer from (major) shortcom-
ings which, to some extent, might explain the difficulties to obtain unanimous results when 
trying to answer one of the presumably most pertinent questions in the field of gender eco-
nomics (i.e., do men and women indeed differ in their (competitive) behavior, risk prefer-
ences, productivity, and the like, and, if so, how much of the apparent gender inequalities 
in the field can be explained by these differences?).   
4.2.1 REAL-LIFE EVIDENCE 
Using real-world data drawn from “naturalistic experiments”, a number of studies find 
considerable gender differences in risk-taking and in performance under competitive pres-
sure. Analyzing quantitative data obtained from test scores of Czech secondary-school 
graduates applying to tuition-free selective universities, Jurajda and Münich (2008, 2011) 
find that women perform significantly worse than equally able men in competitive situa-
tions. Since they show that women do not shy away from selecting themselves into highly 
competitive application programs the authors reject differences in risk aversion as a possi-
ble explanation for the observed gender gap. Along the same lines, Ors et al. (2008, 2013) 
provide similar evidence by showing that the performance of female applicants during ad-
mission tests at a French elite university is significantly worse than the performance of 
male applicants. Again, differences in risk aversion and ability cannot explain the observed 
results, because women perform significantly better in high school exams as well as during 
their first year after admission to the university, suggesting that women tend to “choke” in 
competitive environments. Attali et al. (2011) compare the performance on the Graduate 
Record Examinations (GRE), a standardized test that is used by many graduate schools in 
the US as a selection tool, with the performance of an experimentally designed second 
GRE taking place immediately after the “real” test. The authors document a greater gender 
gap in the competitive and largely incentivized “real” GRE than in the experimental GRE 
which they attribute to men performing better under competitive pressure, i.e. when the 
stakes are particularly high. Price (2008) examines how students at various high-ranked 
academic institutions in the US respond to the “Mellon Foundation’s Graduate Education 
                                               
55 Using data from 100 meter races (ranging from world-class competitions such as the finals of the Olympic 
Games and the IAAF World Championships to national and regional races in Germany), Frick and Scheel 
(2013) find that women exhibit a lower degree of competitiveness than men in the finals of federal state and 
national races while they cannot find any significant gender differences at the international level; i.e. the 
“closeness” or “competitive balance” of international top races is the same for female and male competitions. 
Note that large parts of the following literature review are borrowed from Frick and Scheel (2013).   
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Initiative”, a competitive scholarship program that was initially designed to encourage stu-
dents to make quick progress toward their degree. As a result, the time to candidacy was 
significantly reduced for male, but not for female students. Moreover, the reduction in time 
to candidacy was greater for both males and females when a larger fraction of the compet-
ing cohort was female. 
Hogarth et al. (2012) find gender differences in a competitive environment which they at-
tribute to differences in risk preferences. Exploiting the natural experiment of a TV game 
show, where candidates answer general knowledge questions in multiple rounds, the au-
thors reveal that women earn 40% less than male contestants and exit the game voluntarily 
and earlier than men particularly when being in a minority.56 Corroborating the latter re-
sult, Neelakantan (2010) finds that approximately 10% of the gender gap in accumulated 
wealth of elderly Americans ($194,000 for men and $95,000 for women) can be attributed 
to differences in risk-taking as women are found to be more conservative investors with a 
significantly lower probability to invest in stocks.  
The following studies are unable to find any persistent behavioral gender differences and 
thus stand in stark contrast to the findings presented so far. Using data from the British 
“Workplace Employees Relations Survey”, Manning and Saidi (2010) analyze earnings 
and work effort under performance pay and find very modest (if any) evidence for gender 
specific differences with respect to sorting into the performance pay scheme. Moreover, 
they find only a small effect of performance pay on earnings which does not significantly 
differ by gender. Delfgaauw et al. (2009) conduct a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain 
consisting of 128 stores. Following the introduction of short-term sales competitions 
among randomly chosen subsamples of these stores they find large positive effects on sales 
growth, but only in stores where the manager and a large fraction of the workforce are of 
the same gender. That is, shops with mostly female staff and a female manager improve 
their performance under competitive pressure to the same extent as male-dominated shops 
with a male manager. Interestingly enough, these results hold true even in the absence of 
                                               
56 In a similar type of study, using data from the TV game show “The Weakest Link”, Antonovics et al. 
(2009) find that women’s likelihood of correctly answering a question is unaffected by the opponent’s gender 
whereas men are more likely to give a correct answer when competing against a woman. Säve-Söderbergh 
and Lindquist (2011) analyze the behavior of candidates in the game show “Jeopardy” and find that women 
play more conservatively when facing male competitors only, which is associated with significantly lower 
earnings for women. 
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any monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value of winning a tournament.57 In a 
similar academic setting as in the aforementioned studies by Jurajda and Münich (2008, 
2011) and Ors et al. (2008, 2013), which document the existence of a considerable gender 
gap in highly competitive and stressful situations, Leuven et al. (2011) find gender differ-
ences neither in sorting nor in performance among male and female students of an intro-
ductory microeconomics course. In a study using performance data of Israeli teachers, 
Lavy (2008, 2012) finds that the performance of mathematics and language teachers is 
neither affected by the introduction of a competitive remuneration scheme, nor by the gen-
der composition of the group of teachers at a particular school. The evidence suggests that 
after the introduction of a performance-related bonus system neither the average rank, nor 
the probability of winning a prize (or the size of the prize) differs by gender and that the 
gender composition of the groups of teachers competing with each other did not affect the 
performance of female teachers either. Exploring gender differences in risk aversion and 
negotiating practices, Feidakis and Tsaoussi (2009) compare the behavior of Greek attor-
neys, Greek business students and a control group consisting of young employees in public 
and private organizations and are unable to find any statistically significant gender differ-
ences among attorneys. They argue that gender differences are unlikely to occur in groups 
of employees with a distinct professional culture.      
4.2.2 LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS 
While the majority of the studies quoted above come to the general conclusion that women 
perform worse under pressure than men, a number of laboratory experiments provide dif-
ferent evidence. Shurchkov (2008) for example asked students from Harvard Business 
School, MIT and Boston University to perform a verbal task (generally considered to favor 
women) under varying conditions. The participants were divided in groups of four and 
required to solve word-in-word puzzles in a limited amount of time.58 To examine the in-
fluence of competitive pressure on participants, the experiment was conducted in two stag-
es. In the first round, a piece-rate reward scheme was used, i.e. participants solved their 
tasks in a non-competitive environment as their compensation was determined by their 
absolute rather than their relative performance. In the second round, a winner-takes-all 
tournament was introduced which only rewarded the winner of a respective group while 
                                               
57 This assumption is further supported by the fact that despite the considerable variation in team size the 
authors are unable to find any evidence for free-riding. 
58 In a word-in-word puzzle the objective is to form as many words as possible from the letters of another 
long word. 
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the other group members did not receive any compensation for their efforts. The behavior 
of male and female participants proved to be similar in the non-competitive as well as in 
the tournament setting. In fact, both men and women were found to not increase their per-
formance as a result of competitive pressure. Hence, Shurchkov (2008) finds no evidence 
that women underperform relative to men in a competitive environment.59  
Much in line with these latter results, Dreber et al. (2011) find no difference in perfor-
mance under competitive pressure of seven to ten year old boys and girls in Sweden. Fol-
lowing the initial research conducted with nine to ten year old school children in Israel by 
Gneezy and Rustichini (2004)60, Dreber et al. (2011) replicated the field experiment with 
children from eleven primary schools in the Stockholm area. In addition to competing in 
short distance races (60m), the children engaged in rope skipping and modern dancing, two 
tasks that were deliberately chosen as they are perceived as rather advantageous for girls. 
In the first round of the experiment the children had to perform the respective task sepa-
rately with no direct competition. In the second round the children were matched in pairs 
according to their performance in the first round. As expected, the boys on average ran 
faster while the girls performed better in rope skipping and dancing. However, no differ-
ences in the performance under competitive pressure were found between boys and girls. A 
possible explanation for the contradictory results of both studies is that children in rather 
male-dominated societies (e.g. Israel) experience a different socialization and nurture than 
children in a more gender-equal society (e.g. Sweden).61 In a similar vein, Cárdenas et al. 
(2012) examine gender differences in competitiveness and risk taking among children aged 
9-12 in Colombia and Sweden, two countries ranked 55th and 4th in terms of gender equali-
ty according to various macro-economic indices. Surprisingly, boys and girls proved to be 
equally competitive in all tasks in Colombia whereas the results for Sweden were mixed. 
                                               
59 Corroborating this result, Cotton et al. (2010) find that even in a typically male-dominated task (i.e. a mul-
tiple-stage math tournament) the initial underperformance of women disappears in the later stages of the 
competition. In a more recent study Shurchkov (2012) examines two task stereotypes (math exercises vs. 
verbal tasks) under different competitive regimes and time constraints and finds that men outperform women 
in a high-pressure math-based tournament while women prevail in a low-pressure verbal task. 
60 The children had to run a track of 40 meters twice, first alone and then matched with a child of equal abil-
ity. While boys increased their effort (i.e., they ran faster) in the second (competitive) stage, the girls’ per-
formance was unaffected by the setting.   
61 Following a meta-analysis of 109 studies using performance data of the so-called “20 meters shuttle run 
test” (performed in 37 countries between 1981 and 2003, including more than 400,000 children), Cazorla et 
al. (2006) come to a different result. They find that the differences between the sexes are consistent across a 
large number of countries with different social, political and economic systems, hence supporting the “biolo-
gy-and-predispositions-hypothesis”. However, unlike in the two afore-mentioned studies the children were 
not matched in pairs but all ran alone, i.e. the observed results do not allow any conclusions with respect to 
gender differences in competitive environments. 
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However, girls are more risk averse in both countries, with a smaller gender gap in Swe-
den. Finally, Ivanova-Stenzel and Kübler (2011) examine whether gender differences in 
competitiveness depend on the gender composition of teams by introducing a real-effort 
task with wages either based on the teams’ absolute performance or on the teams’ relative 
performance in a competitive environment. Their results suggest that relative to a single-
sex composition gender diversity decreases gender differences in a competitive setting 
while the gap increases in a non-competitive environment.  
Another stylized fact emerging from a number of experimental studies is that women shy 
away from competition. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find that when having the choice 
between performing a real-effort task in a competitive (tournament) versus a non-
competitive setting (piece rate scheme) twice as many men as women self-select into the 
tournament (with similar findings see e.g. Kamas and Preston 2009, Vandegrift and Yavas 
2009, Gupta et al. 2011). Since the performances of men and women in the two different 
settings are similar, men are apparently overconfident and enter tournaments too often 
while equally able women frequently shy away from competition.62  
In an attempt to explore whether the observed gender differences are innate or caused by 
society (“nature versus nurture”), a number of experimental studies use data from natural 
settings. Examining the competitive choices of girls from single-sex and coeducational 
schools, Booth and Nolen (2012) find that girls from single-sex schools behave more like 
boys when being randomly assigned to gender-diverse experimental groups. Drawing on 
the distinctly different circumstances in matrilineal and patriarchal societies, a number of 
studies have looked at gender differences in competitiveness within these idiosyncratic 
social environments. Gneezy et al. (2009) examine the competitiveness of men and women 
in two profoundly different societies, the Massai, a patriarchal society in Tanzania, and the 
Khasi, a matrilineal society in Northeast India. They find that in the patriarchal Massai 
                                               
62 See also Balafoutas and Sutter (2010), Cason et al. (2010), Sutter and Rützler (2010), Wozniak et al. 
(2010), Healy and Pate (2011), Niederle and Vesterlund (2011), Price (2012), Niederle et al. (2013) and, 
using data from professional tennis players, Wozniak (2012). A noteworthy exception is Price (2010) who 
uses a similar experimental design but is unable to find gender differences in competition aversion. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the participants in this study did not display any gender differences in confidence 
which is considered more important in explaining gender differences in competitiveness than differences in 
risk preferences (as examined in numerous experimental studies; see e.g. Charness and Gneezy 2012, Garcia-
Gallego et al. 2012, Halko et al. 2012, and, for a summary, Croson and Gneezy 2009). A good example for 
men’s overconfidence is presented by Reuben et al. (2012). In a two-stage real effort task, groups select a 
leader to compete against other group leaders. It is found that men are selected significantly more often as 
leaders than is suggested by their individual performance in the first stage and that this effect is mainly driven 
by men’s overconfidence. 
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society the gender gap is similar to that in Western societies. However, the gender gap is 
reversed in the matrilineal society, i.e. here women are found to be more competitive than 
men.63                
4.2.3 SPORTS DATA 
Sports data have been found to be particularly well suited to explore gender differences in 
competitive behavior (Frick 2011a, 2011b). First, professional athletes represent a highly 
self-selected sample of persons with a competitive motivation, enabling researchers to ana-
lyze sex differences among homogeneous individuals with a distinct professional attitude. 
Second, since the contestants have very specific ex ante information about prize structures 
and their opponents’ abilities, the self-selection process as well as the incentive effects of 
tournaments can be examined in detail. Moreover, the high degree of transparency of the 
athletes’ performance and capabilities is likely to reduce gender differences in overconfi-
dence, which, in turn, might lead to a reduction in the gender gap in competitiveness.  
Garratt et al. (2011) look at the self-selection process of male and female runners in the 
“State Street Mile”, a running event that offers its participants the choice between entering 
a less competitive (non-incentivized) race and a more competitive one including prizes. 
The authors find that qualified women and older runners are less likely to self-select into 
the competitive race than qualified young men. Only the fastest younger women, being 
aware of their abilities, do not shy away from competition as they always enter the more 
competitive race. These results are in line with Nekby et al. (2008) who find that in an elite 
10,000-meter race in Sweden women are at least as likely as men to self-select into starting 
groups with average running times that are beyond their current physical abilities, suggest-
ing that within the latter groups, overconfidence is equally likely for men and women. 
Frick (1998) examines how male and female professional marathon runners respond to 
changes in prize money levels and structures. It appears that women respond more to an 
increase of the total purse as well as to changes in its distribution while their performance 
(i.e. their finishing time) is unaffected by bonus payments. These behavioral differences 
can be explained by the fact that the female marathon elite at that time (in the 1980s and 
early 1990s) was more heterogeneous (i.e., less balanced) than the male elite. Due to that 
heterogeneity and an equal number of lucrative races for men and women, the top female 
                                               
63 Andersen et al. (2013) compare the competitiveness of children in patriarchal and matrilineal societies and 
show that the gender differences in competitiveness start to evolve around puberty, with the more pro-
nounced changes occurring in the patriarchal society. For additional studies using data from matrilineal and 
patriarchal societies see e.g. Andersen et al. (2008), Hoffman et al. (2011) and Gong and Yang (2012). 
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athletes were initially able to avoid competing against each other by strategically entering 
certain events only. Thus, it was possible for a woman, but not for a man (who, due to the 
greater homogeneity in the field, always faced competitors of similar strength), to win a 
marathon with a “suboptimal” performance (i.e., a finishing time that was well above the 
world record). More recently, the gender gap in competitiveness has significantly narrowed 
especially in long-distance and ultra-marathon running (see e.g. Frick 2011a, 2011b). Fur-
ther evidence from road races is presented by Lynch and Zax (2000), Maloney and 
McCormick (2000) and Frick and Prinz (2007), with the first study questioning the incen-
tive effects of prizes in tournaments (and instead attributing faster finishing times to sort-
ing effects).  
In a similar approach, several studies explore the response of professional tennis players to 
“competitive pressure”. Paserman (2007) analyzes aggregate set-level data from Grand 
Slam tournaments and finds that for both men and women the quality of the game deterio-
rates with increasing stakes. This drop in performance is greater for women in the decisive 
set, albeit not statistically significant. Yet, when examining point-by-point data, Paserman 
(2010) finds that women are more likely to produce “unforced errors” at crucial points of 
the match, while this does not hold true for men. Hence, there is evidence for a statistically 
significant gender gap in competitiveness under pressure even among highly self-selected 
professional athletes. Sunde (2009) uses data from the final two rounds of all ATP Master 
and Grand Slam tournaments in the years between 1990 and 2002 to analyze the behavior 
of male tennis professionals. He finds that in uneven contests both the favorite and the un-
derdog perform worse than in “balanced” contests, which is in line with the incentive hy-
pothesis. Lallemand et al. (2008) find exactly the opposite result for female tennis profes-
sionals, because here a greater heterogeneity of the two contestants results in a larger num-
ber of wins of the favorite and a larger number of losses of the underdog, supporting the 
capability hypothesis. 
Employing a large panel dataset including 1.4 million chess games recorded over a period 
of 11 years, Gerdes and Gränsmark (2010) analyze the behavior of male and female chess 
experts. Their results suggest that women are more risk averse than men in the sense that 
they choose more conservative opening strategies, whereas men, especially when facing 
female opponents, choose more aggressive strategies even though such strategies reduce 
their winning probability. This, in turn, is indicative of men being overconfident. Using the 
same dataset, Gränsmark (2012) finds that women perform worse under time pressure. 
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Unlike male chess experts, who are found to be too impatient (i.e., men play shorter games 
but at a higher price), women tend to overstrain reflection time at the early stage of the 
game, leading to time pressure and a performance deterioration later.  
Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a, 1990b) find that the overall prize money as well as its 
distribution in professional golf tournaments have a significant impact on player perfor-
mance. The higher the total purse and the larger the prize differential, the lower are the 
scores of the individual golfer (note that lower scores are indicative of a better individual 
performance). In addition, it appears that during the last round a golfer’s performance is 
positively correlated with the marginal returns to effort, i.e. the higher the rewards for im-
proving one’s rank, the lower the number of strokes required to finish that particular round. 
However, replicating that study with comparable data from the Ladies Professional Golf 
Association Tour (LPGA) in the year 2000, Matthews et al. (2007) are unable to confirm 
the results for female golf professionals. They show that an increase of the total purse leads 
to higher scores and thus a weaker performance. A possible explanation for the observed 
gender differences in competitiveness is that women are likely to “choke” (i.e., they suc-
cumb to the pressure that comes with large prizes at stake) whereas men respond positively 
to an increase of prizes by delivering a better performance. 
Summarizing the literature review, it can be stated that the majority of studies find persis-
tent gender differences in risk-taking, overconfidence, willingness to compete and the like. 
Most of the sports economics literature thereby focuses on highly selected top athletes vy-
ing for monetary incentives. This study contributes to this strand of literature by empirical-
ly investigating the gender responsiveness to competition among less talented and rather 
intrinsically motivated individuals. In the following, the datasets and methodology are de-
scribed and some (preliminary) descriptive results presented. 
4.3 DATA, METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
The data come from three prestigious long-distance races, namely the “Swiss Alpine Mara-
thon”, a mountain ultra-marathon in Davos, Switzerland, the “Ironman Hawaii”, the offi-
cial long-distance triathlon World Championship, and the “Vasaloppet”, a long-distance 
cross-country ski race in Sweden.64 These competitions take place annually and include a 
                                               
64 Race results and background information regarding the competitions can be obtained from the websites 
www.swissalpine.ch, www.ironman.com, www.ironmanworldchampionship.com, www.vasaloppet.se and 
www.worldloppet.com.  
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large number of participants, offering several advantages with regard to the empirical anal-
yses. First, in all races, male and female athletes compete at the same time and under iden-
tical conditions. This ensures that the performances of men and women can be compared in 
a natural and mostly undistorted competitive environment.65 Second, the finishing times of 
all participants are available for an uninterrupted period of almost one decade (2002-2010), 
allowing to observe changes over time. Third, today the prize money levels and distribu-
tions are identical for men and women.66 Thus, the “returns to winning” are the same for 
male and female contestants, ruling out potential earnings-related selection effects. Unlike 
in e.g. professional tennis, where it is not possible to accurately measure differences in 
competitiveness between male and female players (simply because they do not compete 
against each other in official individual matches), the data used in this study allow observ-
ing and quantifying gender differences in competitiveness over time.  
The Races 
The “Swiss Alpine Marathon” is a mountain ultra-marathon which covers a distance of 78 
kilometers and a total altitude change of more than 2,200 meters. Starting and ending in 
Davos, Switzerland, at an altitude of 1,538 meters, a part of 21 kilometers of the run leads 
through high alpine terrain with the highest point at 2,632 meters above sea level. The first 
run was organized in 1986 and has taken place annually since then. Prize money levels are 
available following the year 1995 and can be accessed on www.arrs.net, a website that is 
operated by a group of (former) competitive long-distance runners who are at the same 
time devoted statisticians. Although the (inflation-adjusted) total purse increased by more 
than 50 percent from 2002 to 2010, only the first 3 male and female finishers receive com-
paratively small (and equal) monetary rewards of currently CHF 4,000, 2,000 and 1,000 
respectively. With more than 1,000 runners participating every year, monetary incentives 
should thus have no effect for the majority of the contestants whose expected monetary 
utility is fairly close to zero.  
                                               
65 One objection that might be raised against this argument is that in mixed contests, although men and wom-
en compete independently of each other in their respective class, it cannot be ruled out that women’s motiva-
tions and performances are, at least to some extent, affected by the performance of male contestants, and vice 
versa. On the other hand, potential externalities such as weather conditions, which can strongly influence the 
performance of athletes in long-distance races, are equal for all contestants. In fact, over the years, the finish-
ing times vary significantly (and in a similar pattern for men and women) in both races which can, for the 
most part, be attributed to changing conditions in the weather, surface, etc.    
66 Recently, a number of sports have either reduced or even abolished the “gender pay gap” in the sense that 
prize money levels of men and women have been (completely) adjusted. The presumably most prominent 
example is professional tennis, where male and female players nowadays compete for equal prizes in all four 
“Grand Slam” tournaments. 
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The “Ironman Hawaii” is the oldest and most famous long-distance triathlon in the world 
and represents the official annual Ironman World Championship. The first Ironman took 
place on Oahu, Hawaii, in 1978. In 1981, the race was moved to Big Island, Hawaii, with 
the start and finish in Kailua-Kona. The “Ironman Hawaii” is considered one of the tough-
est long-distance races in the world. Athletes have to swim a distance of 3.86 kilometers, 
cycle 180.2 kilometers and run a full marathon of 42.195 kilometers. Besides the extraor-
dinarily long distance, contestants face temperatures of sometimes more than 100 degrees 
(40 degrees Celsius) and crosswinds of up to 70 km/h, which are an enormous challenge in 
particular during the cycling part where slipstream riding behind or next to a participant is 
strictly forbidden (as in every Ironman event). Moreover, every triathlete has to qualify for 
the “Ironman Hawaii” by meeting the qualification norms in one of the other Ironman 
events around the world. Thus, contrary to the “Swiss Alpine Marathon”, which can be 
entered by recreational athletes, too, the starting field at the “Ironman Hawaii” consists of 
highly (self-)selected and rather homogeneous athletes with respect to their abilities and 
(competitive) motivations. Women participate since 1979, although the number of female 
starters was very small in the early years67 and only increased after the equalization of 
prize money levels for men and women in 1986. The “Ironman Hawaii” offers a compara-
tively large (and growing) purse of more than $ 500,000 which is equally distributed 
among the top ten male and female contestants, with both the male and female champion 
receiving more than $ 100,000 each.  
The “Vasaloppet” (literally: Vasa race) is an annual 90 km cross-country ski race that takes 
place in Sweden. The first race was held in 1922, and today, every year more than 10,000 
skiers participate in the oldest, longest and most reputable cross-country ski race in the 
world. Notably, women were not allowed to enter the race between 1924 and 1980 and did 
not receive any awards from 1981 to 1997. The ban was introduced because the stresses 
and strains associated with the race were considered bad for women’s health. Later, it was 
rather the concern that female participants would damage the event’s reputation as a tough 
challenge that upheld the ban. Since 1998, the “Vasaloppet” includes both a men’s and a 
women’s classification, with the mixed field starting at the same time. Unlike the “Swiss 
Alpine Marathon” and the “Ironman Hawaii”, no prize money is awarded in the “Vasalop-
pet”.  
                                               
67 In fact, Lyn Lemaire was the first and only woman in the 1979 “Ironman Hawaii”, thus becoming the first 
female champion practically “by default”. 
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In all three events, top athletes can expect (additional) income through lucrative endorse-
ment contracts. In particular long-distance triathletes are wooed by sport equipment suppli-
ers as they can credibly commit to the use of high quality equipment in different disci-
plines. However, economic incentives in the form of on-site prize money and/ or endorse-
ment deals should only matter for the top athletes. Moreover, the prize money levels and 
distributions for men and women in the “Swiss Alpine Marathon” and the “Ironman Ha-
waii” had been equalized some time before the start of the observation period, hence offer-
ing no variation in the covariate (monetary incentives). For an illustration of the structure 
of the datasets see Table 4-1: 
Table 4-1: Structure and composition of the datasets 
Competition Coverage Participants Number of 
per event/year observations 
    Male Female Total Comparable 
Mountain Ultra-Marathon 2002 - 800 -  100 - 9,000 900 
"Swiss Alpine Marathon"  2010 1,200 250     
Long-Distance Triathlon 2002 - 1,100 - 250 - 16,000 2,250 
"Ironman Hawaii" 2010 1,300 470   
90km Cross-Country Skiing 2002 - 10,000 - 800 -  120,000 7,200 
"Vasaloppet" 2010 13,000 1,600     
 
Since the number of male participants is considerably higher than the number of female 
participants in all three events, the “total” number of observations has to be reduced to a 
“comparable” number of observations. That is, the minimum number of female finishers in 
a given event over the whole period of observation marks the maximum number of male 
and female participants whose finish times can be compared. This leaves us with 100 com-
parable observations (i.e., the finish times of 100 male and female athletes each) in the 
“Swiss Alpine Marathon” per year, 250 annual observations for the “Ironman Hawaii” and 
800 annual observations for the “Vasaloppet”. 
In order to compare the performances of men and women, the individual finish time of 
each athlete is used. In the next step, the difference in finish times between male and fe-
male athletes who achieved the same rank is calculated. Following Frick (2011a, 2011b), I 
calculate not the absolute but the percentage time difference to ensure comparability across 
the different race types and distances. 
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PDij = ((FFTij - MFTij) / MFTij) * 100    (1) 
where PDij:  percentage difference in finish time between male and                                                                                               
female contestant on rank i in race j. 
MFTij: male finish time on rank i in race j.    
FFTij:  female finish time on rank i in race j. 
 
Table 4-2 below reveals that the percentage difference in finish time between men and 
women finishing on the same rank increases with rank. This, in turn, suggests that men are 
more competitive than women. The estimations in section 4.4 support the general assump-
tion that men show a higher degree of competitiveness than women (i.e., men’s races are 
more “balanced” than women’s races). This is in line with Frick (2011a, 2011b), Frick and 
Scheel (2013) and most of the literature discussed above. 
Table 4-2: An illustration of the structure of the samples 
Example: Long-Distance Triathlon, “Ironman Hawaii”.  
Source: http://ironman.com, http://ironmanworldchampionship.com and own calculations. 
Year Rank Male Athlete Time Time Female Athlete Time No. of Proportion 
Difference finishers of Women 
        (in %)       (in %) 
2002 1 T. Deboom 8:29:56 7.45 N. Badman 9:07:54 1455 23.44 
2 P. Reid 8:33:06 8.05 N. Kraft 9:14:24 1455 23.44 
3 C. Brown 8:35:34 9.09 L. Bowden 9:22:27 1455 23.44 
… 
248 J. Olsen 10:13:37 29.58 N. Rotovnik 13:15:07 1455 23.44 
249 M. Weijers 10:13:42 29.62 G. Osterlund 13:15:30 1455 23.44 
  250 P. Mahon 10:13:51 29.60 J. Guetz 13:15:33 1455 23.44 
… 
2010 1 C. McCormack 8:10:37 9.78 M. Carfrae 8:58:36 1770 26.50 
2 A. Raelert 8:12:17 10.91 C. Steffen 9:06:00 1770 26.50 
3 M. Vanhoenack. 8:13:14 11.52 J. Dibens 9:10:04 1770 26.50 
… 
248 A. Gordon 9:44:05 19.54 T. Nishikawa 11:38:13 1770 26.50 
249 K. Glah 9:44:15 19.53 R. Wilson 11:38:22 1770 26.50 
  250 E. Barbet 9:44:16 19.54 J. Smalec 11:38:25 1770 26.50 
 
In order to ensure comparability across years and to control for the robustness of the re-
sults, I introduce two additional variables: the proportion of women among all finishers 
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(%FEM)68 and the total number of finishers in a given year and event (ƩFIN). While the 
importance of the control for women’s participation is obvious, the following thought ex-
periment should help clarifying as to why the inclusion of the total number of finishers is 
necessary.  
Suppose the relative share of women in two consecutive years remains stable at 20 percent 
but the overall number of athletes increases from 1,400 to 1,700. Then the absolute number 
of female athletes would increase from 250 to 340, implying that the less talented women 
finishing in the lowest quintile of the estimation (i.e., between the ranks 201 and 250) 
clearly differ in their characteristics and (relative) sporting performance: whereas the slow-
est observed women in the estimation in fact represent the lowest quantiles of the overall 
population of female athletes in the first year, this does not hold true for the second year 
where a considerable share of the least talented female athletes is not included in the esti-
mation.  
A very straightforward approach to tackle this problem would be to compare the perfor-
mances of men and women finishing, for instance, in the same deciles. However, there is a 
certain time limit in every race that predetermines the finish time of the slowest – but still 
fast enough to escape the “broom wagon” – participants. Due to this ex ante fixed lower 
boundary, the percentage time differences would decrease towards the lower quantiles and 
even disappear in the “slowest” decile, representing an obvious bias. For the reasons just 
mentioned it seems that the above control variables most appropriately capture variations 
in the composition of the starting field. Summary statistics for the datasets of the “Swiss 
Alpine Marathon”, the “Ironman Hawaii” as well as the “Vasaloppet” are displayed sepa-
rately in the following three tables. 
  
                                               
68 Expressed as (F/N*100), where “F” is the number of female finishers and “N” is the number of total fin-
ishers. 
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Table 4-3: Summary statistics “Swiss Alpine Marathon”  
Variable Operationalization # of Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE           
PD Percentage difference in finish time between female and male contestant on rank i in race j 900 27.90 6.11 6.88 46.69 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES           
Rank Position of runner i in race j 900 50.5 - 1 100 
Rank² Square value of rank 900 3,383 - 1 10,000 
Rank³ Cubic value of rank 900 255,025 - 1 1,000,000 
TT Linear time trend (2002 = 1, … 2010 = 9) 900 5 - 1 9 
%FEM Proportion of female finishers among all finishers in race j 900 13.06 1.53 11.48 16.88 
ƩFIN Total number of finishers in race j 900 1,024 199.5 839 1,487 
         
On average, about 1,000 individuals (of whom roughly 130 are female) finish the “Swiss 
Alpine Marathon” every year. It should be noted that both the relative share of female ath-
letes (%FEM) and the total number of finishers in a given race (ƩFIN) increase over time 
in an approximately linear way. 
Table 4-4: Summary statistics “Ironman Hawaii” 
Variable Operationalization # of Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE           
PD Percentage difference in finish time between female and male contestant on rank i in race j 2,250 17.29 3.29 6.73 29.66 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES           
Rank Position of runner i in race j 2,250 125.5 - 1 250 
Rank² Square value of rank 2,250 20,959 - 1 62,500 
Rank³ Cubic value of rank 2,250 3,937,563 - 1 1.56e+07 
TT Linear time trend (2002 = 1, … 2010 = 9) 2,250 5 - 1 9 
%FEM Proportion of female finishers among all finishers in race j 2,250 25.91 1.53 23.44 27.95 
ƩFIN Total number of finishers in race j 2,250 1,626 83.80 1,455 1,770 
         
Despite the restrictive qualification norms, on average, more than 1,600 triathletes partici-
pate (and successfully complete) the “Ironman Hawaii” every year. The share of female 
athletes is significantly larger than in the other two competitions and ranges around 26 per-
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cent. Quite remarkably, performance differences between men and women who finish on 
the same rank seem to be comparatively small, even among less talented individuals. The 
empirical analyses – and in particular the discussion in section 4.4.2 – will shed further 
light on this issue.  
Table 4-5: Summary statistics “Vasaloppet” 
Variable Operationalization # of Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE           
PD Percentage difference in finish time between female and male contestant on rank i in race j 7,200 67.07 18.99 1.7 109.5 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES           
Rank Position of runner i in race j 7,200 400.5 - 1 800 
Rank² Square value of rank 7,200 213,733.5 - 1 640,000 
Rank³ Cubic value of rank 7,200 1.28e+08 - 1 5.12e+08 
TT Linear time trend (2002 = 1, … 2010 = 9) 7,200 5 - 1 9 
%FEM Proportion of female finishers among all finishers in race j 7,200 8.80 1.04 7.7 11.06 
ƩFIN Total number of finishers in race j 7,200 13,146 1,328 11,028 14,947 
         
The “Vasaloppet” differs considerably from the other two races because, firstly, it is a 
mass participation event attracting up to 15,000 – predominantly recreational – athletes per 
year. Secondly, long-distance cross-country skiing appears to be a rather male-dominated 
domain, with an average proportion of female finishers of less than 10 percent. Along the 
same lines, gender differences in competitiveness seem to be more pronounced in the 
“Vasaloppet”, as expressed by larger mean and maximum values for PD.69 And, thirdly, 
athletes are less diverse with respect to their country of origin: About 75 percent of the 
athletes are from Sweden, while the majority of the remaining 25 percent come from other 
Scandinavian countries (see Figure 4-3 in Appendix C).   
Apart from the aforementioned (and anticipated) result that men are, on average, more 
competitive than women – as expressed by the increasing percentage time difference to-
wards the lower ranks – a question of particular interest is whether the observed gender 
differences change over time. Figure 4-1 below includes data on the top 3 male and female 
                                               
69 These statistics might however be “driven” by the large number of observations in the Vasaloppet in com-
parison to the other races. 
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finishers in the “Swiss Alpine Marathon”, “Ironman Hawaii” and “Vasaloppet”, covering 
finish times over a period of 25, 30 and 19 years, respectively.70  
Figure 4-1: Performance gap development between top 3 male and female finishers over time 
 
Note:  The y-axis shows the average percentage time difference between the top 3 male and female athletes 
in a given race.  
 
It appears from Figure 4-1 that the gender gap in competitiveness has decreased over time 
(i.e., the male elite and the female elite, consisting of the top 3 finishers in every race in 
every year, have converged with respect to their performances). This convergence is most 
pronounced at the beginning of the observation period and seems to be asymptotically 
bounded from below by a value of about 10 percent. These (preliminary and descriptive) 
findings are in line with Thibault et al. (2010) who find that after 1983 the gender gap in 
world records has stabilized at a mean difference of 10.0 percent (± 2.94) for all Olympic 
swimming, track-and-field, cycling and speed skating disciplines (with the latter exhibiting 
the lowest gender gap of 7.0 percent). 
4.4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The descriptive results derived from Figure 4-1 above are based on a very limited number 
of observations, covering only the top 3 men and women in every race. The empirical 
                                               
70 Comparable data for the earlier years were only available for the medal ranks. The following estimations in 
section 4.4 include data on all finishers for the years 2002 to 2010. 
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analyses in this section include data on a considerably larger number of male and female 
finishers and aim to explore whether the “overall” gender gap in competitiveness (i.e., the 
performance differences not only of the fastest men and women but of a representative 
share of the respective starting fields) exhibits statistically significant changes over time. 
To uncover these changes, the following regression model is estimated71: 
PDij = α0 + α1RANKij + α2RANK²ij + α3RANK³ij + α4TT + α5%FEMj + α6ƩFINj + Ɛ                           
      (2) 
where PDij:   percentage difference in finish time between female and __
   male contestant on rank i in race j. 
  RANK:  position of runner i in race j. 
  TT:   linear time trend (2002 = 1, … 2010 = 9). 
  %FEMj:  proportion of female finishers among all finishers in race j.     
  ƩFINj:   total number of finishers in race j. 
  Ɛ:  unexplained random error. 
4.4.1 RESULTS “SWISS ALPINE MARATHON” 
In the following, the estimation results of the “Swiss Alpine Marathon” are presented. The 
first three model specifications include the top 100 male and female finishers of each race 
and vary with regard to the control variables included in the estimation. In model specifica-
tions 4 and 5, the top 10 and top 25 finishers, respectively, are excluded from the estima-
tion, for reasons that will be explained later in this section. 
Table 4-6 supports the descriptive evidence presented in the previous section, showing that 
the pool of male ultra-marathon runners is far more homogeneous than the pool of female 
ultra-marathoners. The statistically significant and negative (positive) coefficients of the 
squared (cubic) term of RANK suggest that the percentage time difference between male 
and female runners on the same rank is increasing with rank, first, at a declining and, in the 
higher ranks (i.e., among the less talented athletes), at an accelerating rate. This is in line 
with the results reported by Frick (2011b) who identifies a similar pattern for male and 
female ultra-marathon runners. What is salient in this context is that the coefficient of the 
linear time trend is negative and statistically highly significant even if the control variables 
                                               
71 Since the distribution of the dependent variable PDij is significantly different from the standard normal 
distribution, while the exact theoretical distribution is unknown, all regressions are bootstrapped (Efron 
1979) with 200 replications to ensure robustness of standard errors. 
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“proportion of female finishers” and “total number of finishers” are included (model 3). 
Thus, there is robust evidence for a decrease of the gender gap in competitiveness over 
time (i.e., the performance differences of male and female ultra-marathoners competing in 
the “Swiss Alpine Marathon” have decreased in the years 2002 to 2010). As a further ro-
bustness check, the model is estimated with year dummies instead of a linear time trend. 
However, I am unable to identify any statistical breaks or outliers. In fact, the inclusion of 
year dummies corroborates the assumption that the decrease of the gender gap follows a 
linear trend.72 
Table 4-6: Estimation results: “Swiss Alpine Marathon”, mountain ultra-marathon 
(OLS, bootstrapped standard errors with 200 replications) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Top 100 finishers included 
 
 
 
Top 10 finishers 
excluded 
 
Top 25 finishers 
excluded 
 
Covariates Dependent Variable: PDij 
RANK 0.471*** 0.471*** 0.471*** 0.412*** 0.537*** 
(12.71) (13.19) (15.19) (5.95) (4.19) 
RANK² # 
-
0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.054*** -0.075*** 
(-7.79) (-8.18) (-9.55) (-4.24) (-3.46) 
RANK³ ## 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.044*** 
(7.10) (7.61) (8.81) (4.53) (3.78) 
TT 
-
0.827*** -0.406*** -0.609*** -0.741*** -1.005*** 
(-20.12) (-7.34) (-9.77) (-11.33) (-17.39) 
%FEM -0.891*** -0.060 0.185 0.654*** 
(-10.30) (-0.40) (1.43) (6.39) 
∑FIN -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 
(-7.64) (-11.11) (-19.78) 
CONST 20.36*** 29.89*** 25.57*** 25.38*** 21.35*** 
(38.65) (26.73) (19.37) (16.22) (8.59) 
Observations 900 900 900 810 675 
Wald Chi² 2,510*** 2,873*** 2,750*** 2,394*** 2,363*** 
Adj. R² 0.789 0.808 0.816 0.790 0.812 
# multiplied by 10 for ease of presentation 
## multiplied by 1,000 for ease of presentation 
z statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01. 
 
                                               
72 Results of these estimations are available from the author upon request. 
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Given the development of the percentage time differences between the top 3 male and fe-
male runners over the last 25 years (as illustrated earlier in Figure 4-1), which seem to 
have decreased asymptotically (leveling at a performance gap of about 10 percent), the 
changes are likely to have occurred in the lower ranks. Therefore, it appears worthwhile to 
exclude the top finishers from the analysis. This has been done in models 4 and 5 which 
exclude the top 10 and top 25 male and female finishers of each race. By focusing on less 
talented individuals (who have little prospect of reaching the “money ranks”), it is possible 
to rule out – or at least reduce – potential effort or selection effects that are induced by 
monetary incentives.  
The estimation results of models 4 and 5 suggest that the gender gap has decreased over 
time, irrespective of monetary incentives. Closer inspection of the “time trend” coefficient 
reveals that the reduction of the gender gap is even more pronounced among lower ranked 
individuals. More precisely, the gap between male and female ultra-marathoners finishing 
between ranks 26 and 100 has decreased, on average, by one percentage point per year. 
That is, the 50th ranked man who needed approximately 7.5 hours to finish the race in 
2002, and who was more than 2.5 hours faster than the 50th ranked woman in that year, 
was ceteris paribus less than 2 hours faster than the 50th ranked woman in 2010. Hence, 
over a period of only 9 years, the gender gap in this particular event appears to have nar-
rowed by about 9 percentage points, leading to a dramatic decrease of absolute perfor-
mance differences between men and women. 
This, in turn, implies that not only the quantity but also the quality of female runners has 
increased and that women’s races have become more “balanced”. For example, whereas 
the relative performance gap between the fastest and the 50th ranked female athlete was 
47.5 percent in 2002, the gap was reduced to 38.9 percent in 2010. The “performance dis-
persion” in men’s races, on the other hand, remained largely unchanged, with a relative 
performance gap between rank 1 and rank 50 of 30.6 (28.8) percent in 2002 (2010). Possi-
ble explanations for the observed quality improvements among female runners are that (i) 
more “able” women select into the races and that (ii) women increased their training work-
load and/ or exert more effort during the race. Disentangling these effects is rather intricate 
and requires additional athlete-specific information. Qualitative interviews could shed ad-
ditional light on individuals’ (competitive) motivation. The above explanatory approaches 
will be further elaborated in section 4.4.3. In the following, the results of the “Ironman 
Hawaii” are presented. 
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4.4.2 RESULTS “IRONMAN HAWAII” 
An inspection of the estimation results of the “Ironman Hawaii” reveals that the coeffi-
cients have the same direction as the ones presented in Table 4-6, suggesting that (i) male 
long-distance triathletes, too, are more competitive than female long-distance triathletes, 
albeit (ii) these differences are diminishing over time.  
Table 4-7: Estimation results: “Ironman Hawaii”, long-distance triathlon 
 (OLS, bootstrapped standard errors with 200 replications) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Top 100 finishers included 
 
 
 
Top 10 finishers 
excluded 
 
Top 25 finishers 
excluded 
 
Covariates Dependent Variable: PDij 
RANK 0.471*** 0.471*** 0.471*** 0.412*** 0.537*** 
(12.71) (13.19) (15.19) (5.95) (4.19) 
RANK² # 
-
0.065*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.054*** -0.075*** 
(-7.79) (-8.18) (-9.55) (-4.24) (-3.46) 
RANK³ ## 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.044*** 
(7.10) (7.61) (8.81) (4.53) (3.78) 
TT 
-
0.827*** -0.406*** -0.609*** -0.741*** -1.005*** 
(-20.12) (-7.34) (-9.77) (-11.33) (-17.39) 
%FEM -0.891*** -0.060 0.185 0.654*** 
(-10.30) (-0.40) (1.43) (6.39) 
∑FIN -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.010*** 
(-7.64) (-11.11) (-19.78) 
CONST 20.36*** 29.89*** 25.57*** 25.38*** 21.35*** 
(38.65) (26.73) (19.37) (16.22) (8.59) 
Observations 900 900 900 810 675 
Wald Chi² 2,510*** 2,873*** 2,750*** 2,394*** 2,363*** 
Adj. R² 0.789 0.808 0.816 0.790 0.812 
# multiplied by 10 for ease of presentation 
## multiplied by 1,000 for ease of presentation 
z statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01. 
 
Not surprisingly, the RANK coefficient has a considerably smaller magnitude than the 
RANK coefficient displayed in the “Swiss Alpine Marathon” results table.73 This implies 
                                               
73 Notably, these differences are robust to a wide range of model specifications and additional robustness 
checks, including estimations based on a reduced – and comparable – sample of 100 annual observations. 
The respective estimation results are available upon request. 
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that men’s races are still more “balanced” than women’s races (i.e., men are more homo-
geneous in their performance than women) but to a lesser extent in the “Ironman Hawaii” 
than in the “Swiss Alpine Marathon”. I am tempted to attribute this finding to the highly 
selective entry criteria (i.e, the adherence to strict qualification norms) in the “Ironman 
Hawaii” that ensure participation of male and female athletes who are less diverse with 
regard to their abilities, aspirations and competitive motivations. 
Again, the results are robust to different model specifications, including the estimations 
based on the reduced samples (see models 4 and 5). This, in turn, implies that monetary 
incentives alone cannot explain the narrowing of the gender gap, as the exclusion of those 
athletes vying for the rewards leaves the results largely unchanged. 
Figure 4-2 below captures the main results emerging from the analysis: First, the develop-
ment of the percentage time difference among the top male and female athletes does evi-
dently not follow any particular (linear) time trend. In line with the descriptive evidence 
provided in Figure 4-1, the fastest men are about 10 percent faster than the fastest women, 
with some variation across years. Second, the gender gap in performance increases towards 
the lower ranks (i.e., among the less talented individuals), suggesting that the performance 
dispersion is significantly smaller in men’s races than in women’s races. In other words, 
men’s races (still) seem to be more competitive than women’s races. It appears, however, 
that the gender gap has decreased considerably throughout the last decade. For example, in 
2002, the 250th ranked woman was about 30 percent slower than the man on the same rank. 
In 2010, the time difference on the same rank was less than 20 percent. Given the finish 
time at this particular point of the distribution of about 10 hours for male long-distance 
triathletes, it can be noted that the absolute time difference between a man and a woman on 
rank 250 was reduced by approximately one hour.  
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Figure 4-2: Development of the percentage differences in finishing times between male and female athletes by tank 
(“Ironman Hawaii”, 2002-2010) 
 
Note:  The y-axis shows the percentage time difference between a male and a female triathlete on the same 
rank, while the ranks (1-250) are indicated on the x-axis. Observations of interjacent years are omit-
ted for a better illustration of the results and are available from the author upon request. Standard er-
rors are not included here; however, the existence of statistically significant differences between 
years is corroborated by the empirical analysis. Source: www.ironman.com, 
www.ironmanworldchampionship.com and own calculations. 
 
Admittedly, Figure 4-2 leads us to suspect a cubic relationship between RANK and the per-
centage time difference for the year 2002, whereas an almost linear relationship can be 
observed for the later years. Therefore, a number of robustness checks were performed. 
However, neither the inclusion of year dummies instead of a linear time trend, nor the ex-
clusion of the 2002 observations from the initial model did affect the results.74 This sup-
ports the general assumption that women have become continuously more competitive over 
time.  
4.4.3 RESULTS “VASALOPPET” 
In the following, I report the estimation results of the “Vasaloppet”. Model specifications 
1-5 are based on a comparatively large sample including the top 800 male and female fin-
ishers of each race (although the top finishers are excluded in models 4 and 5). For a better 
comparison with the results in the previous sections, the model is also estimated on the 
basis of a reduced sample (n = 250, model specifications 6-8). 
  
                                               
74 Results tables of the robustness checks are available from the author upon request. 
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Table 4-8: Estimation results: “Vasaloppet”, long-distance cross-country skiing 
 (OLS, bootstrapped standard errors with 200 replications) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Model 6 
 
Model 7 
 
Model 8 
 
Top 800 finishers included 
 
 
Top 10 
finishers 
excluded 
 
Top 25 
finishers 
excluded 
 
 
Top 250 
finishers 
included 
 
Top 10 
finishers 
excluded 
 
 
Top 25 
finishers 
excluded 
 
Covariates Dependent Variable: PDij 
   
RANK 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.177*** 0.167*** 0.426*** 0.316*** 0.265*** 
(53.94) (57.32) (54.11) (52.70) (42.45) (29.29) (21.56) (15.34) 
RANK² # -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.022*** -0.013*** -0.010*** 
(-23.50) (-28.75) (-27.44) (-23.34) (-18.87) (-17.83) (-11.29) (-7.22) 
RANK³ ## 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
(15.90) (21.10) (20.36) (16.01) (13.00) (14.98) (9.32) (5.77) 
TT -0.812*** 0.509*** 0.823*** 0.848*** 0.875*** 0.103*** 0.156*** 0.200*** 
(-29.81) (18.39) (22.63) (26.53) (25.14) (3.02) (4.86) (6.31) 
%FEM -5.836*** -6.846*** -6.953*** -7.111*** -1.856*** -2.000*** -2.215*** 
(-69.74) (-59.99) (-70.53) (-68.25) (-18.68) (-23.31) (-26.87) 
∑FIN 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(11.52) (12.22) (11.45) (11.48) (14.79) (13.94) 
CONST 29.50*** 74.27*** 71.12*** 73.90*** 76.50*** 24.47*** 29.38*** 33.83*** 
(91.78) (96.62) (82.94) (83.44) (84.99) (21.40) (29.54) (30.84) 
   
Observations 7,200 7,200 7,200 7,110 6,975 2,250 2,160 2,025 
Wald Chi² 62,569*** 61,947*** 60,549*** 59,830*** 63,045*** 13,431*** 13,370*** 14,405*** 
Adj. R² 0.852 0.921 0.922 0.921 0.918 0.907 0.899 0.889 
# multiplied by 10 for ease of presentation 
   
## multiplied by 1,000 for ease of presentation 
   
z statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01. 
   
 
The empirical evidence emerging from the “Vasaloppet” is somewhat different from the 
results presented so far. Although the performance dispersion among long-distance cross-
country skiers appears to be significantly smaller for men – thus corroborating the afore-
mentioned results – the gender gap seems to have increased over time. It should be men-
tioned that this result only holds true when controlling for the proportion of female finish-
ers (as well as the overall number of finishers), while it is robust to the exclusion of the top 
10 and top 25 finishers (models 4 and 5). Moreover, quantile regression estimates show 
that changes in the performance gender gap are most pronounced in the lowest tier of the 
distribution (see Table 4-8 in Appendix C). As a further robustness check – and for reasons 
of comparison – models 6-8 are estimated with a reduced number of observations. Alt-
hough changes in the gender gap over time appear to be smaller among more talented ath-
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letes (i.e., among the top 250 male and female finishers), men seem to have become in-
creasingly competitive as compared to women. Possible explanations for this rather sur-
prising result will be discussed in the following section. 
4.4.4 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
A more or less undisputed finding resulting from the above analyses is that men are, on 
average, more competitive than women. In other words, due to a supposedly more homo-
geneous talent pool of male athletes, men’s races are more balanced than women’s races. 
Yet, whereas gender differences among top athletes seem to have stabilized over the years 
(i.e., the fastest men are consistently about 10 percent faster than the fastest women), the 
observed gender gap in competitiveness appears to have narrowed among the less talented 
athletes, at least in competitions with culturally heterogeneous contestants.75  
That is, the majority of (intrinsically motivated) women (who cannot reasonably target the 
top positions) have become more competitive in recent years. This finding suggests that 
sex differences in performance depth cannot only be explained by evolved predispositions 
and physical differences between men and women, as contended by a number of medical 
experts and sports scientists (see e.g. Cheuvront et al. 2005, or Deaner 2006a, 2006b, 
2012), but seem to be affected by time constraints and differences in opportunities availa-
ble in society, too, as argued by Becker (1993).76  
One still unresolved question is whether the observed relative performance improvements 
of females are due to selection effects or increased individual effort. Given that the chang-
es predominantly occur in the lower ranks (i.e., among the less talented individuals), effort 
is not likely stemming from pecuniary incentives. Instead, it is possible that highly selected 
groups of ambitious ultra-marathoners and long-distance triathletes display an exceptional-
                                               
75 Whereas both the “Swiss Alpine Marathon” and “Ironman Hawaii” attract athletes from all over the world, 
individuals who are active in the “Vasaloppet” appear to be culturally less diverse (see Figure 4-3 in Appen-
dix C). This might, to some extent, explain the perhaps unexpected increase of the performance gender gap 
among long-distance cross-county skiers: It is conceivable that saturation and substitution effects impact the 
results in the sense that women from mostly gender-equal societies reduce investments in traditional and 
rather male-dominated activities at the expense of more “trendy” pastimes. This, of course, remains to be 
tested in future research. 
76 What has not been considered in this context is whether there are any age-related changes in the level of 
competitiveness. This has been done recently for the “Swiss Alpine Marathon” in a study by Eichenberger et 
al. (2012) who find that the participation of elderly male and female mountain ultra-marathon runners in-
creased across the years while the performance in terms of running times remained unchanged for women 
and even deteriorated among elderly men. Using data covering 25 years of “Ironman Hawaii” results, 
Knechtle et al. (2012) find that both the relative participation and performance of males older than 44 years 
and females older than 40 years increased while the gender difference in total time performance significantly 
decreased. 
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ly high level of intrinsic motivation which, in turn, induces them to exert maximum effort 
during any athletic contest, irrespective of potential rewards. Coffey and Maloney (2010) 
describe this as the thrill of victory (TOV) effect. In an unprecedented “naturalistic exper-
iment” the authors examine horse and dog racing to separate TOV from incentive effects 
while simultaneously accounting for selection effects. 
The underlying data of this study do not allow accounting for selection effects. Yet, assum-
ing that (i) monetary incentives have no effect on the performance of amateur athletes fin-
ishing well beyond the “money ranks”, and that (ii) intrinsically motivated individuals do 
not systematically vary their effort from year to year, a possible alternative explanation is 
that due to societal changes a growing number of women have gained access to leisure 
time. That is, while discrimination of females in accessing leisure time was prevalent in 
many societies in the past (and continues to be in various parts of the world), nowadays 
more gender-equal societies enable women to engage in time-consuming leisure activities 
– including, among others, challenging sport activities – at declining (social) costs. This 
suggests that both selection effects (more women are able (and willing) to enter competi-
tive races) and TOV effects (women train harder and are thus able to exert more effort dur-
ing the race) work in the same direction, causing gender differences to diminish. A similar 
development was observed for female professional mid- and long-distance runners by 
Frick (2011a): Until the mid-1980s, the female mid- and long-distance running scene was 
dominated by runners from the US as well as from Eastern and Western Europe. Following 
a sudden influx of world-class runners from Africa (and here particularly from Ethiopia 
and Kenya) the “cultural heterogeneity” increased dramatically, associated with a consid-
erable intensification of the competition. A notable difference of Frick’s (2011a) study is 
that pecuniary incentives are likely to have caused much of the observed relative perfor-
mance improvements of women, whereas TOV (and selection) effects appear to dominate 
in the present study. 
4.5 SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The empirical evidence presented in this study suggests that gender differences between 
highly competitive and culturally heterogeneous long-distance athletes have diminished 
over time.77 Since the observed changes occur in the lower parts of the rankings and thus 
                                               
77 Gender differences between culturally less diverse athletes in a rather male-dominated sport, on the other 
hand, seem to have slightly increased and might be explained by changing leisure activity preferences among 
women. 
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irrespective of pecuniary incentives (which are equal for men and women), it appears that 
particularly the less talented and rather intrinsically motivated females have made up 
ground on equally endowed male contestants. That is, while the performance dispersion in 
men’s races remained largely unchanged throughout the last decade, women’s races have 
become increasingly competitive over time, leading to a narrowing of the gender gap 
among amateur athletes. Unlike the influx of female mid- and long-distance runners from 
Africa in the mid-1980s, which was rather economically motivated and resulted in a nar-
rowing of the gender gap among the top athletes, the quantitative as well as qualitative 
increase of (intrinsically motivated) female talent in mass participation events in recent 
years cannot be explained by financial incentives. Rather, it seems that changing socio-
cultural conditions enable more women to invest in time-consuming sports activities at 
declining (social) costs.  
One objection that might be raised against the results is that men and women do not neces-
sarily compete against one another. But even if we assume two independent competitions 
separated by gender, men and women still compete at the same time and under equal con-
ditions, allowing to draw inferences about relative performance differentials among men 
and women. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare absolute performances across 
years, because due to changing weather conditions finish times vary considerably from 
year to year. Even the respective winning times in the “Ironman Hawaii” and “Swiss Al-
pine Marathon” vary by about thirty minutes for both men and women. For comparison, 
the variation in winning times in the “New York City Marathon” over the same time period 
(i.e., 2002-2010) is two and a half minutes for men and about six minutes for women. 
Therefore, the question of how the best women today would fare against past performances 
by men cannot be answered with the underlying data.  
A further limitation is that the study focuses on a (seemingly) non-representative sample of 
highly selected individuals with very similar aspirations and competitive motivations. Even 
though these are exactly the same preconditions that hold true for men and women in top 
positions in management and academia, conclusions about gender responsiveness in the 
labor market must be drawn very cautiously. As a consequence of decreasing opportunity 
(or social) costs in increasingly gender-equal societies, for example, it is possible that the 
“pool” of women who prefer to invest in a professional career (rather than in tasks that are 
associated with traditional role models) increases in a quantitative as well as qualitative 
sense, thus reducing gender differences in competitiveness in the general labor market. Of 
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course, such a development would presuppose transparent and non-discriminatory market 
mechanisms. Only under these premises is it possible (and economically reasonable) to 
increase the share of women in top positions – even in the absence of government-imposed 
measures such as gender quotas and the like. 
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4.6 APPENDIX C 
Figure 4-3 illustrates that the starting field in the Swedish “Vasaloppet” is composed of 
individuals who are largely homogeneous in terms of their cultural background. About 90 
percent of the athletes are from Scandinavian countries which are known to be among the 
most gender-equal societies in the world. The remaining 10 percent of athletes are predom-
inantly from other European countries with a tradition in winter sports, such as Germany 
and Austria. Only few athletes (i.e., less than 1 percent) are of non-European origin. There-
fore, changes in the level of competitiveness (among men and women) are most likely in-
dependent of changes in the “cultural composition” of the starting field. 
Figure 4-3: Cultural homogeneity of athletes in the Swedish “Vasaloppet”, 2002-2010 
 
Source:  www.worldloppet.com and own calculations. 
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Table 4-9: Estimation results: “Vasaloppet”, long-distance cross-country skiing 
(Quantile regressions) 
  .10 Quantile .25 Quantile .50 Quantile .75 Quantile .90 Quantile 
Covariates Dependent Variable: PDij 
RANK 0.232*** 0.204*** 0.169*** 0.172*** 0.145*** 
(185.13) (139.00) (97.99) (144.34) (211.21) 
RANK² # -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-105.14) (-72.38) (-39.67) (-60.73) (-76.58) 
RANK³ ## 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(79.78) (54.30) (26.67) (42.58) (49.39) 
TT 1.581*** 0.093*** 0.035 1.420*** 2.291*** 
(159.49) (5.26) (1.19) (58.92) (146.53) 
%FEM -9.053*** -4.977*** -4.612*** -7.517*** -8.872*** 
(-308.24) (-100.96) (-54.02) (-97.16) (-172.95) 
∑FIN 0.003*** 0.0002*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
(143.29) (7.04) (-12.50) (11.29) (45.58) 
CONST 51.09*** 62.59*** 77.16*** 82.41*** 82.20*** 
(190.49) (182.36) (169.12) (228.62) (391.15) 
Observations 7,200 7,200 7,200 7,200 7,200 
Pseudo R² 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 0.763 
# multiplied by 10 for ease of presentation 
## multiplied by 1,000 for ease of presentation 
t statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01. 
 
The quantile regression results reveal that the increase of the performance gap between 
male and female long-distance cross-country skiers varies across quantiles and seems to be 
most pronounced in the lowest tier of the distribution. That is, relative performance differ-
ences between men and women appear to have increased the most among the less talented 
athletes. Perhaps surprisingly, no statistically significant changes are observed in the mid-
tier of the distribution, suggesting that the overall increase of the performance gender gap 
is caused by high and low performers. 
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5 COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN DOMESTIC SPORTS LEAGUES – A 
GENDER COMPARISON 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
If we were to believe the words of Henry Ford who once said “competition is the keen cut-
ting edge of business, always shaving away at costs” (Henry Ford II, 1949), we would 
surely question the many examples of successful businesses that did exceedingly well by 
dominating an entire market. Former chairman and CEO of General Electric, Jack Welch, 
found a perhaps more contemporary formulation for some of today’s business strategies: 
“Number one, cash is king […] Number two, communicate […] Number three, buy or bury 
the competition” (Blodget 2009). It appears that at least in some industries competition 
seems to be “negligible” at the “expense” of a monopoly. 
In sporting events and especially in professional team sports the situation is different. Un-
like businesses, that can sell their own products independently from those of their competi-
tors, sport teams to some extent rely on the performance of their opponents. In a seminal 
paper in the sports economics literature, Rottenberg (1956: 242) argues that in professional 
sports “competitors must be of approximately equal ‘size’ if any are to be successful; this 
seems to be a unique attribute of professional competitive sports”. In a completely unbal-
anced contest the exact outcome can be predicted with certainty, eventually causing the 
fans to lose interest in the competition. Conventional wisdom holds that some degree of 
outcome uncertainty is needed to attract fan interest in the form of stadium attendance and 
TV viewers. Neale (1964) describes this as the “League Standing Effect”: In a very unbal-
anced league fan interest in the weaker teams will decline, which in the long run also caus-
es fan interest in the stronger teams to fall. Neale (1964: 2) conceptualizes what every team 
must hope for: “Oh Lord, make us good, but not that good”. Yet, in the more recent litera-
ture there is debate about whether a decline in competitive balance will in fact result in a 
reduction of fan interest (with mixed evidence emerging from empirical studies). Given the 
attendance figures in both Premier League and German Bundesliga, where stadium utiliza-
tion rates are constantly well above 90 percent, it is unlikely that a temporary decline in 
competitive balance will noticeably affect fan demand. Moreover, due to stadium capacity 
restrictions it is often impossible to quantify the exact ticket demand for a match. In partic-
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ular in the event of sold-out stadia information concerning the additional number of tickets 
that could have been sold is simply not available.  
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is not to analyze the relationship between competitive 
balance and attendance, as this has been done in numerous papers before (see section 5.2). 
Instead we contribute to the existing sports economics literature by empirically analyzing 
the long-term development of competitive balance in selected domestic sports leagues, 
with a particular focus on gender differences in competition. Our data cover a period of 21 
consecutive seasons (1990/91 – 2010/11) and stem from six different football leagues 
(men’s and women’s English Premier League, men’s and women’s English second divi-
sion and men’s and women’s German Bundesliga) as well as two handball leagues (men’s 
and women’s German Handball Bundesliga).78 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides a selective review 
of the earlier and more recent sports economics literature with a focus on competitive bal-
ance in professional team sports. Section 5.3 describes the data and competitive balance 
measures, while the (predominantly descriptive) evidence is presented in section 5.4. Final-
ly, section 5.5 concludes with a brief summary of the main results and some limitations as 
well as suggestions for future research.   
5.2 REVIEW OF THE EXISTING SPORTS ECONOMICS LITERATURE 
Apart from the already mentioned fundamental works by Rottenberg (1956) and Neale 
(1964) which opened up the sports economics literature, influential early studies include 
Sloane (1971) and El-Hodiri and Quirk (1971, 1974). Notable follow-up works, including 
Jennett (1984), Cairns et al. (1986), and Quirk and Fort (1992), to name but a few, are 
thoroughly summarized and reviewed by Fort and Quirk (1995). In the following years, a 
number of studies (Kesenne 1996, 1999, 2000; Hoehn and Szymanski 1999; Dobson and 
Goddard 2001; and, for a review of this line of literature, Marburger 2002) specifically 
focus on competitive balance in European football – as opposed to the North American 
Major Leagues.  
                                               
78 Data can be accessed on www.rsssf.com and www.statto.com (men’s football Premier League and second 
Division), Rothmans Football Yearbooks and www.women.soccerway.com (women’s football Premier 
League and second division), www.kicker.de (men’s football Bundesliga), www.dfb.de (women’s football 
Bundesliga), and www.bundesligainfo.de (men’s and women’s Handball Bundesliga).  
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In response to a symposium in the Journal of Sports Economics in 2002, where several 
articles from different disciplines (e.g. Humphreys 2002; Noll 2002; Sanderson 2002; 
Zimbalist 2002; Hall et al. 2002) present partially contradictory evidence, Fort and Maxcy 
(2003) review the relevant literature up to that time.79 Thereby, they classify the empirical 
literature on competitive balance in two different strands. 
The first strand of literature is the analysis of competitive balance (ACB) literature which 
analyzes in what way institutional changes in the business practices in professional sports 
leagues affect competitive balance over the course of time. In this respect, institutional 
changes may occur in the form of variations in the respective clubs’ market size (e.g. 
Demmert 1973; Eckard 2001a; Fort 2001), the switch from a “reserve clause” system to 
“free agency”80 (e.g. Balfour and Porter 1991; Eckard 2001b; Maxcy 2002), a change of 
the ownership structure of professional (football) teams (e.g. Szymanski and Kuypers 
1999), or the expansion of a (single) league (e.g. Schmidt 2001) as well as the reorganiza-
tion of a (multi-tier) league (e.g. Dobson et al. 2001). More recent studies in this “niche” of 
the competitive balance literature are presented by Hadley et al. (2005) who find that the 
1994 players’ strike in Major League Baseball (MLB) led to a significant deterioration of 
competitive balance in the post-1994 seasons, and Feddersen (2006) who estimates the 
impact of increasing UEFA Champions League payouts on the financial and sporting im-
balance in the German football Bundesliga. Along the same lines, Haugen (2008) examines 
the effects caused by the change of the point award system (i.e., the transition from a “2-1-
0” to a “3-1-0” system), while Pawlowski et al. (2010) treat the modification of the Cham-
pions League payout system at the turn of the millennium as a natural “quasi-experiment” 
to analyze competitive balance levels in the Top-5 European football leagues before and 
after these institutional changes.  
The second strand of literature on competitive balance is much broader. It analyzes the 
effect of competitive balance on attendance and thus tests Rottenberg’s (1956) uncertainty 
of outcome hypothesis (UOH). In contrast to the ACB literature which examines changes 
in the level of competitive balance across seasons (Butler 1995) the UOH literature usually 
applies “within-season” competitive balance measures to capture changes in attendance 
                                               
79 In particular, Zimbalist’s (2002) article is criticized for several statements questioning the fan’s perception 
of competitive balance. For a response to Fort and Maxcy’s (2003) comment see Zimbalist (2003).  
80 In North American professional team sports leagues, the “reserve clause” has entitled the teams to own the 
rights of a player even after the expiration of the player’s contract. Today, the reserve clause system has 
almost entirely been replaced by “free agency”, implying that a player who is currently not under contract 
(i.e., a “free agent”) is eligible to sign a contract with any club or franchise. 
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figures contingent on the degree of competitive balance in a given season. For a compre-
hensive review of the relevant UOH literature up to that time one can refer to Dobson and 
Goddard (2001) and Garcia and Rodriguez (2002).  
In the following, the more recent UOH literature will be reviewed in detail. Focusing on 
MLB, Schmidt and Berri (2001) aim to empirically test two hypotheses, namely (i) that 
competitive balance in MLB decreased in the 1990s as a result of the increasing gap be-
tween rich and poor teams and, (ii) that there is a relationship between competitive balance 
and aggregate league attendance.81 Their results suggest that the financial imbalance be-
tween the teams did not affect competitive balance in the predicted negative way, as the 
1990s turned out to be the most competitive decade in MLB’s history. The time-series 
analysis supports the positive impact of competitive balance on attendance on the aggre-
gate level, although attendance per game appears to have increased only slightly. On the 
other hand, the panel data analysis revealed that improvements in single-year competitive 
balance had a statistically significant and negative impact on attendance, whereas im-
provements in long-term competitive balance over three and five years positively affected 
gate attendance. 
Garcia and Rodriguez (2002) analyze the determinants of football match attendance in the 
Spanish Primera División and find no statistically significant correlation between attend-
ance and the uncertainty of the outcome, as measured by the squared difference of league 
positions.82 A positive effect on attendance was only found for home teams that were in 
contention for the league championship. Buzzacchi et al. (2003) develop a dynamic com-
petitive balance measure to compare the “open” football leagues in Europe, characterized 
by promotion and relegation systems, with the North American “closed” leagues and ob-
serve that the “open” leagues are less balanced than the “closed” leagues under considera-
tion in terms of the outcome of play while at the same time providing more equal opportu-
nities regarding potential new entrants to a league. Feddersen and Maennig (2005) empiri-
cally analyze competitive balance developments in four European football leagues (i.e., 
English Premier League, Spanish Primera Division, German Bundesliga and Italian Serie 
A) and four US Major Leagues (i.e., MLB, NBA, NFL and NHL) over a time period of 
                                               
81 Previous research had focused on the relationship between competitive balance and within-season attend-
ance. Schmidt and Berri (2001) conduct a time-series analysis spanning the entire history of MLB and addi-
tionally use a panel dataset for the years for which price data exist in order to test whether this relationship 
holds at the aggregate level.    
82 Since no betting odds were available for the Spanish league in the period of observation, the authors intro-
duced a measure based on the relative difference in league positions. 
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more than 30 years. Thereby, they identify 48 trends of which 19 (12) are found signifi-
cantly negative (positive), pointing at a growing (im)balance, with the remaining 17 trends 
insignificantly different from zero. For an extensive review of the UOH literature in Euro-
pean football see Groot (2008). 
Recently, a number of studies focused on the North American Major Leagues. Drawing on 
attendance data in MLB covering a period of 50 years, Krautmann et al. (2010) use a with-
in-season competitive balance measure to analyze the impact of what they term “playoff-
uncertainty”, i.e., a team’s probability of making the playoffs, on attendance. They find 
that towards the end of the season tighter pennant races evoke an increase in league-wide 
attendance. Fort and Quirk (2011) seek to identify optimal (i.e., welfare-maximizing) com-
petitive balance levels in the National Football League (NFL), representing a “closed” 
sports league where the major part of ticket sales comes from season tickets – as opposed 
to single-ticket leagues like MLB where a relatively large part of tickets is sold on the 
match day. Their research suggests that careful empirical analyses – incorporating potential 
influencing factors such as talent choice, regulatory governing structures and antitrust rem-
edies – are required in order to determine whether an increase in competitive balance en-
hances welfare in a season-ticket league. A first attempt to close this gap in the empirical 
literature is made by Mills and Fort (2011, 2014) who look at annual league-level per-
game attendance (LAPG), i.e., a league’s average per game attendance in a given year. 
Using attendance data from the NBA (seasons 1955/56-2009/10), NFL (1934/35-2009/10) 
and NHL (1960/61-2009/10) they find little evidence supporting Rottenberg’s UOH hy-
pothesis. On the other hand, they find that the time series of LAPG in all three Major 
Leagues are non-stationary but stationary with break points which correspond to historical 
occurrences such as World Wars I and II, league mergers, league expansions, player strikes 
and the like. 
Summarizing, there is an already large and still growing literature on the determinants (and 
consequences) of competitiveness in professional team sports. While the majority of stud-
ies focus on the US Major Leagues, a growing number of sports economists have drawn 
their attention to European team sports. In the following section, we discuss several com-
petitive balance measures that serve as a basis for our analysis. 
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5.3 MEASURING COMPETITIVENESS IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL 
The most commonly used measure of competitive balance is the dispersion of winning 
percentages within sports leagues. Scully (1989), Vrooman (1995) and Quirk and Fort 
(1997) use the standard deviation of winning percentages to assess the performance disper-
sion of teams in North American sports leagues. Although European football is quite dif-
ferent in its organizational form to North American sports83 – and in particular with respect 
to the point award system that allows tied games and which experienced a transition from a 
2-1-0 to a 3-1-0 system in the mid-nineties – Szymanski (2001) argues that winning per-
centage is still a reliable measure of competitive balance in English (and hence European) 
football.84 In order to take potential draws into account, the winning percentage (WPCT) is 
defined as the ratio of wins and weighted draws to total games played. In a league with N 
teams over a period of T seasons WPCTi,t is defined as the winning percentage of team i in 
season t. Following Humphreys (2002), the standard deviation of winning percentages for 
this league is:     
NT
WPCT ti
T
t
N
i
)²5.0( ,
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


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,     (1) 
where the idealized WPCT85 is subtracted from each team’s individual WPCT in season t 
while the squared term is divided by the number of teams and seasons. Since Ѡ largely 
depends on the league size in any given season t (Ѡ decreases the greater the value for N) it 
is only possible to compare leagues of equal size. To take changes in league size into ac-
count, Leeds and von Allmen (2008: 156) introduce an additional measure, Ratio R. In 
order to obtain Ratio R the “ideal” standard deviation of winning percentages – represent-
ing the “ideal” competitive balance in a league with N teams – is computed as follows: 
                                               
83 One distinctive difference is that European football is characterized by a multi-tier “open” league system 
where the best teams get promoted to a higher division (and the worst teams are relegated), whereas the 
North American Major Leagues are based on a more rigid “closed-shop” system. Moreover, the labor market 
of European football players is less regulated and comes close to a competitive market (Szymanski and Smith 
1997), in particular since the so-called “Bosman-ruling” in 1995 (see e.g. Simmons 1997, Antonioni and 
Cubbin 2000, Feess and Muehlheusser 2002, 2003a, 2003b, Feess et al. 2004, Frick et al. 2007 and Frick 
2009), while collective bargaining agreements, salary caps and rookie draft systems regulate the labor mar-
kets of the North American Major Leagues. See also Fort (2000) for a comparison of the European and North 
American sports markets.   
84 Buzzacchi et al. (2001, 2003) introduce a dynamic measure of competitive balance which is particularly 
suitable for open leagues with relegation and promotion systems as can be found in most European sports 
leagues.  
85 The dispersion of winning percentages in a completely balanced league where all teams are of equal 
strength and claim the same number of wins and draws is 0.5. 
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 ,       (2) 
where G is the number of match days per season in a given league. Here again, Ѡp is de-
creasing in the number of games played. Ratio R is defined as the ratio of the “simple” 
standard deviation to the “ideal” standard deviation of winning percentages:     
p
R


 .       (3) 
If R takes the value of 1 the league is perfectly balanced; i.e., all teams perform equally 
well. Generally speaking, the closer R is to 1 the greater is the competitive balance in the 
league. A value of 2 would indicate that the league is rather unbalanced, while a value of 
2.5 or above indicates that the league is completely unbalanced (see also Perline and Stoldt 
2007a). With this measure it is possible to compare the level of competitive balance of 
diverse sports leagues of various sizes and across different sports; yet it also has some 
shortcomings. Although R is a convenient measure when applied for within-season com-
petitive balance comparisons, it is incapable of capturing across-seasons changes in rela-
tive league standings within a particular league. This point is emphasized by the subse-
quent example following Humphreys (2002): Consider two hypothetical three-team 
leagues over a period of 3 seasons (Table 5-1). In one league each team wins the champi-
onship once but also finishes runner-up as well as at the bottom of the league table in one 
season whereas the win-loss record (and thus the rank) of each team in the other league is 
identical in each season. Consequently, Ratio R shows the same value for each league and 
for every season. However, competitive balance across-seasons is undoubtedly greater in 
League 1 which “produces” three different champions in three years, whereas League 2 is 
consistently dominated by the same team. 
Table 5-1: Win-loss records in two hypothetical three-team leagues 
League 1 League 2 
Team Season 1 Season 2 Season 3     Team Season 1 Season 2 Season 3 
A 2-0 0-2 1-1 A 2-0 2-0 2-0 
B 1-1 2-0 0-2 B 1-1 1-1 1-1 
C 0-2 1-1 2-0   C 0-2 0-2 0-2 
Source: Own illustration following Humphreys (2002). 
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This example illustrates that additional measures of competitive balance are needed in or-
der to make valid assertions concerning the level of competitiveness in professional team 
sports. A method often used by industrial economists is to measure the “relative” competi-
tiveness of an industry.86 One measure that captures the concentration or distribution of 
firms within an industry is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is defined as 
the squared sum of all companies’ market shares in an industry: 

N
i
iMSHHI )²(
,     (4) 
where MSi is the market share of the ith firm on a scale from 0 to 1. HHI can take values 
between 1/N (perfect parity among all firms in the industry) and 1 (pure monopoly). As 
this measure requires the market shares of N - 1 firms, potential data limitations might 
hamper research endeavors applying the HHI method. Using MLB as an example, Depken 
(1999) states that in professional sports data requirements do not constitute a problem as a 
team’s “market share” can be measured as a team’s percentage of total wins in the league. 
Since in European football not only wins and losses but also draws are possible, we use a 
team’s percentage of total points in the league as a proxy for its “market share”.87 Taking 
into account changes in the league size over time, Depken (1999) introduces an additional 
measure, dHHI = HHI - 1/N, which adjusts the HHI in a linear way. We use the following 
– to some extent modified – measure: 
100
/20
²
1 x
N
s
HHI
N
i
i
adj


,     (5) 
where HHI is divided by the quotient of 20 and the number of teams per league (N), repre-
senting the adjusted HHI for a league consisting of 20 teams.88 In order to illustrate to what 
extent HHI is sensitive to changes in league size and how the new measure HHIadj adjusts 
the results, consider a perfectly balanced league with N = 2, […], 20 teams (see Table 5-2).  
                                               
86 See, inter alia, Gilbert (1984) who analyzes the relative competitiveness of the banking industry, Sullivan 
(1985) for evidence in the cigarette industry, MacDonald (1987) for an analysis of the railroad industry, and 
Borenstein (1989) who investigates the airline industry. 
87 For the conversion of wins and draws into points we use the three-point system which came into effect in 
all major European football leagues in the mid-1990s. For inter-seasonal comparability, the accumulated 
points in the seasons prior to the transition from a 2-1-0 to a 3-1-0 system are also converted on the basis of 
the three-point system.     
88 For presentation purposes, this term is multiplied by 100. 
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Table 5-2: HHI and HHIadj values in a hypothetical perfectly balanced league of varying size 
Number of teams HHI x 100 HHIadj 
2 50 5 
3 33.3 5 
4 25 5 
: : : 
10 10 5 
: : : 
20 5 5 
Source: Own illustration and own calculations. 
 
While HHI is strongly influenced by the number of teams in a league (the more teams the 
lower HHI), we can control for the variation in league size using HHIadj. Similar to the 
aforementioned Ratio R indicator, this measure can be used to compare competitive bal-
ance levels of different leagues of various sizes. However, HHIadj suffers from the short-
comings that (i) (similar to Ratio R) changes in relative league standings over the years 
cannot be captured, thus making the results of across-seasons competitive balance compar-
isons less meaningful, and that (ii) due to the nonlinear distribution of points in the 3-1-0 
point award system HHIadj values for leagues of seemingly identical competitive balance 
levels can vary contingent on the number of draws. As illustrated in Table 5-3 below, two 
hypothetical leagues can be equally balanced as measured by wins, draws and losses. Yet, 
since draws lead to fewer points accumulated by both teams (i.e., two points for a draw 
instead of three points in case of a win) the distribution of points within each league can 
vary considerably. This, in turn, is reflected in differing HHIadj values.  
Table 5-3: The effect of draws on HHIadj 
  
    League 1       League 2   
Team Wins Draws Losses Points   Wins Draws Losses Points 
A 6 0 0 18 6 0 0 18 
B 2 2 2 8 3 0 3 9 
C 2 2 2 8 3 0 3 9 
D 0 0 6 0   0 0 6 0 
HHIadj: 7.82 HHIadj: 7.50 
                    
Source: Own illustration and own calculations. 
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Admittedly, such extreme cases seem highly unlikely as the number of draws is relatively 
evenly distributed across leagues and over time.89 Several studies (e.g. Fernandez-Cantelli 
and Meeden 2003; Brocas and Carrillo 2004; and Haugen 2008) have shown that the num-
ber of draws remained constant even after the transition from the former 2-1-0 point sys-
tem to the 3-1-0 system. Therefore, the variation of HHIadj is – if at all – only marginally 
influenced by a variation of the number of draws across leagues (and seasons) and can 
therefore be disregarded.  
Another within-season competitive balance measure is the Concentration Ratio (CRi), 
which is defined as the cumulated share of points (si) of the top N = 1, 2, …, i clubs in rela-
tion to the accumulated share of points won by the remaining teams in the league. In Euro-
pean football, usually the top 5 clubs of each season are compared to the rest of the league. 
In analogy to the previous two measures, CR5 has to be standardized in order to account for 
changes in the size of the league(s). This is done as follows:  
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where the C5-Index is defined as the quotient of the observable CR5 to the CR5 of a perfect-
ly balanced league. By implication, the C5-Index in a perfectly balanced league would take 
a value of 100, while greater values imply a reduction in competitive balance. Similar to 
the already introduced competitive balance measures, Ratio R and HHIadj, the C5-Index is 
convenient for the comparison of competitive balance levels of different leagues of differ-
ent size. Moreover, Michie and Oughton (2004, 2005) point out that the C5-Index offers an 
advantage inasmuch as the exact percentage changes in the level of competitive balance 
can be assessed. If, for example, the C5-Index of a perfectly balanced league takes a value 
of 130 in the subsequent season, the league experienced a reduction in competitive balance 
of 30 percent. But here again, the pitfall is that changes in relative league standings over 
time cannot be captured. 
                                               
89 This can be corroborated by looking at the cumulated points in any given league l in season t and by com-
paring this value to the cumulated points in other seasons and other leagues. For example, the total points 
accumulated annually in the English Premier League can – given a league size of N = 20 teams – theoretical-
ly take values between 760 (only ties) and 1140 (all games decided). In fact, our own calculations reveal that 
the mean cumulated points per season in the Premier League in the previous 16 seasons (prior to that the 
league consisted of 22 teams for several consecutive years) is 1039.5, with a standard deviation (sd) of 10.4 
(min.: 1021, max.: 1063). For comparison, the possible range of points in the German Bundesliga (given that 
N = 18) is [760, ..., 1140], while the mean cumulated points per season in the same observation period is 
838.5 (sd: 12.0, min.: 810, max.: 855). 
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An alternative to the hitherto discussed within-season competitive balance measures is the 
dispersion of championship titles over the years. Similar to HHI (or HHIadj) which 
measures the dispersion of wins (or points) within a given season, HHIacrossseasons quantifies 
to which extent a league is dominated by one or a few teams. It is defined as the sum of 
squared championship titles won by i teams, divided by the number of seasons: 
N
CT
HHI
N
i
i
onsacrossseas

 1
²
                (7) 
In the women’s football Bundesliga, for example, seven different teams were able to win 
the championship in the 21 seasons between 1990/91 and 2010/11. Most titles were won 
by 1. FFC Frankfurt (7), followed by Potsdam (5), Siegen (4), FSV Frankfurt (2), while 
Duisburg, Brauweiler and Niederkirchen each won the championship once. The corre-
sponding across-seasons competitive balance value can be computed as follows:  
62.4
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The men’s football Bundesliga, on the other hand, seems to be less balanced in terms of 
championship titles. Over the same period, six different teams won at least one champion-
ship, with Bayern Munich (10 titles) clearly dominating the league. The remaining titles 
were divided between Dortmund (4), Stuttgart, Kaiserslautern and Bremen (2 each), while 
Wolfsburg won their first and hitherto only title in the season 2008/09. The corresponding 
HHIacrossseasons takes a value of 6.14 and corroborates the finding that championship titles in 
the past two decades were divided more equally in women’s football as compared to men’s 
football. 
Although this measure allows quantifying the degree of long-term competitiveness in 
sports leagues, it also suffers from major shortcomings. First, by measuring the dispersion 
of championship titles across seasons one cannot determine the “closeness” of the champi-
onships. For example, a league with 10 different champions in 10 different seasons might 
nevertheless be somewhat unbalanced if the respective championships were decided by a 
margin of 20 points or more. A league that is seemingly dominated by one single team, on 
the other hand, might in fact be fiercely contested, with the same team repeatedly finishing 
ahead of its closest competitors by a narrow margin. Second, since HHIacrossseasons is a high-
ly aggregated measure that provides only one observation for the longitudinal data of each 
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league, it is only possible to descriptively compare the results between different leagues. 
Third, in light of the relegation system in European team sports leagues it makes no sense 
to measure the dispersion of championship titles in lower divisions as this would simply 
“produce” spurious evidence due to sample selection bias.90  
Given the benefits and drawbacks of the competitive balance measures discussed earlier in 
this section (and taking the vast literature related to this topic into account), it appears that 
the ideal measure of competitive balance has yet to be developed. Meanwhile we remain 
with a whole set of different (complementary rather than substitutable) competitive balance 
indices of which only a few are discussed in this paper. In the next section we present the 
predominantly descriptive results of our analysis which are then supported by some basic 
test statistics. 
5.4 RESULTS 
We begin with the presentation of the results by illustrating the long-term development of 
competitive balance levels in the earlier mentioned team sports leagues, with a particular 
focus on gender differences. For this purpose we compare annual Ratio R indices for each 
league, spanning a period of 21 seasons (and 20 seasons in the case of the English wom-
en’s football leagues).91 
  
                                               
90 Those teams winning the championship e.g. in the second division are promoted to the first division in the 
subsequent season and are necessarily excluded from the pool of potential second division champions for at 
least one season. See Heckman (1979) for a thorough discussion of potential bias resulting from non-
randomly selected samples. 
91 The women’s football league was reintroduced in England in the season 1991/92 after a lengthy ban of 
women’s football on the part of the English Football Association. Indeed, women’s football has a much 
longer history than commonly assumed. Already in the 1920s, some women’s football matches in England 
were played in front of more than 50,000 spectators (see Matheson and Congdon-Hohman 2013).  
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Table 5-4: Development of within-season competitive balance levels in all leagues (measured by Ratio R) 
German Football Bundesliga 
English Football Premier League 
English Football Second Division 
German Handball Bundesliga 
Note:  Ratio R values are on the y-axis, while seasons are indicated on the x-axis. Own illustration based 
on own calculations. 
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It appears that in European football the men’s leagues are more balanced than the women’s 
leagues and that these differences are persistent over time. With the exception of a few 
seasons in the English Premier League where men’s and women’s leagues display similar 
levels of competitiveness, the observed gender differences seem to prevail in different ge-
ographical environments as well as across different divisions. On the other hand, the evi-
dence from the German Handball Bundesliga is somewhat different. Although the men’s 
league appears to be far more balanced than the women’s league in the early seasons, there 
are almost no differences in the “middle years” while the gender gap in competitiveness 
seems to be reversed in the last third of the observation period. The results are very similar 
when measuring the level of competitive balance on the basis of the HHIadj or the C5-Index 
(see Appendix D).  
It should be stated that the results so far are of a rather descriptive nature as we cannot test 
for statistical significance with respect to single (i.e., annual) observations. Yet, it can be 
assumed that the (highly aggregate) information that is comprised in every single competi-
tive balance indicator provides conclusive evidence regarding the level of (within-season) 
competitive balance in the respective leagues. Nevertheless, it is worth testing for the ex-
istence of statistically significant gender differences over time. This can be done by a sim-
ple one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), where the response variable is the respective 
competitive balance measure while the distinguishing factor variable is gender. Since we 
conduct a two-sample ANOVA the differences between group means would be identical to 
the results of a t-test. Figure 5-1 below shows the results of the mean comparison tests. 
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Figure 5-1: Comparison of average competitive balance levels between leagues (measured by Ratio R) 
 
Note:  Ratio R values are on the y-axis, while leagues are displayed on the x-axis. Own illustration based 
on own calculations. By conducting F-tests in Stata 11 for each “pair” of leagues we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the means of annual competitive balance levels are equal in the respective 
men’s and women’s football leagues (Prob> F < 0.0001). The marginal differences in the average 
competitiveness in men’s and women’s Handball Bundesliga, on the other hand, are found to be sta-
tistically insignificant. This result changes, however, when comparing the means of the HHIadj indi-
ces (see Appendix D). In this case, we find statistically significant (albeit still comparatively small) 
differences even in German handball. Gender differences in competitiveness as expressed by the 
C5-Index are less pronounced and even found to be statistically insignificant in the English Premier 
League as well as in the Handball Bundesliga (see Appendix D). 
 
The descriptive as well as econometric results indicate that there are considerable and per-
sistent differences in competitiveness between the respective men’s and women’s football 
leagues. At the same time, the (overall) gender gap in German handball appears negligible, 
following an increase of competitiveness in the women’s league and a simultaneous de-
crease of competitiveness in the men’s league. In addition to the mean comparison tests we 
conducted Bartlett’s (1937) test for equal variances for each “pair” of leagues. The results, 
however, have to be interpreted cautiously, since Bartlett’s test is very sensitive to depar-
tures from normality (see e.g. Markowski and Markowski 1990). The assumption that the 
data are drawn from a normal distribution is obviously violated for all three indices (see 
Figure 5-2). 
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Figure 5-2: Epanechnikov kernel density estimates of alternative competitive balance measures 
Ratio R HHIadj C5-Index 
 
Note:  Brown and Forsythe (1974) propose an alternative test that is robust under non-normality. This test 
can be conducted using the “sdtest”-command in Stata 11 and yields very similar results supporting 
the descriptive evidence above. All test results are available from the authors upon request. 
 
An interesting subsidiary aspect is that both the English men’s and women’s second divi-
sion football leagues appear to be more “balanced” in terms of competitiveness than any of 
the first division leagues in England or Germany. A possible explanation for this perhaps 
surprising result is that the turnover of teams in the lower divisions is significantly larger 
than in any top-tier division. That is, while in the highest division only the weakest teams 
are being relegated (while the top teams can extend their lead over time), the regulation of 
the sporting equality in lower divisions works at both tails of the distributions: The strong-
est teams are promoted to a higher division while the weakest teams are demoted to a low-
er division. 
As mentioned earlier, the women’s football Bundesliga appears more balanced in terms of 
the dispersion of championship titles over time than the men’s league. This finding is even 
more pronounced in German handball, where the men’s league is clearly dominated by one 
team, THW Kiel, who won 13 out of 21 possible titles, whereas the titles in the women’s 
league are more equally split among a number of teams. In English football, both leagues 
are equally unbalanced in terms of championships, with Manchester United and Arsenal 
London (12 titles each) dominating the men’s and the women’s Premier League, respec-
tively (see Figure 5-3 for an overview of HHIacrossseasons indices).  
These results are somewhat counterintuitive as one would normally expect a larger disper-
sion of championship titles in a “more balanced” league than in a seemingly unbalanced 
league. On the other hand, this example emphasizes that the analysis of competitive bal-
ance is far from trivial and can sometimes lead to markedly different results, depending on 
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the index applied. Considering the benefits and drawbacks of each method (see previous 
section), we devote greater weight to the within-season competitive balance measures. 
Figure 5-3: Comparison of long-term competitive balance levels between leagues (measured by HHIacrossseasons) 
 
Note:  HHIacrossseasons values are shown on the y-axis, while leagues are displayed on the x-axis. For reasons 
discussed in the previous section the dispersion of championship titles has not been computed for 
men’s and women’s second division football.  
 
-A Brief Look at Attendance in Women’s Football and Handball in Germany- 
As mentioned in the introductory part of this paper, it is not our goal (nor would it be sen-
sible) to analyze the relationship between the “closeness” of the competition and stadium 
attendance. This is due, in particular, to measurement problems arising from stadium ca-
pacity restrictions in the case of men’s football: For the econometrician it is, for example, 
not possible to quantify the exact ticket demand for sold-out games. Nevertheless, it ap-
pears worthwhile to provide some descriptive statistics on fan demand in women’s leagues. 
Attendance in women’s football, for example, is much lower than in the men’s leagues but 
seems to be affected by largely televised events boosting the reputation of women’s foot-
ball in general. At least in Germany, the highest women’s league seems to have heavily 
benefited from the women’s Football World Cup taking place every four years (see Figure 
5-4). 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Men's
Football
Bundesliga
Women's
Football
Bundesliga
Men's
Football
Premier
League
Women's
Football
Premier
League
Men's
Football 2nd
division
England
Women's
Football 2nd
division
England
Men's
Handball
Bundesliga
Women's
Handball
Bundesliga
Competitive Balance in Domestic Sports Leagues – A Gender Comparison 123
Figure 5-4: Average stadium attendance in the women’s football Bundesliga over time 
 
Note:  Average per game attendance is displayed on the y-axis, while seasons are indicated on the x-axis. 
For reasons discussed in the previous section the dispersion of championship titles has not been 
computed for men’s and women’s second division football.  
 
Obviously still in its infancy, the women’s football Bundesliga received only little fan in-
terest in terms of stadium attendance until the season 2002/03. Throughout the following 
seasons, attendance rates increased, although not on a constant level. A striking aspect in 
this context is that there are dramatic surges in attendance in the seasons following the 
women’s Football World Cup (e.g. a 55% increase in the season 2003/04, 21% in 2007/08 
and 42% in 2011/12). It appears that in particular the notable achievements of the German 
national team (which won the World Cup in 2003 and 2007) and the World Cup hosted in 
Germany in 2011 proved very beneficial for the promotion of women’s football in Germa-
ny – at least in terms of ticket sales for women’s Bundesliga games. Yet, the surges in at-
tendance in the season following a World Cup were often followed by a decline in fan in-
terest in the subsequent season(s).  
An admittedly ad hoc (but nevertheless conceivable) explanation for the 25 percent in-
crease in attendance in the season 2006/07 is the men’s FIFA World Cup that was also 
hosted in Germany in 2006 and that might have generated positive spillover effects for 
women’s football. However, in the absence of counterfactual evidence this remains highly 
speculative. That is, without information on how average capacity utilization rates in the 
women’s football Bundesliga would have developed without the men’s FIFA World Cup 
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on home soil, it is not possible to quantify the impact of the World Cup on fan demand. 
Besides, the same holds true for the impact of the respective women’s World Cup competi-
tions on fan demand, although the repeating pattern suggests that a causal connection ex-
ists.    
Attendance data for the German handball leagues are only available for a few seasons. An 
inspection of the average attendance of teams active in the highest two divisions in the 
season 2010/11 (see Table 5-7 in Appendix D) suggests that the gender gap in fan demand 
is considerably smaller than in football. Indeed, some of the teams in the women’s Bun-
desliga draw the same number of fans as men’s second division teams, while one team, HC 
Leipzig, even comes close to the lower bound of attendance in the men’s Bundesliga. 
Again, the data do not allow drawing any conclusions regarding the impact of the league’s 
attractiveness (or competitive balance) on attendance. It might as well be the case that 
handball – being a sport that had originally been designed for women – is perceived more 
gender-neutral than football and is thus more appealing to fans. This, in turn, could (i) at-
tract more fans to women’s games and (ii) encourage more women to select into a com-
petitive environment. The latter would explain why talent in women’s handball is appar-
ently more equally distributed (relative to the men’s league) than is the case in women’s 
football. 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
We analyze the long-term development of competitive balance in selected European team 
sports leagues. Thereby, we contribute to the existing literature by focusing on gender dif-
ferences in competitive balance.92 Examining the within-season competitive balance over a 
period of two decades, we find that in football (i.e., the German Bundesliga, English Prem-
ier League and second division) competition is far more balanced among men’s teams than 
among women’s teams. A possible explanation for the persistent gender differences is that 
the pool of highly skilled individuals is significantly smaller among women and that the 
comparatively heterogeneous female talent is unevenly distributed. The evidence emerging 
from a supposedly less male-dominated competitive environment (i.e., the German Hand-
ball Bundesliga) is somewhat different. Here, we are unable to find persistent and statisti-
cally significant gender differences in competitive balance. Yet, the descriptive evidence 
                                               
92 Similar research exploiting data from the North American Basketball leagues has been conducted by Per-
line and Stoldt (2007b) and Matheson et al. (2013). 
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suggests that the women’s league has become increasingly competitive over time, while 
the men’s league has become less balanced. Given the limited number of annual observa-
tions, it is of course too early to infer on systematic changes in the talent distributions 
among men and women. On the aggregate, however, it seems that gender differences in 
competiveness are considerably smaller in German top division handball than in some Eu-
ropean football leagues. 
Although we deliberately refrain from empirically analyzing the effects of competitive 
balance on attendance, a descriptive analysis of attendance in some of the women’s leagues 
provides two interesting insights. First, attendance in the women’s football Bundesliga 
seems to be strongly influenced by international tournaments such as the women’s Football 
World Cup. These largely televised events appear to have boosted the popularity of the 
sport in Germany which, in turn, led to a dramatic increase of spectators in the women’s 
Bundesliga in every season following a World Cup event. Second, the most recent attend-
ance figures from the German handball leagues reveal that the gender gap in attendance is 
considerably smaller than in the football leagues examined in this paper. Whether this is 
due to the increasing (relative) attractiveness (or “closeness”) of the women’s Handball 
Bundesliga remains to be tested in future research. Unfortunately, the underlying data do 
not allow conducting more sophisticated empirical analyses. A sample including a number 
of different sports in different countries and across different divisions would serve as a 
basis for a multivariate analysis. 
Nevertheless, it remains difficult to determine causal relationships between competitive 
balance and attendance. A contested issue among sports economists is, for example, 
whether competitive balance indeed matters for fans. At least in European football it is 
commonly acknowledged that “David-against-Goliath encounters” attract significantly 
more fans than matches between two rather weak opponents with ex ante similar prospects 
of winning. Buraimo and Simmons (2008) explain this with the home fans’ desire to be in 
the stadium in the rare event that David beats Goliath. It is also conceivable that superstar 
effects play a role, in the sense that the favorite team’s star players draw “marginal” fans 
(i.e., people who under “normal” conditions would have preferred to stay at home) to the 
stadium. Disentangling these effects poses a huge challenge for the econometrician but at 
the same time provides avenues for future research.  
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5.6 APPENDIX D 
Table 5-5: Development of within-season competitive balance levels in all leagues (measured by HHIadj) 
German Football Bundesliga 
 
English Football Premier League 
 
English Football Second Division 
 
German Handball Bundesliga 
 
Note:  HHIadj values are on the y-axis, while seasons are indicated on the x-axis. Own illustration based on 
own calculations. 
  
5,00
5,50
6,00
6,50
7,00
19
90
/9
1
19
91
/9
2
19
92
/9
3
19
93
/9
4
19
94
/9
5
19
95
/9
6
19
96
/9
7
19
97
/9
8
19
98
/9
9
19
99
/0
0
20
00
/0
1
20
01
/0
2
20
02
/0
3
20
03
/0
4
20
04
/0
5
20
05
/0
6
20
06
/0
7
20
07
/0
8
20
08
/0
9
20
09
/1
0
20
10
/1
1
Men
Women
5,00
5,50
6,00
6,50
7,00
19
90
/9
1
19
91
/9
2
19
92
/9
3
19
93
/9
4
19
94
/9
5
19
95
/9
6
19
96
/9
7
19
97
/9
8
19
98
/9
9
19
99
/0
0
20
00
/0
1
20
01
/0
2
20
02
/0
3
20
03
/0
4
20
04
/0
5
20
05
/0
6
20
06
/0
7
20
07
/0
8
20
08
/0
9
20
09
/1
0
20
10
/1
1
Men
Women
5,00
5,50
6,00
6,50
7,00
19
90
/9
1
19
91
/9
2
19
92
/9
3
19
93
/9
4
19
94
/9
5
19
95
/9
6
19
96
/9
7
19
97
/9
8
19
98
/9
9
19
99
/0
0
20
00
/0
1
20
01
/0
2
20
02
/0
3
20
03
/0
4
20
04
/0
5
20
05
/0
6
20
06
/0
7
20
07
/0
8
20
08
/0
9
20
09
/1
0
20
10
/1
1
Men
Women
5,00
5,50
6,00
6,50
7,00
19
90
/9
1
19
91
/9
2
19
92
/9
3
19
93
/9
4
19
94
/9
5
19
95
/9
6
19
96
/9
7
19
97
/9
8
19
98
/9
9
19
99
/0
0
20
00
/0
1
20
01
/0
2
20
02
/0
3
20
03
/0
4
20
04
/0
5
20
05
/0
6
20
06
/0
7
20
07
/0
8
20
08
/0
9
20
09
/1
0
20
10
/1
1
Men
Women
Competitive Balance in Domestic Sports Leagues – A Gender Comparison 127
Table 5-6: Development of within-season competitive balance levels in all leagues (measured by C5-Index) 
German Football Bundesliga 
English Football Premier League 
English Football Second Division 
German Handball Bundesliga 
Note:  C5-Index values are on the y-axis, while seasons are indicated on the x-axis. Own illustration based 
on own calculations. 
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Figure 5-5: Comparison of average competitive balance levels between leagues (measured by HHIadj) 
 
Note:  HHIadj values are on the y-axis, while leagues are displayed on the x-axis. Own illustration based on 
own calculations. 
 
Figure 5-6: Comparison of average competitive balance levels between leagues (measured by C5-Index) 
 
Note:  C5-Index values are on the y-axis, while leagues are displayed on the x-axis. Own illustration based 
on own calculations. 
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Table 5-7: Average attendance in German handball in the season 2010/11 
Rank Team Overall Attendance Average Attendance Home Games 
1 HSV Hamburg 181,722 10,689 17 
2 THW Kiel 174,250 10,250 17 
3 Füchse Berlin 138,946 8,173 17 
4 Rhein-Neckar Löwen 136,559 8,032 17 
5 SG Flensburg-H. 100,580 5,916 17 
6 SC Magdeburg 88,594 5,211 17   
7 Frisch Auf Göppingen 81,000 4,764 17 Men's first 
8 TBV Lemgo 74,788 4,399 17 division teams 
9 HSG Wetzlar 60,324 3,548 17 
10 TSV Hannover-Burgdorf 54,796 3,223 17 
11 TV Großwallstadt 54,762 3,221 17 
12 ASV Hamm-Westfalen 50,949 2,997 17 
13 VfL Gummersbach 45,576 2,680 17 
14 TuS N-Lübbecke 42,057 2,473 17 
15 HBW Balingen-Weilstetten 41,240 2,425 17 
16 MT Melsungen 38,361 2,256 17 
17 GWD Minden 37,760 2,221 17   
18 TV Bittenfeld 37,567 2,209 17 Men's second 
19 DHC Rheinland 36,967 2,174 17 division teams 
20 TSG Friesenheim 35,400 2,082 17 
21 HC Leipzig 27,020 2,078 13   
22 VfL Bad Schwartau 32,232 2,014 16 Women's first 
23 SV Post Schwerin 30,657 1,916 16 division teams 
24 TuSEM Essen 29,917 1,869 16 
25 Eintracht Hildesheim 28,403 1,775 16 
26 ThSV Eisenach 27,554 1,620 17 
27 Bergischer HC 26,795 1,576 17 
28 HG Saarlouis 25,099 1,476 17 
29 Buxtehuder SV 19,283 1,377 14 
30 Wilhelmshavener HV 21,915 1,369 16 
31 SG BBM Bietigheim 22,309 1,312 17 
31 HSG Nordhorn-Lingen 20,552 1,284 16 
32 TV Emsdetten 20,465 1,279 16 
33 TV Hüttenberg 22,488 1,249 18 
34 HC Erlangen 20,800 1,223 17 
35 TV 1893 Neuhausen 20,800 1,223 17 
36 EHV Aue 20,700 1,217 17 
37 HC Empor Rostock 19,316 1,207 16 
38 Dessau-Roßlauer HV 06 18,430 1,151 16 
39 VfL Oldenburg 14,360 1,104 13 
40 HSG Düsseldorf 18,663 1,097 17 
41 HSC Coburg 18,550 1,091 17 
42 Thüringer HC 14,544 1,038 14 
43 DJK/MJC Trier 11,110 1,010 11 
44 FHC Frankfurt/Oder 11,667 972 12 
45 SG H2Ku Herrenberg 16,509 971 17 
46 Bayer Leverkusen 10,370 864 12 
47 TSG Wismar 9,380 852 11   
48 Frisch Auf Göppingen 9,200 836 11 Women's second 
49 SVG Celle 10,670 820 13 division teams 
50 TuSpo Obernburg 13,900 817 17 
  Average 41,683 2,522 16 
Source: www.handball-world.com and own calculations.  
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6 GENDER DIFFERENCES IN DECISION-MAKING UNDER RISK: 
EVIDENCE FROM TV GAME SHOW DATA 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
A wide range of theories of decision making under risk have been developed and have con-
tributed to the understanding of differences in individual behavior, including von Neumann 
and Morgenstern’s (1944) normative expected utility theory as well as Kahneman and 
Tversky's (1979) prospect theory. Nevertheless, the empirical testing of individual decision 
making, especially with regard to risk and overconfidence, has proven to be difficult. La-
boratory experiments, for example, are characterized by a high degree of internal validity 
but are often criticized for their lack of external validity. One point of criticism is that la-
boratory experiments are limited in terms of their budget, which often forces experimenters 
to incentivize participants with small or even hypothetical stakes. This, in turn, could result 
in subjects not being motivated to act realistically and, thus, bears the risk of subjects not 
revealing their actual preferences and beliefs (Post et al. 2008). In this context, Holt and 
Laury (2002) find evidence that subjects tend to be more risk averse when they face large 
monetary stakes in contrast to hypothetical or small amounts of money. 
One possibility to circumvent these problems is to use field data93, and in particular data 
from TV game shows. In fact, television shows provide a good natural context in which 
individuals face well-defined decision-making tasks that are usually linked to large mone-
tary amounts at stake. Game shows that have been in the focus of economic research in-
clude, among others, Card Sharks (Gertner 1993), Jeopardy! (Metrick 1995; Säve-
Söderbergh and Lindquist 2011), Lingo (Beetsma and Schotman 2001), Hoosier Million-
aire (Fullenkamp et al. 2003), Who Wants to be a Millionaire? (Daghofer 2007; Johnson 
and Gleason 2009; Hartley et al. 2013), The Weakest Link (Levitt 2003; Antonovics et al. 
2005, 2009) and the recently widely exploited TV show Deal or No Deal (Post et al. 2008; 
Deck et al. 2008; Brooks et al. 2009; Mulino et al. 2009; De Roos and Sarafidis 2010; 
Bombardini and Trebbi 2012).  
The game show that is analyzed in this paper, The Million Pound Drop (as well as the 
German and Swiss equivalents of this show, Rette die Million and Die Millionenfalle) has, 
                                               
93 Rather than being a substitute for lab-based experiments, Harrison and List (2004) conclude in an exten-
sive review of the relevant literature that field and laboratory experiments complement one another. 
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to the best of our knowledge, not been empirically researched before, but provides an ideal 
setting to analyze gender differences in decision making under risk. The first and main 
advantage is that the stakes are exceptionally high from the beginning of the game: Al-
ready the first decision involves an amount at stake of one million pounds. This stands in 
stark contrast to other game shows, such as Who Wants to be a Millionaire, where partici-
pants get to the high-stakes questions only after having “survived” a number of rounds by 
correctly answering questions. We are thus able to rule out – or at least reduce – any 
knowledge-specific selection effects. This is particularly true since the rules of the game 
are simple and well-known to the participants. Another distinctive feature is that contest-
ants compete together in pairs. Hence, besides the possibility to observe and compare the 
performance of single-gender and mixed teams, it is possible to examine individual behav-
ior of male and female contestants depending on the team composition.  
Using data covering 45 episodes, 94 different teams and 567 individual decisions from the 
above-mentioned game show, we test, first, if male teams are less risk averse than female 
teams, and second, if men are overconfident in particular when playing with a female team 
partner. We contribute to the already large and still growing literature by analyzing gender 
differences in overconfidence and risk behavior in a high-stakes real-life environment. At 
the same time, the results have important implications for the labor market inasmuch as 
they can partly explain the observed gender differences on the playing field, e.g. the un-
derrepresentation of women in leading positions in management, politics, academia, and 
the like.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 6.2 provides a selective review of the literature on 
(gender) differences in decision making under risk as well as some theoretical considera-
tions. Section 6.3 describes the basic rules of the game show. In section 6.4, we present the 
data, develop our hypotheses and provide some descriptive evidence. The empirical anal-
yses are presented and discussed in section 6.5, while section 6.6 offers concluding re-
marks, limitations and suggestions for further research. 
6.2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
There are two strands of literature related to our research. The first strand of literature ana-
lyzes (gender) differences in decision making under risk, while the second addresses one of 
the potential causes of differences in individual risk preferences, namely the phenomenon 
of overconfidence in economic decision making. Overconfidence refers to the stylized fact 
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emerging from the social psychology literature stating that boundedly rational (as opposed 
to rational and utility-maximizing) individuals tend to overestimate their own capability 
relative to others (see e.g. Larwood and Whittaker 1977; Svensson 1981; Alicke 1985; 
Benoît and Dubra 2011). The analysis of individual risk preferences and overconfident 
behavior followed in the wake of alternative theories of non-rational behavior. Simon 
(1955) was among the first to question the standard economic model in which utility max-
imization and perfect rationality are inherent traits of the “homo economicus”. In what has 
become popular as prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) (and advancements to 
this theory by Tversky and Kahneman 1991, 1992) argue that individuals are sensitive to 
losses and gains based on (subjective) reference points rather than (objective) probabilities. 
This, in turn, often leads to suboptimal outcomes from a general welfare (or neo-classical) 
perspective. In this context, other behavioristic traits, such as myopia, anticipated regret or 
perceptions of fairness and reciprocity that could influence individual decision making 
(see, for example, Bruni and Sugden 2007) are not considered in the present study. 
In the following, we review some of the “classical” and more recent works related to either 
of the two above-mentioned strands, beginning with the literature referring to gender dif-
ferences in decision making under risk. A large part of the literature on gender differences 
in individual risk preferences uses data from laboratory experiments. The general tenor of 
these studies is that women are, on average, less confident and more risk averse than men. 
The following Table 6-1 summarizes some of the available literature with a particular fo-
cus on gender differences in risk behavior. This list is of course far from exhaustive. 
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Table 6-1: Overview of selected experimental studies on (gender) differences in risk behavior 
Summary Table of Gender Differences in Risk Behavior 
Author(s) Setting Experimental Design Results 
Significantly 
More Risk 
Averse Sex 
Brinig (1995) Abstract 
Subjects were given the choice of 
one of three urns, having a 90% 
chance of winning a “very small” 
prize, a 20% chance of winning a 
“slightly larger” prize and a 5% 
chance of winning a “very large” 
prize.  
Male subjects have a greater 
preference for risk from the onset 
of adolescence to around the mid-
forties. 
Female 
Eckel, 
Grossman 
(2002) 
Abstract 
Subjects had to choose one out of 
five lotteries which were associated 
with different risk choices and 
expected returns. 
On average, women are found to be 
consistently more risk averse than 
men.  
 
Female 
Harbaugh, 
Krause, 
Vester-lund 
(2002) 
Abstract 
Subjects from age 5 to 64 were faced 
with choices between a certain 
outcome and a lottery in order to 
examine how risk attitudes change 
with age. 
Gain domain: 
Subjects are risk seeking when they 
face high-probability prospects 
over gains and are risk averse when 
they are confronted with relatively 
small-probability prospects.  
Neither 
Loss domain: 
On the other hand, subjects are risk 
averse when they face high-
probability losses and are risk 
seeking when confronted with 
small-probability losses.  
Neither 
 
Holt, Laury 
(2002) Abstract 
Subjects faced a lottery-choice 
experiment with the intention of 
measuring the degree of risk aversion 
over a wide range of low and high 
payoffs. 
Low payoff: 
Women are slightly more risk 
averse than men.  
Female 
High payoff: 
Men and women become more risk 
averse.  
Neither 
Johnson, 
Powell 
(1994) 
Contextual Men and women made betting decisions on horse and dog races. 
Women prefer gambles with a high 
probability of low returns and, 
therefore, take less risk, whereas 
men prefer gambles with a lower 
chance of some higher return. 
Female 
Powell, Ansic  
(1997) Contextual 
Insurance setting: 
Subjects faced insurance cover 
decisions.  
 
Insurance setting: 
Female subjects more often buy 
(extensive) insurance than male 
subjects and are more risk averse. 
Female 
Currency market experiment: 
Subjects faced currency market 
decisions and had to trade one 
currency for another in a risky 
market with the intention of making 
gains. 
Currency market experiment: 
Female subjects are more risk 
averse than men when they have to 
decide whether to avoid risk while 
holding the wealth level or trading 
one currency for another in a risky 
market environment and possibly 
losing money. 
Female 
Gysler, 
Kruse, 
Schubert 
(2002) 
Contextual 
Subjects were confronted with 
twelve lotteries which included 
different risk levels in a financial 
decision context.  
The subjects were asked to bet on 
whether or not the lotteries would 
post a daily market price increase. 
Controlling for factors such as 
competence, knowledge of 
financial markets and confidence in 
their own judgements, Gysler et al. 
show that women are significantly 
more risk averse than men.  
Female 
Agnew, 
Anderson, 
Gerlach, 
Szykman 
(2008) 
Contextual 
Subjects at retiring age had the 
choice between purchasing a fixed 
immediate lifetime annuity or 
investing their savings on their own. 
Women are more likely than men 
to choose the annuity and are less 
willing to invest the savings on 
their own. 
Female 
Eckel, 
Grossman 
(2008) 
Contextual 
Subjects faced specific choices and 
had to make decisions with regard to 
the investment in a share of stock of 
one of five different companies 
Male participants are significantly 
more risk prone than female 
subjects. 
Female 
Source:  Own illustration. 
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The finding that women are, on average, less inclined to take risk than men is corroborated 
by a comprehensive review of the experimental economics literature by Croson and 
Gneezy (2009). This, in turn, has important implications for the participation of men and 
women in the labor market. If women systematically make other choices and behave dif-
ferently than men, this can explain part of the gender gap observed in payment and key 
management positions. On the one hand, risk averse women are less likely to select into 
competitive career paths than equally-endowed men (see e.g. Nekby et al. 2008 for evi-
dence from already highly selected road runners). On the other hand, if employers believe 
that women lack the necessary confidence or risk-loving attitude required for certain posi-
tions, they are likely to prefer male candidates over female candidates in recruitment or 
promotion decisions. Generally, most management decisions are made in uncertain and 
risky environments and are associated with uncertain opportunities, threats or costs. 
However, results from laboratory studies of the above kind are often criticized for their 
lack of external validity and should, therefore, be interpreted with caution. A contested 
issue is, for example, whether the behavior of men and women in a “non-managerial” pop-
ulation typically consisting of undergraduate students allows drawing inferences on the 
behavior of males and females in top management positions. Along these lines, Johnson 
and Powell (1994) explore gender differences in the nature of decisions taken by a “mana-
gerial” population of potential and actual managers and compare these results to a “non-
managerial” population of undergraduate students. The results suggest that the commonly 
observed stereotypes and gender differences may not apply to highly selected sub-
populations. Indeed, males and females with a managerial background are found to display 
similar risk preferences and make decisions of equal quality.94  
Despite these exceptions, the intuition is that among the general (i.e., “non-managerial”) 
population women are significantly more risk averse than men. In the following, we dis-
cuss potential explanations for the observed gender differences. First, as posited by some 
social psychologists (e.g. Fujita et al. 1991; Brody 1993; Larkin and Pines 2003), women 
show greater emotional reactions to situations involving risk and uncertainty. As a result, 
women are more likely to avoid negative social outcomes especially when being in the 
                                               
94 Similar evidence (and criticism) is provided by Schubert et al. (1999). The intuition that some sub-
populations tend to be distinctively different than the general population in terms of their attitudes toward 
risk is supported by Heß et al. (2013). Drawing on survey data from the German Bundestag as well as the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the authors show that career politicians in Germany have signifi-
cantly stronger risk preferences than the general population of GSOEP respondents. 
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center of public attention. Moreover, Croson and Gneezy (2009) conjecture that women 
experience emotions more intensely than men and that this trait can eventually adversely 
affect their decision making under risk. Another explanatory approach is that individuals 
differ in their perception of risk (see, inter alia, Arch 1993; Sitkin and Weingart 1995; 
Croson and Gneezy 2009). Whereas men tend to appraise risky situations as a challenge, 
women are more likely to perceive a risky environment as a threat and thus shy away from 
such environments. Finally, and to some extent related to the previous point, individuals 
tend to be overconfident (Camerer and Lovallo 1999; van den Steen 2004; Hoelzl and Rus-
tichini 2005)95, with men being more overconfident than women (Niederle and Vesterlund 
2007, Nekby et al. 2008; Gerdes and Gränsmark 2010; Reuben et al. 2012).  
Although the first two explanations for gender differences in risk behavior are valid in eve-
ryday contexts, they are supposedly less conclusive for potential differences as observed in 
the quiz show The Million Pound Drop. Due to the contestants’ deliberate decision to par-
ticipate in a risky (and of course public) environment, we observe a sub-population of 
males and females who are likely to be less risk averse than the general population. This 
has two important implications for our analysis. First, if we are able to identify systematic 
differences in the risk behavior of male and female game show participants, these effects 
are likely to be even more pronounced among the general population (i.e., we under- rather 
than overestimate the effects). Second, due to the aforementioned selection effects we can 
rule out some of the common explanations for differences in risk preferences and are thus 
able to examine overconfident behavior in an isolated manner. 
6.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE GAME SHOW 
The TV game show The Million Pound Drop was developed by the Dutch production 
company Endemol and first aired in the United Kingdom in May 2010. The game show 
soon became popular and was exported to dozens of other countries, including Germany 
and Switzerland. The following description applies to the episodes of The Million Pound 
Drop aired in the United Kingdom. Except for the slightly different and (due to currency 
fluctuations) varying monetary amounts, the main structure of this quiz show is identical to 
the German and Swiss versions.  
                                               
95 Further evidence regarding the causes and consequences of overconfidence has recently been provided by 
Nöth and Weber (2003), Koszegi (2006), Menkhoff et al. (2006) and Garcia et al. (2007). Overconfidence is 
not only observed among the general population but also among CEOs who are found to overstate future 
returns of their companies (Malmendier and Tate 2005, 2008) and among financial analysts who tend to 
become overconfident following a series of accurate predictions (Hilary and Menzley 2006). 
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The contestants, who apply for and play in the show together in pairs, are given one mil-
lion pounds in £50 notes which are divided into 40 bundles of £25,000 each. The teams 
must then answer eight questions with the aim of retaining as much of their initial prize-
money as possible. At the beginning of each round, teams have to pick one out of two cat-
egories and then have to answer a multiple-choice question related to this category. The 
first four questions have four possible answer options, while the next three questions have 
three and the final question only has two answer options. In each round, the candidates can 
either bet all of their (remaining) money on one answer option or wager their bets, depend-
ing on how confident they are about the answer. However, there are two important re-
strictions. First, one answer field must always be kept clear with no money on it. That im-
plies that the splitting of stakes is no longer possible in the eighth and last (all-or-nothing) 
round. Second, after the question and the corresponding answer options have been present-
ed by the anchorwoman, the team has 60 seconds to place the money onto trapdoors corre-
sponding to the answer(s) chosen. If the candidates are confident about their answer, they 
are able to stop the clock before the time limit is up. The trapdoors that are related to incor-
rect answers then open and any money placed on these trapdoors is lost. Moreover, those 
bundles that are not placed on either answer option by the end of the time limit are lost, 
too. If a team has any money left, it proceeds to the next round where the process is repeat-
ed. Yet, teams losing all their money in one particular round are out of the game and leave 
the show empty-handed. Therefore, the contestants have a huge incentive to retain as much 
of their money as possible. Figure 6-1 illustrates the basic structure of the main game. 
Figure 6-1: Flow chart of the main game 
 
Note:  Pairs can also consist of two male or two female candidates. Source: Own illustration.  
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Episodes usually last between one and two hours and include two to four teams competing 
one after another. Most recently, the show’s format was significantly modified, with teams 
of four candidates playing the game. In addition to that, a lottery was introduced: Contest-
ants now have the choice between either “cashing out” after question seven or doubling 
their prize money with a correctly answered question eight. Our analysis is however based 
on the “traditional” format as described above. 
6.4 DATA, HYPOTHESES AND DESCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE 
The data used for the analysis come from 45 episodes of The Million Pound Drop (as well 
as the German and Swiss equivalents), covering 94 different teams and 567 individual de-
cisions. Collection of the data was done by watching game show episodes that were (and to 
some extent still are) available online on youtube and the respective broadcasters’ web-
sites. The structure and composition of the dataset is illustrated below. 
Table 6-2: Structure of the dataset 
Country Episodes Observation period Teams 
Decisions 
excluding 
question 8 
Decisions 
including 
question 8 
UK 15 October 2010 - February 2012 33 182 194 
GER 8 May 2011 - March 2012 24 137 147 
CH 22 July 2011 - June 2012 37 211 226 
∑ 45 2010 - 2012 94 530 567 
 
As already mentioned in the previous section, question number eight includes only two 
possible answer options and does not allow any strategic splitting behavior. Due to this 
limited decision choice, the observations of the eighth question can only be considered in 
some of our models.  
Apart from the advantages discussed at the beginning of this paper, the game show is well 
suited for the empirical testing of risk behavior and overconfidence for two further reasons: 
First, we can quantify the teams’ splitting behavior by means of a concentration ratio 
which serves as a proxy for risk aversion.96 Second, during the one-minute decision phase 
                                               
96 Of course, a large part of those questions where candidates decide to not split their stakes but instead place 
all of their money on one single trapdoor are hardly indicative of a particularly risk loving attitude. Instead, it 
appears more likely that the candidates simply know the correct answer which, in turn, would disqualify this 
observation as a decision under uncertainty. On the other hand, we cannot categorically rule out the possibil-
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we are able to observe each candidate’s behavior and can, therefore, explore whether men 
and women behave differently in single-gender and mixed teams. Based on the theoretical 
considerations and the literature reviewed in section 6.2, the following hypotheses are de-
rived: 
Hrisk: Male teams bet larger shares of their money on the answers they be-
lieve to be correct (i.e., they are less risk averse) than female teams 
which prefer to diversify their bets. 
Hoverconfidence: Men are overconfident especially when playing with women in mixed 
teams. 
Table 6-3 provides summary statistics for our sample of 45 game show episodes aired in 
Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom in the years 2010 to 2012. For each team 
we collected, among others, the team’s composition97, each candidate’s age, the remaining 
amount of money prior to each decision, the proportion of money bet on the preferred an-
swer (and whether the preferred answer is correct or not), the time that is needed for a de-
cision, the question number (which also controls for the number of possible answer op-
tions) as well as the number of answer options chosen. Furthermore, information on the 
decision-makers of the categories and the quiz questions, last-minute money shifts and the 
success- and failure-rates in previous rounds was collected. Finally, we calculated an ine-
quality measure in order to capture the splitting and risk behavior of male, female and 
mixed teams. We use the Gini coefficient which is however slightly adjusted in order to 
control for the varying number of answer options. The adjusted Gini coefficient ranges 
between zero and one, with a value of zero indicating that the money is split equally, 
whereas a value of one implies that the entire amount is bet on one answer option. 
We use the following formula to calculate the Gini coefficient: 
G= ∑ hini
2i-n-1
n
 with 0≤G≤1- 1
n
	,      (1) 
 
                                                                                                                                              
ity that especially in the later rounds (and with less money at stake) candidates stake everything “on one 
card” despite being uncertain about the correct answer. 
97 Here, we focused on the gender of both candidates. We also looked at team diversity with respect to age, 
relationship and occupational status of the candidates to examine whether, for example, a mother and her 
daughter or an employer and his employee behave differently than e.g. siblings or colleagues. Yet, none of 
these diversity measures turned out to significantly affect the decision-making behavior. This might be due to 
the fact that teams are indeed rather homogeneous regarding the latter characteristics. 
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where  G represents the Gini coefficient, 
  i indicates the respective answer option on which the money is bet, 
  hi is the relative share of money bet on an answer option, and 
  n stands for the number of splitting options. 
 
To control for the varying number of answer (and splitting) options, we divide G by the 
inverse of the number of splitting options: 
     Adj. Gini = ܩ భ
೙
ൗ      (2) 
Table 6-3: Summary statistics 
Variable Operationalization Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Adj. Gini 
Adjusted Gini coefficient, tending towards zero 
if money is split equally (and towards one 
otherwise)    
530 0.70 0.34 0 1 
Team composition 
      
Mixed team Dummy taking the value of 1 if team consists of a male and a female, zero otherwise 567 0.55 - 0 1 
Male team Dummy taking the value of 1 if team consists of two males, zero otherwise 567 0.30 - 0 1 
Female team Dummy taking the value of 1 if team consists of two females, zero otherwise 567 0.15 - 0 1 
Country 
      
Country (UK) Dummy taking the value of 1 if game show was broadcasted in the UK, zero otherwise 567 0.34 - 0 1 
Country (GER) 
Dummy taking the value of 1 if game show was 
broadcasted in Germany, zero otherwise 567 0.26 - 0 1 
Country (CH) 
Dummy taking the value of 1 if game show was 
broadcasted in Switzerland, zero otherwise 567 0.40 - 0 1 
Age Candidate’s age in years 567 35.9 10.6 20 93 
CumAge Teams’ cumulative age 567 71.8 21.2 40 162 
Question no. Question number (or round of the game) 567 3.88 2.15 1 8 
Options chosen Number of answer options bet on 530 1.70 0.72 1 3 
Proportion preferred Proportion of money bet on preferred answer 530 0.80 0.21 0.33 1 
Preferred correct Dummy indicating whether the preferred an-swer is correct (1) or not (0) 530 0.75 - 0 1 
Time 
Time needed to physically move the money 
onto the trapdoors related to the answer options 
(in seconds)  
567 55.11 11.12 2 60 
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Timer stopped Dummy indicating whether the timer was stopped (1) or not (0) 567 0.21 - 0 1 
Balance Remaining amount of money at the beginning of each round 567 589,242 387,779 25,000 1,000,000 
Failure 
Counter variable indicating the number of 
consecutive failures (i.e., substantial losses due 
to an incorrect preferred answer option) in 
previous rounds 
567 0.19 0.49 0 4 
Success 
Counter variable indicating the number of 
consecutive successes (i.e., correct preferred 
answer option) in previous rounds 
567 1.61 1.68 0 7 
Decider category Categorical variable denoting the decision-maker regarding the category 567 - - 1 7 
Decider question Categorical variable denoting the decision-maker regarding the question 567 - - 1 7 
Last-minute en-
largement 
Categorical variable denoting who shifted 
money from a small to a large stack in the last 
seconds of the one-minute decision phase 
567 - - 0 7 
Last-minute reduc-
tion 
Categorical variable denoting who shifted 
money from a large to a small stack in the last 
seconds of the one-minute decision phase 
567 - - 0 7 
Questions survived Number of questions “survived” without losing all money 94 5.34 2.36 0 8 
Amount won Overall amount of money won after having correctly answered question number eight 94 29,521 72,491 0 500,000 
Note:  Due to the limited decision choice in the last round (recall that the splitting of stakes is not allowed) 
these observations are omitted for adj. Gini. The categorical variable decider category indicates 
whether only one male (=1) or female (=2) in a mixed team, or only one person in a single-gender 
male (=3) or female team (=4) has taken the decision. In these cases we refer to a non-consensual 
decision. If both members of a female (=5), male (=6) or mixed team (=7) agree upon a category, we 
refer to a consensual decision. We use the same pattern for the decider question and last-minute-
change variables, with the latter including the possibility that no changes are made (=0). 
 
In the following, we provide descriptive evidence on the success rates of teams, their split-
ting behavior as well as the decision-making process of single- and mixed-gender teams. 
Hereby, we particularly focus on the one-minute decision phase where candidates physical-
ly move their money onto the trapdoors related to the respective answer options. 
In the first step, the teams’ success rates are compared. More specifically, we examine how 
many of the male, female and mixed teams are able to “survive” all eight questions and 
whether the team composition has an effect on team performance.98  
                                               
98 The term “team” might be somewhat misleading as most of the literature analyzing the effect of gender 
diversity on team outcomes focuses on teams of three or more members (see e.g. Kashy and Kenny 2000, 
Horwitz and Horwitz 2007 or Bell et al. 2011 for comprehensive reviews of this literature). Therefore, 
“team” explicitly refers to the pairs (or dyads) of candidates competing in the quiz show. 
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Figure 6-2: Percentage of “surviving” and “failing” teams 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
It appears from Figure 6-2 that female teams perform considerably better than male teams, 
with 38 percent of all female teams successfully completing all eight questions (as opposed 
to 31 percent of all male teams). Mixed teams seem to perform worst, with only every 
fourth team “surviving the game”. Most of the mixed and male teams appear to fail in 
rounds 5-7, whereas the majority of female teams apparently fail in the first four rounds. 
Conducting a chi-squared test suggests, however, that the observed differences are statisti-
cally insignificant. The multivariate analyses discussed in the next section (we estimate a 
semi-parametric survival model as well as an ordered probit regression) will shed addition-
al light on the determinants of team success.   
Interestingly, in terms of earnings mixed teams fare significantly better than the previous 
results would have led one to suspect: Out of those teams surviving all eight questions 
mixed teams win on average 1.5 times the amount of female teams and 1.6 times the 
amount of male teams (see Figure 6-3). 
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Figure 6-3: Average earnings of “surviving” teams 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The results of a two-group mean-comparison test suggest that the differences in prize mon-
ey between mixed and single-gender teams are statistically significant, whereas no statisti-
cally significant differences are found between male and female teams. Taking both the 
“survival” rates (of all) and the average earnings of (only surviving) teams into account, it 
seems that mixed teams split their stakes to a lesser extent (are less risk averse) than single-
gender teams. In consequence, mixed pairs exit the game earlier but win higher amounts of 
money if they manage to survive all eight questions. The average earnings of all teams 
(including teams exiting the game prematurely) do not differ significantly – in a statistical 
sense – between the different gender compositions. 
In the next step, we aim to shed light on the teams’ betting patterns and success rates. Figu-
re 6-4 below informs about how much of the available balance is bet on the preferred an-
swer and how often this preferred answer turned out to be correct. Hence, this descriptive 
analysis is a good measure of the contestants’ confidence. While the first column in the 
diagram indicates how confident the teams are of their answers, the second column shows 
if the teams are indeed good at evaluating themselves or not. As an illustration, mixed 
teams put on average 82 percent of the available balance on the preferred answer which, 
however, turns out to be correct in 73 percent of the cases only. 
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Figure 6-4: Betting patterns and success rates 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
In contrast, male teams put an average portion of 80 percent of their available balance on 
the preferred answer which turns out to be correct in 77 percent of the cases. Female teams 
appear to have the best self-assessment as the percentage of money bet on the preferred 
answer is almost equal to their actual success rate. Although none of these differences are 
statistically significant, the descriptive evidence suggests that mixed teams tend to be over-
confident, while single-gender teams – and particularly female teams – evaluate them-
selves more realistically.  
In the last step, we attempt to look into the “black box” of the decision-making process. 
This can be done by examining the individual decisions within teams (rather than interpret-
ing decisions as team decisions). Therefore, we closely observe the behavior of the candi-
dates during the one-minute decision phase99, where typical scenarios are as follows: First, 
both candidates appear to have a similar knowledge regarding the question (i.e., they either 
know the answer with a given probability or they have no idea) and decide upon their bets 
on a consensual basis. Second, both candidates have different opinions but nevertheless 
reach a consensus. Third and most interestingly, only one of the two team members takes 
                                               
99 We collect similar data regarding the selection of the question category as well as potential last-minute 
money shifts. However, here we are unable to find systematic (gender) differences between different team 
compositions. 
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the decision while the other person is not involved in the decision-making process.100 The 
following three Figures illustrate the individual decision-making process in mixed, male 
and female teams. 
Figure 6-5: Decision-makers in mixed teams 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
Regarding mixed teams, it appears that 56 percent of the questions are answered on a con-
sensual basis. In contrast, in 44 percent of the cases only one team member makes the deci-
sion. Here, it is noticeable that men act as sole decision-makers on average twice as often 
as women do, even though their average success rate is slightly lower than that of women 
(albeit not significantly different from one another in a statistical sense). Interestingly, the 
likelihood of a preferred answer being correct is higher when only one team member 
makes the decision. This is mainly due to the fact that the majority of difficult questions in 
the later rounds, when both candidates are uncertain about the correct answer, are an-
swered consensually. Given the frequency of male “solo runs” and their success rates com-
pared to female sole decision-makers, it appears that men are overconfident when playing 
with a female partner. 
                                               
100 Candidates in fact communicate a lot at the beginning of the decision phase, stating how knowledgeable 
and confident they are. Only if one candidate clearly signals that she is confident and consequently takes the 
initiative, with the other candidate remaining passive, we classify this as a non-consensual decision. Note that 
we do not observe situations in which both candidates have totally different opinions and do not reach some 
form of consensus.  
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On the other hand, the individual choice behavior in single-gender teams is somewhat dif-
ferent. In male teams, 71 percent of the questions are answered on a consensual basis, 
whereas only 29 percent of the questions are answered non-consensually (implying that 
each individual solely decides in 14.5 percent of all cases). 
Figure 6-6: Decision-makers in male teams 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
An almost identical pattern can be observed for female teams, with exactly the same pro-
portion of questions being answered by a sole decision-maker (and only slightly different 
success rates).   
Figure 6-7: Decision-makers in female teams 
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Source: Own illustration. 
When comparing the individual choice behavior in single-gender and mixed teams, a strik-
ing result is that males and females exhibit exactly the same behavior when playing in 
gender-homogeneous teams. In gender-heterogeneous teams, however, men act as sole 
decision-makers twice as often as women. This might to some extent explain why mixed 
teams appear to be less-risk averse in terms of their splitting behavior: Overconfident (and 
presumably more risk loving) men tend to influence the decision-making process more 
frequently than women (who do not behave differently than in female-only teams). These 
are of course preliminary results which have to be tested econometrically by means of mul-
tivariate analyses, as will be done in the subsequent section. 
6.5 ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE 
In order to test our hypotheses that  
(i) male teams bet larger shares of their money on the answers they be-
lieve to be correct (i.e., they are less risk averse) than female teams 
which prefer to diversify their bets (Hrisk), 
 
and (ii) men are overconfident especially when playing with women in mixed 
teams (Hoverconfidence), 
we estimate an OLS regression as well as a probit regression, reporting marginal effects for 
the latter for ease of presentation. In addition to that, we estimate a semi-parametric pro-
portional hazard model (see Cox 1972) and an ordered probit regression to analyze wheth-
er the “survival” of teams is affected by the teams’ composition. The OLS model has the 
following functional form: 
Adj. Gini = β0 + β1team composition + β2country + β3question no. + β4options 
chosen + β5preferred correct + β6timer stopped + β7balance + 
β8CumAge + Ɛi. 
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Table 6-4: Estimation results OLS regression 
 Dependent variable: Adj. Gini 
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Female team Reference Category 
Reference 
Category 
Reference 
Category 
Reference 
Category 
Male team 0.064** [0.032] 
0.053* 
[0.057] 
0.056* 
[0.049] 
0.075** 
[0.017] 
Mixed team 0.045* [0.063] 
0.043* 
[0.063] 
0.045* 
[0.051] 
0.068** 
[0.014] 
Country (UK) Reference Category 
Reference 
Category --- 
Reference 
Category 
Country (GER) -0.032 [0.289] 
-0.022 
[0.345] --- 
-0.036 
[0.392] 
Country (CH) -0.023 [0.307] 
-0.019 
[0.363] --- 
-0.029 
[0.339] 
Question no. -0.050*** [0.000] 
-0.051*** 
[0.000] 
-0.051*** 
[0.000] --- 
Options chosen -0.326*** [0.000] 
-0.320*** 
[0.000] 
-0.318*** 
[0.000] --- 
Preferred correct 0.061** [0.011] 
0.067*** 
[0.006] 
0.066*** 
[0.006] 
0.230*** 
[0.000] 
Timer stopped 0.037** [0.033] 
0.040** 
[0.025] 
0.045** 
[0.011] 
0.263*** 
[0.000] 
Balance (in 10,000) 0.005 [0.193] 
0.005 
[0.320] 
0.004 
[0.440] 
0.022*** 
[0.000] 
CumAge  0.001 [0.341] --- --- --- 
Constant 1.327*** [0.000] 
1.317*** 
[0.000] 
1.310*** 
[0.000] 
0.279*** 
[0.000] 
     
Observations 
F  
R² 
530 
131.6 
0.708 
530 
149.6 
0.694 
530 
189.1 
0.693 
530 
49.3 
0.317 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. P-values are reported in brackets. All model specifications are 
estimated using robust standard errors clustered on team level. Model 1 includes all variables, 
whereas some controls are omitted in models 2-4.  
 
Most of the above results are straightforward and rather unsurprising. For example, the 
further the candidates advance in the show (and, thus, the more difficult the questions be-
come), the stronger the diversification of their bets. Teams deciding to stop the timer be-
fore the time limit is up seem to be quite certain about the answer and tend to bet more 
money on the preferred answer option. Those candidates who know the correct answer for 
sure most likely do not split their stakes at all. We can, to some extent, control for such 
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cases by means of the covariate preferred correct. Although we observe a strong (and in-
verse) correlation of -0.75 between the teams’ splitting behavior (adj. Gini) and the num-
ber of answer options they bet on (options chosen) – which explains the relatively high 
value of R² – we include both controls as the latter serves as an additional proxy for risk 
aversion. A particularly interesting result, on the other hand, is that male teams appear to 
split their money to a lesser extent than female teams, all other things being equal. We can 
thus support our hypothesis that male teams are less risk averse than female teams. Moreo-
ver, it appears that even mixed teams are significantly more risk loving than female teams 
(while mixed and male teams do not significantly differ from each other). These results are 
robust across all model specifications.  
Against the backdrop of the previous finding that males in mixed teams appear to act as 
sole decision-makers twice as often as in single-gender teams, a plausible explanation 
could be that male “risk taking” outweighs female “safeguarding” in heterogeneous teams. 
In the next step, we aim to assess the costs and benefits of such behavior. Among other 
things, we test whether the dominant behavior of men in mixed teams is advantageous for 
the teams’ success or whether men are simply overconfident. Therefore, we estimate a 
probit regression of the following form: 
Preferred correct = β0 + β1non-consensual: man in mixed team + β2non-consensual: 
woman in mixed team + β3non-consensual: woman in single-gender 
team + β4non-consensual: man in single-gender team + β5team com-
position + β6question no. + β7balance + β8failure + β9success + 
β10timer stopped + β11CumAge + Ɛi, 
where preferred correct is our binary dependent variable reflecting a team’s success in a 
given round. The regression results can be found in the following Table 6-5. For interpreta-
tion purposes, we report marginal effects at the means of the covariates which show a dis-
crete change from the base level for categorical variables and an infinitesimal change for 
continuous variables.  
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Table 6-5: Marginal effects after probit regression 
 Dependent variable: Preferred correct 
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 
Non-consensual: Man in mixed team 
0.093* 
[0.061] 
0.094* 
[0.061] 
Non-consensual: Woman in mixed team 
0.118* 
[0.051] 
0.119* 
[0.053] 
Non-consensual: Woman in single-gender team 
0.117** 
[0.044] 
0.130** 
[0.013] 
Non-consensual: Man in single-gender team 
0.024 
[0.678] 
0.016 
[0.784] 
Consensual decision Reference Category 
Male team 
0.070 
[0.112] 
0.076* 
[0.086] 
Female team 
0.083* 
[0.075] 
0.084* 
[0.067] 
Mixed team Reference Category 
Question no. 
-0.055*** 
[0.005] 
-0.054*** 
[0.007] 
Balance (in 10,000) 
-0.002 
[0.100] 
-0.002 
[0.126] 
Failure 
-0.164*** 
[0.006] 
-0.164*** 
[0.005] 
Success 
0.003 
[0.875] 
0.003 
[0.861] 
Timer stopped 
0.227*** 
[0.000] 
0.226*** 
[0.000] 
CumAge 
0.001 
[0.184] --- 
   
Observations 
Wald Chi²  
Pseudo R² 
567 
74.20*** 
0.142 
567 
70.78*** 
0.140 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. P-values are reported in brackets. Both model specifications are 
estimated using robust standard errors clustered on team level.  
 
Similar to the previous estimations, most of the coefficients have the expected direction: 
Teams which decide to stop the timer give significantly more accurate predictions than 
teams exploiting the one-minute time limit. This does of course not imply that stopping the 
timer increases the likelihood of correctly answering the question per se. It rather seems 
that the causality works in the opposite direction and that timer stopped is a signal of a 
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team’s certainty. Perhaps surprisingly, the number of correctly answered questions in the 
previous rounds does not affect the accuracy of the answer in the present round. Failure, 
on the other hand, has a statistically significant and negative effect, suggesting that teams 
who have lost the lion’s share of their money in the previous round(s) are more likely to 
(continue to) incur losses than successful teams. Again, with the increasing difficulty of 
questions in the later rounds candidates face decreasing chances of correctly answering 
questions. 
Quite remarkably, single-gender teams seem to have an eight percentage points (PPS) 
higher likelihood of a correct preferred answer than mixed teams. With regard to individual 
decision making within the different team compositions it seems that if women act as sole 
decision-makers they have a higher success rate than men. This difference amounts to al-
most three PPS, corresponding to up to £30,000 difference in earnings (depending on the 
remaining budget and the splitting behavior). It should be noted, however, that part of 
these gender differences could be due to selection effects: Since women are found to “step 
forward” less frequently than men it could well be that only those women who are very 
certain about their answer take the initiative. Despite that, it seems that men are overconfi-
dent when playing with a female partner as their success rate does not justify the frequency 
of their “solo runs”.   
In the last step, we analyze whether the “survival” of a team is affected by its composition 
and/or the individual decision making. We estimate a semi-parametric Cox proportional 
hazard model to test whether any of these covariates has an effect on a team’s probability 
of “surviving” the current round, conditional on having “survived” the previous round. The 
ordered probit model, on the other hand, analyzes the teams’ “survival” in a more general 
sense: Here, the dependent variable reflects the number of questions “survived” at the end 
of the game. This variable is ordinal in nature and ranges from 0 (a team fails in the first 
round) to 8 (identifying the winning teams). However, irrespective of the estimation tech-
nique, we are unable to find statistically significant differences between mixed, male and 
female teams. Nor do the different scenarios in the decision phase (e.g. male decision-
maker in mixed teams, consensual decision in female teams, etc.) have a statistically sig-
nificant impact on team success.101 With respect to these results, it should be noted that due 
to the limited number of observations at the aggregate level (n = 94 teams) we cannot in-
                                               
101 In the interest of brevity, the results of these estimations are not included in this paper but are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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clude all covariates and controls. Particularly some of the categorical variables are omitted 
due to an insufficient number of observations. 
Summarizing the results it can be stated that although male and mixed teams appear to be 
less risk averse than female teams – while at the individual level men tend to be overconfi-
dent when playing with a female team partner – these differences do not systematically 
influence the teams’ overall success. Yet, with respect to the descriptive statistics presented 
in the previous section, there is at least weak evidence that female teams more often “sur-
vive” all eight questions (although their splitting behavior impedes higher earnings). At the 
same time, the opposite seems to be true for mixed teams, which are found to fail more 
often but generate, on average, higher earnings if they manage to successfully complete all 
eight rounds. Generally speaking, it appears that as soon as a man is part of the team, larger 
shares of the team’s budget are bet on the preferred answer, indicating that men are more 
inclined towards risk than women. 
6.6 CONCLUSIONS AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Drawing on data from a TV quiz show, this paper provides empirical evidence for gender 
differences in high-stakes risk taking and overconfidence. More specifically, among the 
pairs competing for a prize money of up to one million pounds female teams tend to split 
their stakes more often and thus appear to be more risk averse than teams consisting of at 
least one male candidate. Looking at individual decision making within teams it seems that 
men and women do not significantly differ from each other as long as they play in single-
gender teams. In mixed teams, however, men are found to take the initiative twice as often 
as in single-gender teams (while women do not behave differently than men in homogene-
ous teams). Since male “solo-runs” are associated with a lower success rate compared to 
female decision-makers in mixed teams, we attribute this result to the existence of male 
overconfidence. The finding that men tend to overestimate their own ability when facing a 
female partner is in line with Gerdes and Gränsmark (2010) who show that even among 
expert chess players, men ceteris paribus prefer more aggressive (but often suboptimal) 
opening strategies when playing against a female opponent. 
Of course, one has to be careful regarding the generalization of these results because of a 
potential sample selection bias: Game show contestants most likely differ in their charac-
teristics from the general population. Although we have no information on the criteria upon 
which the candidates are selected and invited to the show, it is reasonable to assume that 
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these individuals are, on average, more extrovert, confident and risk loving than individu-
als in a randomly chosen sample. On the other hand, since we are able to find persistent 
gender differences even among highly selected (and presumably less diverse) individuals, 
we rather underestimate the effects with respect to the remaining population. A drawback 
of this study is the limited number of observations at the aggregate (i.e., team) level. In 
order to conduct a more conclusive survival analysis with all variables of interest, more 
observations are needed. In particular, a larger number of female teams would enrich the 
dataset and allow for a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of team success. How-
ever, considering the already mentioned rule changes of the game show (see chapter 6.3) it 
is no longer possible to make additional and comparable observations of the “traditional” 
format. Nevertheless, the new format (which features teams of four candidates and a lot-
tery after the penultimate question) opens avenues for future research. In particular, one 
could analyze the behavior of both men and women in single-gender, (fe)male-dominated 
as well as equally represented teams. 
Our findings have important managerial implications as they highlight situations in which 
individual decisions might lead to outcomes that are suboptimal for the group. One mecha-
nism to reduce overconfidence and to encourage less confident individuals to actively en-
gage in the decision-making process in the business context is to measure and evaluate the 
impact of individual decisions. Objective (and relative) performance measures that are 
made accessible to all employees could serve as an incentive for inherently risk averse but 
indeed productive agents. This would of course presuppose manageable monitoring and 
measurement costs that need to be amortized through efficiency gains. 
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7 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
This dissertation provides an economic analysis of individual behavior in competitive envi-
ronments, with a particular focus on real-life tournaments. Drawing on data from various 
sports contests as well as a high-stakes TV quiz show, the present work makes several (in-
novative) contributions to the existing research by examining very specific and so far ne-
glected (or even completely ignored) labor markets and peculiar competitive situations. In 
the first part of this work (chapters 2 and 3), the career determinants of professional ski 
jumpers and – at best semi-professional – referees who are active in the highest divisions 
of German association football are analyzed. Part 2 (chapters 4-6) focuses on gender dif-
ferences in competitive environments. These competitive environments range from long-
distance endurance races to professional European team sports as well as situations in 
which pairs of candidates have to answer knowledge-based questions in a limited amount 
of time and in the presence of exceptionally high stakes.  
The empirical evidence presented in the respective chapters is mostly in line with the relat-
ed literature. Nevertheless, some of the results are rather surprising and might be attributed 
to the peculiarities of the competition. Professional ski jumpers, for example, seem to have, 
on average, similar career lengths as professional athletes in other – “equally demanding” – 
sports. This is surprising insofar as ski jumping is still considered a “niche” sport with 
comparably little “money” involved. On the face of it, one would expect that only the top 
athletes, who regularly perform well in the competitions and benefit from both on-site 
prize money and additional income from lucrative endorsement contracts, are able to “sur-
vive” on the circuit over a longer period of time. Less talented athletes, on the other hand, 
should be better off falling back on their “outside options”. That is, rational individuals 
who fail to succeed in a sports career should choose a more secure and permanent em-
ployment (perhaps in a different industry), concomitant with a guaranteed income. Howev-
er, the opposite seems to be true. The fact that even less successful athletes tend to stay in 
the “business” for an extended period of time is most probably due to the peculiar nature of 
the sports industry, which will be elaborated in the following. 
One of the distinctive features of professional sports competitions is that these usually rep-
resent winner-takes-all markets where marginal differences in talent translate into consid-
erable differences in earnings (Rosen 1981). This so-called superstar theory has been com-
plemented by Adler (1985) who identifies an individual’s popularity (rather than mere tal-
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ent) as an integral component of success. The “popularity factor”, in turn, fosters the al-
ready mentioned additional earnings opportunities in the form of endorsement contracts, 
television appearances and the like. Hence, unlike “traditional” labor markets where mar-
ginal differences in talent, ability or productivity lead to significant differences in earnings 
at the top level (e.g. CEOs earn significantly more than employees at the top management 
level) that are, however, limited to direct income such as fixed salaries and bonus pay-
ments, the labor market for individual professional athletes appears to offer two (comple-
mentary) “winner’s prizes”: a) a significantly higher regular income from e.g. prize money 
and, b) additional income from the commercial exploitation of the individual athlete’s 
popularity. These positive network externalities of popularity have been facilitated by the 
ongoing professionalization and medialization of sports (see, inter alia, Borghans and 
Groot 1998; Franck and Nüesch 2012; Deutscher et al. 2012).102 Another peculiarity of the 
sports industry is that professional athletes have usually made investments into very specif-
ic human capital which prohibits them from selecting into an alternative and perhaps relat-
ed field of work. Thus, the transferability of skills appears to be relatively low among pro-
fessional athletes. As an example, a professional ski jumper is likely to fail or at least face 
considerable income losses when attempting to pursue a career as a downhill or cross-
country skier. An engineer, on the other hand, may even benefit from a professional 
change into e.g. the field of financial analysis. 
This might explain why even less talented individuals who are active in a niche sport strive 
to pursue their sporting career for as long as possible: The option value of a potential future 
career breakthrough heavily outweighs the expected income from a supposedly more “se-
cure” outside option. This is particularly true as (former) “superstars” in the ski jumping 
World Cup are found to be, ceteris paribus, less threatened by competitive pressure and, 
thus, can expect significantly longer careers than athletes who have failed to win a major 
individual title so far. Another idiosyncratic feature of the ski jumping World Cup is that 
the level of competitive pressure varies dramatically from one national federation to the 
other and is, at the same time, easily observable and quantifiable for the econometrician. 
On the basis of these data, it was possible to examine individual professional careers in the 
same industry but at different “employers” (i.e., national federations). Although it is diffi-
cult to generalize the obtained results to other industries, they are of pivotal importance for 
                                               
102 It should be noted that the superstar phenomenon is not exclusively “reserved” for professional athletes. 
Among others, it is particularly the music industry that offers very similar conditions for “superstardom”, as 
prominently indicated by e.g. Krueger (2005) as well as Connolly and Krueger (2006). 
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the actors in this specific market. Athletes holding a dual citizenship, for example, should 
carefully weigh the presumably better training opportunities in a rather strong national fed-
eration against the potential career setbacks resulting from the increased competitive pres-
sure. After all, it could be more beneficial for the individual athlete to start for a weaker 
national federation.103  
Another very specific institutional environment that has been investigated in the course of 
this work is the labor market for referees in German association football. A perhaps unique 
characteristic of referees active in any major sports is that despite their comparably low 
(and often solely match-based) income, their performance is frequently monitored by tens 
of thousands of spectators in the stadia and, not to forget, an almost unrestricted number of 
TV viewers. Given this close to perfect monitoring, a referee’s reputation is likely to be 
heavily impacted by his performance in one direction or the other. These reputation effects, 
in turn, might serve as an ideal substitute for the provision of performance based short-
term incentives which, in effect, appear to be nonexistent in the case of German football 
referees. On the other hand, carefully designed long-term incentives in the form of individ-
ual promotions for the best performing referees are found to be a potent measure to foster 
consistently good refereeing performance. Along these lines, the hypotheses and economic 
predictions derived from tournament theory are perfectly suited to explain the nexus be-
tween incentives, performance and individual career outcomes even in a very unique com-
petitive environment. 
The second part of this work has focused on gender differences in (again) very specific 
competitive environments. Although the distinctive chapters shed light on different aspects 
in the field of gender economics, the empirical evidence broadly supports the notion that 
gender differences in competition cannot be (solely) explained by inherent differences but 
are influenced by the institutional setting. As has been demonstrated on the example of 
long-distance endurance athletes, changing socio-cultural conditions may well lead to a 
reduction of the performance gender gap over time. These results are in line with Frick 
                                               
103 Note that only one athlete in our sample in fact switches citizenship during his active career. It may well 
be that more athletes change their nationality before turning professional. Since we only observe athletes who 
have managed to win World Cup points, information on “early switchers” is not available. Yet, similar con-
siderations are likely to be made by e.g. professional football players possessing a dual nationality. In par-
ticular “marginal” players (i.e., players who have uncertain prospects of qualifying for a strong national 
team) could improve their chances by choosing to play for the presumably weaker national team. Since a 
player’s market value is positively correlated with the number of international caps (see e.g. Frick 2007 as 
well as Battré and Höhmann 2011), opting for the weaker nation could maximize the expected individual 
income in the long term.     
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(2011a, 2011b). What is new in the present context is that particularly less talented, recrea-
tional athletes who finish well beyond the “money ranks” seem to respond to changing 
socio-cultural conditions, while (direct) monetary incentives cannot explain this behavior.  
Yet, looking at professional team sports, incentives do seem to play a major role in attract-
ing (female) talent. As the underlying research indicates, typically male-dominated organi-
zations such as professional football teams appear to be relatively homogeneous in the case 
of men’s leagues. In contrast, women’s leagues are characterized by a considerably more 
uneven distribution of talent. Hence, women’s football leagues are less balanced and sup-
posedly less appealing to the fans than men’s leagues. Using Rottenberg’s (1956) uncer-
tainty of outcome hypothesis to explain the enormous discrepancy between the demands 
for men’s football on the one hand and for women’s football on the other, would be evi-
dently too simplistic and misleading. Nevertheless, the obvious disparity in demand causes 
a tremendous gender pay gap that deters talented females to pursue a professional career in 
this specific environment. It will be interesting to see whether professional female football 
players become relatively more competitive in response to perhaps increasing incentives in 
the not too distant future. Subsequent research should also focus on other, more gender 
equal sports. A first attempt has been made in this work by focusing on the German hand-
ball league, with the results pointing in the expected direction: A less pronounced gender 
pay gap is associated with similarly balanced men’s and women’s competitions. Given the 
limited scope of the analysis, it is (as of yet) not possible to generalize these results. There-
fore, further research is required to test the robustness of the results. 
Finally, the empirical evidence on gender differences in high-stakes decision making sug-
gests that team composition has a statistically significant impact on individual behavior. 
Most notably, men appear to be overly prone to act as sole decision-makers when “cooper-
ating” with a female team partner. Controlling for the outcomes of each decision, it has 
been argued that male overconfidence is likely to explain the observed gender differences 
in mixed teams. Moreover, in single-gender environments women are found to be more 
risk averse than men (albeit these differences do not seem to affect the teams’ expected 
profit). These results support the general tenor that men and women (still) differ in their 
competitive behavior. An interesting insight emerging from the present research is that the 
commonly acknowledged behavioral differences seem to hold true even for highly selected 
individuals who are presumably less diverse with respect to personality traits such as self-
awareness, self-confidence, risk behavior and the like. 
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In conclusion, the evidence and implications discussed in this work provide exciting in-
sights in the fields of personnel, labor and sports economics and point out avenues for fu-
ture research. Given the peculiar nature of the institutional settings examined in the respec-
tive analyses, a generalization of the results is undeniably difficult. Hence, one could ob-
ject that the present investigations suffer from the same shortcomings as “insider econo-
metric” studies (see chapter 1). On the other hand, this type of research offers an innova-
tive and complementary rather than substitutable approach that allows examining whether 
generally accepted results and theoretical considerations can also explain individual behav-
ior and economic relationships in very specific environments.  
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